5. (c) The similarity of the planning and the collection of the missions given to the 
FMs tend to indicate that the FM who were infiltrated are planning 
response and prepared position vis-a-vis their perception to IV or a pre-
power exchange between the VC, SVN, the NLP, and IVN.

6. (d) Requirements Partially Satisfied: SIGN U-044-3463. Collection 
an action continues.

7. (d) Source Disposition: Sources have no further interest of air int-
lelligence interest, and exploitation has been terminated. All 25 FMs remain 
at the PLEIKU FM Facility for an indefinite period of time.
The report contains information developed from a coordinated series of interrogations conducted by a USAF interrogator. The purpose of these interrogations was to determine the reason why NVA soldiers refuse to return to NVA when given the opportunity. Included in this report are the responses given by NVA and VC who were interviewed in answer to a series of standardized questions that were presented to them.
The PNU TAI PW facility for at least a year, but efforts were also made to select some PWs who had recently been captured. The grade structure of the selected PWs gave a representative sample and ranged from mid-lieutenant (the ranking PW held) to private. The group of PWs who were interviewed had spent an average of 16.4 months in captivity. Sources were interviewed separately and in the order listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Length of Time in PW Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPC</td>
<td>OCT 1970 (10 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse (Female)</td>
<td>JUL 1970 (11 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC</td>
<td>APR 1970 (15 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC</td>
<td>AUG 1970 (13 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>APR 1971 (4 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC (Female)</td>
<td>SEP 1968 (35 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>OCT 1970 (10 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>JUN 1970 (10 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC (Female)</td>
<td>FEB 1971 (6 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVT</td>
<td>APR 1970 (15 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPL</td>
<td>DEC 1970 (9 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVT</td>
<td>APR 1970 (15 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVT</td>
<td>FEB 1970 (18 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC</td>
<td>OCT 1970 (10 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSGT</td>
<td>MAR 1970 (16 Months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC (Female)</td>
<td>NOV 1966 (57 Months)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Circumstances of Acquisition: The interviews were conducted in an attempt to determine why the NVA PWs might refuse to return to NVA when given the opportunity to do so. At the PNU TAI facility, each of the 20 PWs were asked the following list of questions when interviewed:

a. Is there an NVA/WG organization active in PW camps in South Vietnam?

b. How widespread is this organization?

   (1) In how many camps have you observed this organization?
   (2) Does this organization exist in all compounds?

c. How effective does this organization control the PWs?

   (1) How is discipline enforced? Give examples.
   (2) What acts has this organization made PWs do against their will?

d. What are the objectives of this organization?

   (1) Are these objectives decided locally, or communicated from outside the camp? If so, how?
   (2) Have these objectives changed? If so, how?
   (3) How is the organization attempting to fulfill its objectives?

  e. Who are the leaders of the organization?

    (1) Are all the leaders party members?
    (2) Are all the leaders officers?
    (3) How are the leaders chosen?
    (4) How do the leaders reach decisions?

    (5) How does rank structure affect who will be the leader in the organization?

f. Has the organization attempted to subvert guards or other camp personnel? If so, how?
g. How do the leaders communicate their decisions to the other officers?

h. Is there any contact with persons outside the camp? If so, how?

i. Is there contact between different FW camp compounds?

j. Does the organization differ between NVA and VC compounds?

k. Did the organization limit FWs not to go back to the border lands in June? At any time? If so, what reasons were given for this order?

(1) What effect has the NLF program had on this organization?

3. Responses Given by NVA/FWs:

a. All sixteen NVA/FWs questioned (one female, 15 male) denied that any organization whatsoever existed among the NVA. All claimed that they disapproved of the repatriation to North Vietnam until such time as there would be a general exchange of prisoners between combatants, and until progress was made to restore all to the camps. When asked whether they could, in any way, cooperate with this answer, all NVA/FWs replied that they could, and at this conclusion through individual thought. FW number 2, for example, replied to the series of questions with the same argument as those given by the man. She had been kept segregated from the main compound for two months of captivity, and had not been allowed to talk to others even when serving in the work areas. FW number 4 stated that he would not return to North Vietnam at this time but would return to the NLF if released. FW number 11 stated that he had been treated very well and would not go back to North Vietnam until there was an exchange of FWs between the US and North Vietnam. When told that he was an ARVN FW, he stated that he was a US FW and cannot be exchanged by any means except the US. FW number 13 stated that he would return to North Vietnam unless the exchange of FWs occurred between the US and the NLF. FWs number 15 and number 19 stated that they would not accept repatriation if the exchange occurred between North and South Vietnam.

b. Three FWs stated that if they accepted repatriation unilaterally they could not return to their homes, since they felt that they would be treated as traitors and would not be accepted by their governments. Most NVA/FWs believed that their government would refuse to accept them until the war is ended and an exchange of prisoners occurs.

c. When the FWs were asked who gave them their instructions not returning to NWH (1) until the war is concluded, (2) that they were not exchanged, and (3) there is peace between North and South Vietnam, all FWs stated that they had reached their conclusions individually. Individual questions about camp organization or camp leaders. In all cases, NVA/FWs answered that an organization among the FWs did not exist.

