BINNENDIJK: I was born in Leyden, Netherlands right after the end World War II. That fact probably had a lot to do with my choice of career interests—foreign affairs. I came to the US as a baby. I returned to the Netherlands quite often with my father during summers. He was a college professor and had the summers to himself. That gave me a continuing exposure to the Netherlands and Europe.

I went to high school in Springfield, PA.—outside of Philadelphia. My father was a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, which was major factor in my choice of colleges since the University gave faculty children a free education.

Originally, I intended to become a biologist. I remember the day during the second semester of my freshman year when, as the Vietnam War was brought to our consciousness, I watched unfold in front of my eyes. I walked out into the Quad as a biology-major-to-be; I ended that walk having decided to go into history-foreign policy instead. That change was a reflection of the importance of the war and its effect on me
and my fellow students. The significance of Vietnam hit me almost like a blinding flash; I suddenly recognized what I wanted to do with my life.

I received my BA in history from Penn. I had a friend in school who had attended the Fletcher School; he was very complimentary of the curriculum and faculty. As graduation from Penn was approaching, I considered law school and some other options, but after a visit to Medford, Mass. I decided to go to Fletcher. I started there in the Fall of 1968 I stayed there long enough to receive my MA, MALD and Ph.D. My academic pursuits were interrupted for about six months while I served in the Army Reserves. I received my Ph.D. in international affairs in 1972. I should say that Fletcher required work in four different fields: diplomacy, public diplomacy, general politics, and economics. I wrote my Ph.D. thesis on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. I actually handed my thesis in on the day that reversion went into affect—May 15, 1972. I should mention that I chose the thesis subject because I was hired to do some research for the Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy there. Greg Henderson, a Korean expert, was the professor who wanted some work done on Okinawa reversion. It was a subject very much in the news with demonstrations in Tokyo and he wanted to have a study done on the subject from the public diplomacy perspective. So the School not only paid me a small stipend, but also my travel costs which enabled me to go to Okinawa and Tokyo. It occurred to me that this research had given me material for half a Ph.D. thesis. Somehow I managed to find some more money and returned to the Far East to do more research and was able to complete the thesis. In fact, I turned a job into a Ph.D. thesis.

Fortunately, my research was focused more on the process than on the substance, since I was not a Japanese expert. I did my work under Karl Deutsch, who was then a professor at Harvard University. He was very interested in such things as information flows—e.g. how the elites in society influence decision-making, how the public and the media influences decision-making. So I developed an influence-flow model for the Okinawa decision-making process. The nature of that particular process was different from the normal one in that it was much more subject to Japanese public opinion and media
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influences. It was more like the Vietnam War process in the US than a normal decision-making process.

We had a number of Foreign Service people at Fletcher, some of whom were on the faculty. These were the “Diplomats in Residence.” During my research for my thesis, I went to Tokyo where I met Dick Sneider, and others involved in reversion. I also went to Okinawa where Bill Clark was very helpful. He was a staff member of the civil administrator’s office in Naha. I don't think I would have been able to finish my thesis without Bill's help and that of some of his colleagues. So I got to know a number of Foreign Service people while at Fletcher. I did give a career in the Foreign Service some thought, as did most of my fellow students. But the 1972 environment was not very conducive to a government career in foreign affairs. Vietnam was still on; there was a lot of tension in the US. I was uncomfortable with the War; I was not radicalized but our policy at the time was not one that I could have fully supported. I just felt that at the time, I could make a contribution outside of the Foreign Service.

I suppose that my argument with the administration had a moral aspect to it. More profoundly, however, I had serious doubts that our investment was worth it. To a large degree, I saw Vietnam as a nationalistic struggle and secondly as an ideological battle; as far as I was concerned, it was not worth the massive cost of American lives and resources that we were incurring. I was not swayed by the “domino theory” argument. There may have been some local “dominoes”, but I could not see that our global position would be damaged by events in Vietnam. I did recognize that foreign policy mistakes could be made which were extremely costly to the average American. It was that recognition which had such great impact on my generation that got me interested in foreign policy in the first place. I did demonstrate against our Cambodian policy; I felt it was a horrible mistake. But participation in demonstrations was the limit of my opposition. The Vietnam debacle was an important factor in shaping my views of the US foreign policy and the world. It did not turn me into an isolationist; I felt that we needed to engage in issues outside our border. It was just that our Vietnam policies were based on wrong assumptions, calculus and
analysis. As I said, I did not think that the investment was worth the return; if we had been able to keep South Vietnam going as an independent state with a much smaller military presence even at some dollar costs, but without the casualties that we suffered, I might have supported our efforts in South Asia.