4. Responses Given by VC/FWs:

The questions in para 2 were slightly modified for VC causes. It was made to determine if the hard core VC cadre were in

captives refusing repatriation and OCHUS and status.

a. Of the four VC/FWs interviewed, three were females who had little
Collecting data will not only aid in the control of the spread of diseases but also help to identify and recruit individuals for future research. This information will be used to develop new strategies for controlling the disease.

In their recent study, researchers found that the disease spread more rapidly in areas with poor sanitation. However, they also noted that the disease spread more slowly in areas with better sanitation.

The researchers also found that the disease spread more rapidly in areas with a higher population density. However, they also noted that the disease spread more slowly in areas with a lower population density.

In conclusion, the disease spread more rapidly in areas with poor sanitation and a higher population density. However, the disease spread more slowly in areas with better sanitation and a lower population density.

In short, the disease spread more rapidly in areas with poor sanitation and a higher population density. However, the disease spread more slowly in areas with better sanitation and a lower population density.
Captured are not held as FWs in compliance with the Geneva Conventions.

In any case, discrepancies are obvious grist for critics' mill. Request Embassy MACV further thoughts this problem. Also request text or substance MACV press briefing mentioned para 3 ref A.

2. Ref B advises discrepancy due to release detainees prior to classification as FWs. This leads us to believe that report Ref C of 1914 VC prisoners and 5,525 suspects probably misleading. Presumably US/GVN holds far fewer than 1,914 FWs as a result II corps operation against 610th Division. If high percentage released, should they have been described as prisoners in the first place? This aspect prisoner problem particularly important in view that high rate of prisoner capture cited as major indicator progress of war. Are MACV cumulative prisoner totals adjusted to account for those released?

3. Ref D explains that only 27 of 251 prisoners initially determined to be VCC/NVA detained as FWs. What explains major difference between original determination that 251 are VCC/NVA ultimate determination that only 27 entitled FW status under MACV directive? Ref D also states 224 returned to district. Is return followed by GVN detention in some cases, or are all released outright? Are VCC/NVA being released because of shortage detention facilities? What becomes of civil defendants not entitled FW status? Is there any reason to be concerned that persons who should
Who should be detained as FWS are still being put into national or provincial jails? Also, what disposition made of thirteen wounded cited in para 1 B of Ref D?

4. Are some NVN/VCC piped off into interrogation channels not mentioned in Ref D? If so, request details. What happens to them after interrogation? Specifically, are those entitled to FW status who undergo longer interrogation eventually sent to FW camps?

5. We informed Jean Pictet, principal legal adviser ICRG and editor official ICRG commentary Geneva Conventions intends visit Viet-Nam shortly and can be expected interest self in similar questions.

GP-1.
NOT LISTED ON THE ROSTER OF THOSE RELEASED/REPLACED AND MUST BE
PRESUMED TO STILL BE IN RVN CUSTODY.
1. REQUEST CLARIFICATION AS TO CURRENT STATUS/DISPOSITION
OF THE ABOVE US CAPTURED ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR BE PROVIDED "N.C." 29 APR IN ORDER
TO MEET REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF THIS OFFICE.

BT 92699

ANNOTES
RM

REF A IS 97875
REF B IS 98376
REF C AND D NOT IDENTIFIED

IN 51694

ACTION

FO 10-4 x00-1 x02-2

5/2205649898/9877

5/22205263/9877

ACTION

DINH GUB(81) DJB(83) BJGB(83) JS(83) JS(84) JS(84) NMCC BEGDBF(84)

DINH DEPI AB-machine(81) ASDI(81) ASDICOMP(81) ASDI PA(81) GOS(81)

DIAA DIAI(81) NMCC CMC CIEA

CNDIEH DC

CRAIN DC

NMCC PONT RITCHIE MD

FILE(1)

(6/47)

TRAN 917528075/2282822/986128075/98418

928075/228272 MAR 74

FK CINC PAC HONOLULU HD

TO RUSKHUM/DA WASHDC

INFO RUBI/USD/JS WASHDC

NMCC/USDA SAISON VI

RUCKHTA/CORPS/SCON FT MCPHERSON GA

RUSHNO/AMEND SAISON VI

RUSOPI/60 2BD USPH/CHIC FT MEADE HD

BT 1/11/74 SENDS

ACCOUNTING FOR U.S. CAPTURED ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (EPM)

A. CONewater 928075 MAR 73

B. DA 141796Z FEB 74

C. CINC PAC 928072 MAR 74

D. ALL REMAINING U.S. CAPTURED EPM HAVE BEEN RELEASED. ROSTERS

E. HAVE BEEN NAILED.

2. ONE U.S. CAPTURED PW (NGUYEN MINH DON) OPTED FOR THE GN;

GE 928075

ANNOTES

RM 318

PAGE 2

NNNN 2884122
FORT KMADB, MD REFLECTS THAT AT LEAST 48 US CAPTURED ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (POWs) REMAIN IN DETENTION. THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

1. The report includes information on the release of 24 prisoners (NPI) on the occasion of the New Year, Christmas, and other major holidays. The report also includes information on the release of 10 prisoners from November 1, 1979, to December 31, 1979.

2. Two prisoners were released on November 13 and 14, 1979.

3. The report does not include information on the release of any prisoners in January 1979.

4. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

5. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

6. The report also includes a list of prisoners who remain in custody, along with their dates of capture and other relevant information.

7. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

8. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

9. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

10. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

11. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

12. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

13. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

14. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

15. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

16. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

17. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

18. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

19. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

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21. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

22. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

23. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

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25. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

26. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

27. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

28. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

29. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

30. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

31. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

32. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

33. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

34. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

35. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

36. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

37. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

38. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.

39. The report notes that the US government has kept some prisoners of war in custody longer than the agreed-upon timeframe.

40. The report includes a list of prisoners who have been released, along with their dates of release and other relevant information.
AFI: 60750, Z INFO: X001-2, X00-3, X00-1, IN-3, PR-1, X00-2, X00-1, (44)

VZ2CCAF61
CSAF
ACTION J1(J3)
DISTRICT JCS DJCS JSJS(03) JSJ(02) NMCC J31(04) SICDIP(07) ASDI15A(09)
ASDICOMP(01) SADHMA(01) ASDIPA(01)
CSA
CSAP
CMR
CMC DIA(28) MCC FILE(1)
(232)

ADV DIST RH HNMSWA #7780 3048730
ZNY ZUI RUEKJCS8635 3991330 ZDK RH HNMSWA
(2) 38242402 cpl-75

FM CONUSMACV
TO RUEKJCS/JCS
RH KAC/CINCPAC
RHNGA/CINCPAC
RHNGA/CINCPACFLY
RHNGG/CINCPACAF
RHMPA/CSG FMFPAC
(8)

SUBJECT: ACCOUNTING FOR ENEMY MISSING-IN-ACTION (EMIA) PERSONNEL REFERENCE:

A. JCS 4712/8915922 SEP 71
B. CINCPAC 1594372 SEP 71
C. CONUSMACV 2707272 SEP 71
D. GENELVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD, 12 AUGUST 1949
E. GENELVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, 12 AUGUST 1949
F. DIRECTIVE NO. 7695/OP/VP C, DATED 22 AUGUST 1963, PUBLISHED BY MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MOD), REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, SUBJECT: HAJE AND BURIAL SERVICES


REPLY BY CONUSMACV TO JCS WITH EMPHASIS ON DOCUMENTATION THAT CONTAINS THE ENTIRE APPROACH TO EMIA PROBLEM, REF G IS CONUSMACV RESPONSE TO REF A AND B. AS THOSE REF PERTAIN TO US FORCES ONLY, REF D AND E ARE GENEA CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS FOR TREATMENT OF WOUNDED, SICK, AND DECEASED ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND PRISONERS OF WAR. REF F AND G ARE ONLY KNOWN GVN GUIDANCE TO ITS FORCES ON THIS MATTER. THIS PROVIDES RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS AS THEY PERTAIN TO GVN FORCES ONLY

1. RESPONSES ARE KEPT TO PARAGRAPHS OF REF A.

A. PARA 1A: NEITHER REF F NOR REF G QUOTES GVN FORCES TO MAKE EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY ENEMY DEAD PRIOR TO BURIAL. TO MAINTAIN RECORDS, IN ACTUAL PRACTICE GVN FORCES MAKE VIRTUALLY NO EFFORTS TO TRANSIT/IDENTIFY ENEMY DEAD OR TO MAINTAIN RECORDS. GVN AUTHORITIES CITE THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS REGARD:

(1) NORTH VIETNAM DENIES THE PRESENCE OF ITS FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
(2) IN ALMOST ALL CASES, ENEMY BODIES BEAR NO IDENTIFYING
MATTER. BODIES ARE SEARCHED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ONLY.
B. PARA 1B: REF F STATES IN PART I "ENEMY CORPSES WILL BE BURI-
ED IN A SEPARATE CEMETERY, OR AREA TO FACILITATE THE TRANSFER OF RE-
SPONSIBILITIES OF CARE TO THE COUNTRY OF THE DECEASED WHEN THE WAR IS OVER." IN PRACTICE, GVN FORCES RARELY BURY ENEMY DEAD, IN THE FEW INSTANCES WHERE GVN FORCES HAVE BURIED ENEMY REMAINS, ALMOST NO RECORDS WERE KEPT. THE MAJORITY OF THESE BURIALS WERE IN MASS GRAVES AND WERE ACCOMPLISHED HASTILY IN THE INTEREST OF SANITATION, IDENT-
ITIES OF PERSONS SO BURIED ARE RARELY KNOWN AND ALMOST NEVER RECOR-
DED GRAVE SITES ARE NOT MARKED.

A. PARA 1C: REF G IMPLIES THAT CREMATION IS AUTHORIZED, NEITHER REF F NOR REF G CONTAINS GUIDANCE CONCERNING DISPOSITION OF ASHES, CREMATION IS PRACTICED ON OCCASION, ASHES ARE NOT RETAINED.

B. PARA 1D:

(1) QUESTION 11 GVN MILITARY FORCES/OTHER GVN AGENCIES DO NOT MAINTAIN A CENTRAL REGISTRY OF IDENTIFIED ENEMY DEAD.
(2) QUESTION 12 RALLYING FROM US/GVN SOURCES ARE PROCESSED THROUGH PROVINCE CHIEU HOI CENETER UNDER THE "OPEN ARMS" PROGRAM. THE CENTRAL REGISTRY FOR THESE EMIA IS MAINTAINED BY GVN MINISTRY OF CHIEU HOI AND THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMAND (COMPUTERIZED LISTING) CONTAIN A REGISTRY OF THOSE CRIMINALLY PROCEESSED.

A. PARA 1E OTHER PROCEDURE IN EFFECT WHICH COULD ASSIST US/ GVN AUTHORITIES IN SUBSEQUENTLY ACCOUNTING FOR ENEMY PERSONNEL LISTED BY THE OTHER SIDE AS A MISSING ARE.

(1) RECORDS OF INTERROGATIONS OF PRISONERS ARE MAINTAINED BY VARIOS GVN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

AP IN: 3250 20 DEC 66 V/wht
AP DIST: XOPX-3 RDP-3 RFOS-1 NIN-4 (12)
CALL 53337 FOR NPGC/MC SERVICE
K2 I 20 532

P. 2115426.0V/US 66
FM CHNSY
TO RHL/HQ/CINCAP
INFO RNCH/SECSTATE
RHEA/ JCS
RUF/FGV/US MISSION GENEVA

SUBJ: VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PRISONERS

REF A: JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MSG 35164, DTG 862224Z OCT 66
B: CHNSY MSG 49535, DTG 281318Z OCT 66
C: SECSTATE MSG 179571, DTG 85488Z NOV 66
D: CHNSY MSG 48234, DTG 84922Z NOV 66

1. THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POISED IN REFERENCE C.

REFERENCE FROM THE NATURE AND TYPE MILITARY OPERATION

IS THE BASIC FACTOR FOR CONSIDERATION. IN Binh Dinh province, a
HEAVILY POPULATED AREA LONG UNDER VC CONTROL, ALL INHABITANTS WERE
UNDER SUSPICION WITH RESPECT TENDING TO CLASSIFY INITIAL, ALL
POSSIBLY HOSTILE ELEMENTS AS VC. REASONABLE REQUIREMENT FOR DETAINES SAFTY
POTENTIALLY HOSTILE ELEMENTS AS VC. REQUIREMENT FOR DETAINES SAFETY
WHILE IN US CUSTODY. IN STRUCTURED CLASSIFICATION, 8 ACCOMPLISHED RAPIDLY AT FORWARD SCREENING POINTS.
CLASSIFICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED AFTER WELCOME VISITS TO SCREEN OUT THOSE HAVING INFORMATION OF
RELATIVE JOBS IN HOSTILE WORK, SPECIAL IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING OUT
IMMEDIATE TACTICAL VALUE AND EASY IDENTIFICATION. THE BASIC PROBLEM IN PROCESSING LARGE NAG
POSSIBLE ELEMENTS AS VC. REQUIREMENT FOR DETAINES SAFTY

US/CHNSY INTERROGATOR/CARL TRANSLATOR PERSONNEL UTILIZED FOR DETAINES
SCREENING. AS A CONSEQUENCE, INITIAL CLASSIFICATION OF VC INCLUDING
ELEMENTS WHO DID NOT NECESSARILY QUALIFY FOR PR STATUS. FINAL CLASSIFICATION IS DETERMINED ONLY AFTER DETAILED INTERROGATION. THE POINT
MUST BE MADE THAT FIRST RIPPED REPORTS AND FIRST DETAILED INTERROGATIONS
ARE ACCOMPLISHED AT DIVISION/brigade INTERROGATION CENTERS.
ACTION BEING TAKEN TO OVERCOME SHORTAGE OF QUALIFIED VIETNAMESE
SPEAKING US INTERROGATOR/CARL TRANSLATOR PERSONNEL AS EXPERIENCED IN THIS

(NOV 66)

INFO: CJCJ-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-1 JS-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC-1
SECGF-7 ASD/ISA-7 ASD/P-1 WHOUSE-4 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2
CSAF-1 CGC-6 FILE-1(60)CA/DBT

PAGE 1 OF 2
OPERATION. FURTHER, DETAINED PERSONNEL IN FUTURE WILL BE REFERRED TO AS DETAINED PERSONNEL IN FUTURE WILL BE REFERRED TO AS DETAINABLE PERSONNEL. ONCE DETAINED PERSONNEL ARE TAKEN TO GVN CIVIL AUTHORITIES FOR TRIAL, RETURNS RELEASED TO GVN CIVIL AUTHORITIES FOR TRANSFERRING TO CHIEF Ho Chi Minh AND DEMO CIVILIAN OR OTHER CIVILIAN RELEASED FOR RETURN TO PLACE OF CAPTURE. NO PWS WERE RELEASED TO DISTRICT MATES. THOSE DETERMINED TO BE PWS (27) WERE EVACUATED TO PH CAMP. DETENTION FACILITIES ARE NO SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AT THIS TIME. IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLISHED DIRECTIVES, AVAILABILITY OF PH CAMPS IN EACH CORPS AREA AND DETAINABLE PERSONNEL ARE TAKEN TO GVN MEDICAL CHANNELS FOR TREATMENT. FINAL DISPOSITION WILL BE DETERMINED BY INTERROGATION AND CLASSIFICATION AS MEDICAL CONDITION PERMITS.

3. NO NVA/VCC PWS WERE "STIPHENFORT" INTO INTERROGATION CHANNELS. PWS WERE INTERROGATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MACV DIRECTIVES 92-3 AND 58-11 AND ACCOUNTABILITY MAINTAINED. PWS WHO UNDERGO EXTENDED INTERROGATION ARE EVACUATED TO THE COMBINED MILITARY INTERROGATION CENTER (CMIC) OR THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (NIC) IN SAIGON AS PROVIDED FOR IN MACV DIRECTIVES. IN ALL CASES, THOSE INDIVIDUALS TREATED TO PH CAMP STATUS WERE SENT TO PH CAMP AFTER INTERROGA-

ATION WAS COMPLETED.

4. REFERENCE OUTLINES TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES PRESENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS TO REDUCE CONFUSION AND IMPROVE ACCURACY IN REPORTING OF DETAINED PERSONNEL.

AMEND, SAIGON, CONCURS, GP-4

BY

NNNN

REF A IS 52203
REF B IS IDENTIFIED
REF C IS BOX 200 (J1)
REF D IS 11005
ADV CY NMCC

PAGE 2 OF 2

45407
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

F IN: 51906 (4 Nov 66) A/a
F DIST: XOPX-1, NIN-4, XPD-3, SAF-OS-3, FDC-2 (14)
S
G
S P
S A H L
S C
S M S
S I N I S
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S D O D
S T A
S S C

STATE 79707

TO: DOD FROM: MAR

REF: State 53333 (CONGSAV 44667)

CINC PAG

CONSHAV

There continues to be high level interest here in achieving greater forward movement on the POW problem. As you have recognized, one major aspect of the problem is to be sure that adequate facilities to handle increased number of the POWs and other captives are being planned and constructed on realistic time schedule. We note from referenced CONSHAV message that replies to questions posed in refdeletal which bear on this aspect problem (Para B and E) would be provided beginning November 1. Since we have not yet received answers and in view urgency move about this sector POW question, request Mission Council's recommendations in this matter ASAP. BOD concurs.

END

RUSK

IN: 15984 (5 Nov 66) H/bgt
DIST: XOPX-1, NIN-4, XPD-3, SAF-OS-3

ACTION: Ambassy SAIGON

INFO: USMission GENEVA

CINC PAC

CONSHAV

STATE 79757

CINC PAC FOR POLAD

REF: A - Saigon 9100
    B - Saigon 9138
    C - Saigon 9305, page 7, para 3
    D - CONSHAV 44623/2013182
    E - CINC PAC 3119322

1. Concur Ref E. Believe practice reporting persons later released as QUOTE VC captured QUOTE leaves confusing impression that persons who should be detained are released or that persons entitled P W status under Geneva Convention are not held as POWs.

Statistical aspect problem particularly important in view fact that high rate of prisoners captured cited as major indicator progress of war. Are IN SF cumulative prisoner totals (e.g. Ref C released report 1,914 VC captured) adjusted to account for those/
2. We hesitate burden you with additional questions, which are suggested by your helpful responses to our previous messages, but would greatly assist our understanding of this subject if we had clearer idea of certain aspects of prisoner situation. For example, Ref D reports that only 27 of 251 detainees personnel initially determined to be VCC/NVA are now held as PWs, and that 224 returned to District. What explains large discrepancy between original and final determination? Is return followed by GVH detention in some cases, or are all released outright, or is ultimate disposition unknown? Are VCC/NVA being released because of shortage detention facilities? Is there any reason to be concerned that persons who should be detained as PWs are still being put into national or provincial jails? What disposition was made of thirteen wounded cited in para 1 B of Ref D and what status (e.g. PW, returnee, civilian, and so forth) do they have?

3. Are some NVA/VCC siphoned off into interrogation channels not mentioned in Ref D? If so, request details. What happens to them after interrogation? Specifically, are those entitled to PW status who undergo longer interrogation eventually sent to PW camps?
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

AP 17:55

AP IN:  50932 (5 Nov 66) A/27

AP DIST:  JAG-1, NRH-7, XPD-4, SAPOS-3, IIS-1, ISF-2, 
ISO-1, NPFX-2, SMS-1 (23)

SVC TO 1 7 8 0 4

CALL 53337

FOR NHCC/HC

SERVICE

K 05 06:572

GR 233 FRO:  MACJ1

SUBJ: VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PRISONERS OF WAR

REF:  A.  CONUS MACJ1 59422, DTG 2113Z OCT 66
B.  NHCC 918, DTG 2345Z OCT 66

1.  RECENT NEWS REPORTS AND MESSAGES INDICATE CONFUSION IN

APPLICATION OF TERMS ON CAPTURED PRISONERS AND PRISONERS OF WAR.

2.  A REFEREE TO APPEAR OF THE GROUP OF 386 REPORTED PRISONERS TAKEN

EARLY ON 27 PM WHICH P

VALUED A FINAL TAKE OF ONLY 27 PMS.  REF B

CITED STATISTICS IN UP NEWS RELEASE, WASHINGTON, 22 OCTOBER 1966,

INDICATING "HORRIBLE INCREASE IN OCTOBER PRISONER OF WAR TOTALS" IN

REFERRING TO REFEREE OPERATION.

3.  FIGURES TO DATE SHOW NUMBER OF CAPTURED PERSONNEL TAKEN IN

COMBINED OPERATIONS INCLUDING US OF IRVING, ARRIVAL 8888 AND

ROW-FAM NO 6 AS 7,477.  OF THIS NUMBER, 1,776 WERE REPORTED AS

VC CAPTIVES AND 5,728 AS VC SUSPECTS.  US CAPTURED ALONE TOTALLED

6,476.  HOWEVER, TO DATE ONLY 218 PMS FROM THESE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN

RECEIVED AT 517 CSIC PM CAMP.  A FURTHER REEVALUATION OF THE US STATIS-

ICS INCLUDING THE 4,826 DETAINES TAKEN BY THE 1ST CAV DIV REVEALED

THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN:  INNOCENT CIVILIANS - 1,287;  CIVIL DEFENDENTS-

569;  PRISONERS - 956;  PW - 195.  STILL UNRECORDED PROCEEDING - 2,415

AF ORG TEAM IS ANALYZING THE RESULTS OF THE OPERATION TO INSURE

PROPER ACCOUNTABILITY OF ALL CAPTIVES.

4.  THE OPERATIONS ARE ON THE PARTS OF UNIDENTIFIED PERSONNEL.

TO CALL ALL CAPTURED PERSONNEL PR PH PRIOR TO PROCESSING AND CLASSIFI-

ATION RESULTS IN CONFUSION IN TERMINOLOGY AND STATISTICS.  MACV POSI-

TIONS THAT ALL CAPTURED PERSONNEL WILL BE REFERRED TO AS DETAINES,

BEGINNING AT THE POINT OF CAPTURE, AS THEY ARE PROCESSED TO THE REAR

(NOVM-66)

INFO:  CJCS-1 JDS-3 SJCS-1 J1-1 J3-8 SACSA-3 SECDEF-7 ASDF/ISA-7
ASDF/PA-1 DIA-15 CSA-1 CON-2 CSAF-1 CMC-6 FILE-1 (57) ROL/AB

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MESSAGE CENTER

THEY ARE FURTHER CLASSIFIED IN APPLICABLE CATEGORIES AS INNOCENT CIVILIANS, CIVIL DEFENDANTS, ETC., AND DISPOSED OF ACCORDINGLY UNDER AN ACCOUNTING SYSTEM NOW IN EFFECT. FINAL CLASSIFICATION AS PM IS DETERMINED AT DIV/SEP BDE COLLECTING POINT.

4. ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO DEFINE THE SYSTEM FURTHER TO INSURE DETAINES ARE CLASSIFIED AND REPORTED BY CORRECT DESIGNATION, MACR DIRECTIVES 19B-3 ON PM HANDLING, AWAITING PUBLICATION, AND 381-21 ON INTELLIGENCE REPORTING, UNDER REVISION, WILL STANDARDIZE TERMINOLOGY ON CLASSIFICATION AND REPORTING OF DETAINES AND PRS.

5. ADOPTION OF STANDARD TERMINOLOGY FOR CATEGORIES OF CAPTURED PERSONNEL BY MILITARY REPORTING AGENCIES AT ALL LEVELS SHOULD REDUCE CONFUSION AND IMPROVE ACCURACY IN REPORTING SUCH PERSONNEL.

GP-4

GT

ADV COPY TO NMCC

REF A IS 80556

REF B IS 84299

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

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R H678
IL-RX324 4883 3841948 AP IN: 423236 (1 Nov 66) F/ad1
K0I 09 392
R 3116625 OCT 66 AP DIST: XPD-4, NIN-7, SASO-3, XOPX-8,
JK-CINCPAC (17)
R 9K016VCC S/5-406
INFO AEVC/SEC STATE VASH DC
KENDA/JCS
KUMR/AN/EMB SAIGON
ST

IDENTIFICATION AND REPORTING OF PRISONERS OF WAR
A. SEC STATE 72350/2116625 OCT 66
B. AEVC/STATE SAIGON 91583/250452 OCT 66 - PASEP
1. AS STATED IN REFERENCE A AND B PUBLIC COMPLAINS AND REPORTS CAN PRESENT A MISLEADING AND/OR DISTORTED PICTURE OF ACTUAL PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED, DETAINED AND PLACED IN PM CORPS.
SINCE CAPTIVES FALL INTO A VARIETY OF CATEGORIES, THEY SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED AND REPORTED APPROPRIATELY. THEY SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS PRISONERS OF WAR ONLY AFTER SUCH STATUS IS CLEARLY DETERMINED.
2. REQUEST ALL PROCEDURES AND REPORTS WHICH IDENTIFY AND REPORT CAPTIVES BE REVISED TO ENSURE ONLY 60% FIVE PRISONERS OF WAR ARE IDENTIFIED AND REPORTED, THEREBY PREVENTING THE RELEASE OF DISTORTED FIGURES BEFORE PROPER SCREENING IS ACCOMPLISHED.
3. REQUEST CINCPAC BE ADVISED IF CLARIFICATION OF FOR TERMINOLOGY WAS GIVEN TO SAIGON PRESS CORPS AS INDICATED IN PARA 3 OF REFERENCE B. GP-4

ST

(9 NOV 66)

INFO: CJCS-1 DJ5-3 SJCS-1 J1-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 SASH-5 SECDEF-7
ASD/ISA-7 DIA-15 ASD/PA-1 CSA-1 CNO-2 CGAF-1 CMC-6 FILE-1 (65)

JH/BBM

REF A IS 80391

REF B IS 84299

ADV CY TO NMCC

PAGE 1 OF 1
INFO: D3-8 J5-2 ASD/ISA-1 SAMMA-1 NMCC-1 DIA-15 CSF-1
SAF-1 CAM-10 CAM-2 3/5/DEP-7
CJCS-1 DJS-3 SACS-3 SACMA-1
SACS-3 SSM-5 ASD/PA-1 GC-1 FILE-1 (71) FE/RAD

REF: A 16 8099175 16 469960 NOT IDENT

51
ADD: DIST: JI-1(72) 1 NOV 66

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SUBJ: VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PRISONERS

1. UP DISPATCH OCT 22 DETALLED WASHINGTON QUOTED "PENTAGON EXPERTS" TO EFFECT THERE HAD BEEN "SHARP INCREASE IN OCTOBER PRISONER OF WAR TOTALS" AND THAT "PRISONER OF WAR TOTALS COULD REACH 2,500 TO 3,000 A MONTH COMPARED TO AVERAGE RATE IN PAST MON 616 HOURS OF LESS THAN 1,000".

2. THIS ESTIMATES NUMBER OF PERSONS DETAINED FOR PROCESSING WITH MUCH LARGER NUMBERS DETERMINED TO BE PRISONERS OF WAR NOT ONLY AS INAPPROPRIATE BUT ALSO MAY WELL CREATE DIFFICULTY IN ACCOUNTING FOR THE "PRISONERS OF WAR," PRESS SAYS WE HOLD, BUT WHO IN FACT HAVE BEEN RELEASED IN COURSE OF PROCESSING. THIS IN TURN COULD PREJUDGE OUR EFFORTS ESTABLISH PRISONER OF WAR STATUS AND SECURE REPATRIATION OF U.S. PERSONNEL CAPTURED BY VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE.

3. 4PM PRESS BRIEFING TODAY WILL ATTEMPT CLARIFY TO SAIGON PRESS CORPS TERMINOLOGY USED FOR CAPTURED, DETAINED, AND PRISONERS OF WAR.

PORTER (OCT 66)

INFO.....CJCS-1 DJS-3 SACS-3 SACMA-1

SACS-3 SSM-5 ASD/PA-1 GC-1 FILE-1 (66) CAM-L

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1229, WHILE THE NUMBER CAUGHT DROPPED FROM 774 TO 686.

2. 1 CTZ. ACTIVITY CONTINUED AT APPROXIMATELY SAME LEVEL AS US MARINES CONTINUED OPERATION PRAIRIE ALONG SOUTHERN DMZ. SINCE OPERATION PRAIRIE STARTED 13 AUG 66, ENEMY HAS LOST 1175 KIA

BUT ONLY FIVE CAPTURED. THIS LOW CAPTURE RATIO MAY REFLECT THE ENEMY'S PROFITABLE USE OF DMZ AS SANCTUARY TO ENHANCE EFFICIENCY AND MORALE. ON 21 OCT, ESTIMATED ENEMY COMPANY SUPPORTED BY mortarS ATTACKED SOUTH VIETNAMESE VILLAGE TEO NHI INSIDE DMZ KILLING NINE LOCAL POPULAR FORCE DEFENDERS. FRIENDLY ARTILLERY FIRED FROM SOUTH DMZ TO SUPPORT VILLAGE AND SILENCE mortars. IN OTHER ACTIVITY, AN ARVN SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION INITIATED ON 17 OCTOBER IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE BY 51ST REGIMENT AND REINFORCED BY TWO COMPANIES OF US MARINES RESULTED IN 235 ENEMY KILLED, COMPARED TO ONLY 30 FRIENDLY KILLED; ARMY ELEMENTS WITHDREW FROM OTHER OPERATIONS TO REINFORCE MARINE TACTICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. INCREASING ENEMY TROOP MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE AND STEPPED UP HARASSMENT OF DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, REFUGEE CAMPS AND OUTPOSTS IN QUANG NAM INDICATE POSSIBILITY OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN BOTH QUANG NAM AND QUANG HAN PROVINCES.

3. 11 CTZ. THE NVA 618TH DIVISION REMAINED PINNED AGAINST THE SEA IN BINH DINH PROVINCE. THIS WEEK 260 WERE KILLED AND 277 SURRENDERED FOR A TOTAL OF 1,192 KIA, 1,918 VC CAPTURED AND 5,359 SUSPECTS DETAINED, COMPARED TO FRIENDLY LOSSES OF 49 KIA AND 253 WIA. AT LEAST ONE ENEMY REGIMENT (POSSIBLY 320 NVA) HAS MOVED TO POSITION MENACING PLEI OQUEN SPECIAL FORCES CAMP IN KONTUM PROVINCE.

4. 11 CTZ. ALTHOUGH ENEMY INCIDENTS IN III CORPS DECREASED SLIGHTLY. TERRORISTS INCIDENTS CONTINUED HUMPT IN 60% OF SIX INCIDENTS IN SAIGON, FIVE INVOLVED AMERICANS. ONE WAS DETONATION OF A CLAYMORE MINE AGAINST ENLISTED BILLET; OTHERS SIMILARLY THROWN AT US STOPS FROM CYCLES. THESE INCIDENTS WERE PART OF REPORTED VIET CONG PLANS TO SABOTAGE THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL LIBERATION DAY (1 NOV) CELEBRATION IN MILITARY ACTIVITY, VC 5TH AND 9TH DIVISIONS CONTINUED TO AVOID CONTACT WHILE ALLIED FORCES CONDUCTED MULTIPLE OPERATIONS TO SUPPRESS ENEMY INITIATIVE AND SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT.
(D) LIMITED TACTICAL INTERROGATION WAS CONDUCTED.
  (E) DETAINEES DETERMINED TO BE VCC/NVA AND RE-
  TURNEEs WERE EVACUATED TO THE BRIGADE COLLECTING POINTS. OTHER DETA-
  INEES WERE EVACUATED TO THE CENTRAL DISTRICT CLEARING/SCREENING
  POINT.

(2) CENTRAL DISTRICT CLEARING/SCREENING POINT (US/NAVY):
  (A) ALL DETAINEES EXCEPT VCC/NVA AND RETURNEES
      WERE PROCESSED THROUGH THIS POINT BY PERSONNEL FROM DISTRICT NATIONAL
      POLICE AND US CR Personnel.
  (B) THOSE DETERMINED SUBSEQUENTLY TO BE VCC/NVA
      WERE EVACUATED TO THE DIV Pk COLLECTING POINT.
  (C) REFUGEES WERE SETTLED IN VILLAGES OR ALLOWED
      TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES.
  (D) DETAINEES REMAINED AT THIS POINT UP TO 12
      HOURS.

(3) THESE ARE LIMITED FIELD-TYPE FACILITIES PRO-
      VIDED JOINTLY BY US/NAVY.

(4) BRIGADE COLLECTING POINT (US):
  (A) ALL DETAINEES WERE AGAIN SCREENED AND LIMITED
      TACTICAL INTERROGATION WAS CONDUCTED.
  (B) THOSE DETERMINED TO BE VCC/NVA WERE EVACUATED
      TO THE DIV Pk COLLECTING POINT. OTHERS WERE SENT TO THE CENTRAL DIS-
      TRICT CLEARING/SCREENING POINTS.

  (C) REFUGEES PERIODICALLY WERE SEPARATED AND KNOW-
      LEDGE OF IMMEDIATE TACTICAL VALUE WAS EXPLOITED.
  (D) DETAINEES REMAINED AT THIS POINT FROM 6 TO 8
      HOURS. TBS ARE LIMITED FIELD-TYPE FACILITIES.

(4) DIVISION Pk COLLECTING POINT (US):
  (A) ALL DETAINEES WERE AGAIN SCREENED AND SCREENED.
  (B) LATER INTERROGATION WAS CONDUCTED AS DEEMED
      NECESSARY.
  (C) ALL DETAINEES WERE REFUGEE OR OTHERWISE
      INNOCENT WERE RETURNED TO THE CENTRAL DISTRICT CLEARING/SCREENING
      POINT.

(5) ALL DETAINEES WERE PROCESSED AND BILLETED IN
      SEMI-PERMANENT FACILITIES, WHERE THEY WERE PROVIDED FOOD AND ESSENTIAL
      MEDICAL TREATMENT.
  (D) PkS REMAINED AT THIS POINT UP TO 7 DAYS DUR-

ACT: J1-4

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 JSQS-1 J3-8 JS-2 SAMAA-1 SASM-5 ASD/MPR-1 DIA-15
  CSA-1 CHQ-2 CSAF-1 CMG-6 RF/FILE-1(5) RLI/F/

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