I think anyone who attended Fletcher in the late 1960s and early 1970s would remember Ruhl Bartlett and his wonderful course on American diplomatic history. Also George Halm and his course on international economics. Fletcher gave me a balanced view. I left there pretty much a centrist, not leaning too far in any political direction. That is probably the single most important aspect of my Fletcher education. I learned that foreign policy is a process that needs to be managed and that tremendous mistakes can be made if a country goes off on a tangent. On the other hand, if the policy is conducted correctly, there are great rewards to our country.

As I indicated earlier, I took a number of courses at Fletcher in public diplomacy. I learned the importance of not only making policy, but selling it by permitting the media, the public and most importantly the Congress to feel that they have participated. I concluded that consensus was absolutely necessary if a policy were to be successful. I learned a lot about the Congressional role while studying reversion as well as the role of non-governmental organizations. On Okinawa, the NGO's in favor of reversion had a profound impact on Japanese views over time. They were not able to force an immediate decision, but they chipped away over decades until reversion was accomplished. They didn't give up, but worked on molding Japanese and Okinawan views day after day and over time were able to change public and media perceptions of the issue, eventually convincing the government of the validity of their views. (The same was true of the United States and the Vietnam War.) So I did gain an appreciation of the way NGOs can have an impact. I learned about Japanese NGOs, but I think that the same importance can be given to our own. Congress played a lesser role in the reversion process; it did ratify the treaty, but a
large extent in the US, reversion was the province of the Executive Branch. In Japan and Okinawa, it was far more than that.

In 1972, as I was leaving academia, I decided that my writing skills needed honing—despite the fact that I had just finished a lengthy treatise. That led me to seek a job with a little newspaper. I had done a series of articles for a local Boston paper, written mostly while traveling in the Far East. That was enough to get me hired by the “Virginia Sentinel”—a newspaper in Northern Virginia. I covered the school board meetings, the House and Senate races of 1972, etc. As I said, my main purpose was to learn how to write—quickly and crisply.

In fact, the stint with a newspaper was a very good training ground. I did learn how to write. It was of course in the pre-computer era; we put the paper together in the time honored tradition of “cut and paste”. I had a razor blade and glue and we literally made the mock-up that way. The Virginia Sentinel was a weekly; that gave me the opportunity to write a number of stories for each edition. I had to meet deadlines and therefore learned to write quickly. Some of the editors were younger than I was, but they did teach me how to get rid of excess words and how to write a straight sentence. They were extremely helpful; they turned my writing around. There was no question in my mind that after working on the paper, I was a much improved writer.

Soon, I did decide to seek other employment. I was not sure at that point what I really wanted to do. One day, some one told me that there was a vacancy on the Congressional Research Service, an arm of Congress, staff. It was suggested that I look into it. It was timely because the newspaper work did not satisfy my interests. I had been trained to work in international affairs; covering the local school board did not quite fit. It was great for my writing and for my understanding of local politics and government, but not what I really sought. I remember coming home feeling unsatisfied. I yearned to return to my major interest. Fortunately, after being interviewed, I was offered the CRS job and I took it.
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I worked in the international division of CRS, which was located in the old Library of Congress—before the new building was opened. We had our desks in the top stack of the Library—it was a real fire trap. We were squeezed into small cubicles working away at our assignments. I worked for Bill Gibbons whose boss was Charlie Gelner, who was the head of the national security and international division. I think the Gibbons’ staff consisted of 6-12 analysts. The division was of course much larger and included such people as John Collins—there were probably 30-40 analysts in it. Some people were more busy than others.

The CRS had been founded as an aide to Congressional Committees—to provide research capabilities for the Congressional Committees. They would turn to us for short studies—some required 24 hour replies—and longer term studies. In 1973, CRS did not, in my view, mesh too well with the Congressional Committees. I found most interesting the Committees tasks which were related to upcoming hearings and potential legislative initiatives. I found it very rewarding to engage with Committee staffers and sometimes with the Members and Senators and to provide an additional resource to them. CRS staffers became part of the legislative process in that way. They enjoyed the luxury of time, which I found out later, Committee staffers really did not have. That enabled the CRS to give an issue some considerable thought in depth, somewhat shielded by the daily hassle that Committee staffers had to suffer. We were able to think about a problem, examine it on paper and provide support to the Committees.

Bill Gibbons had good relations with the Committees. He was a Democrat. He knew John Culver; he knew the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He was basically our broker. When he got the commissions, he turned many of them over to me.

During my short stay at CRS, I was involved in three major projects. One was on the Vietnam War. That was an analysis of all of the amendments that had been introduced in
Congress to terminate our participation in the War or to bring the conflict to an end. That project had been commissioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The second project involved the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). It was a study requested by Congressman John Culver—later senator—who was the chairman of the economic subcommittee of the House Foreign Relations Committee. He was examining OPIC which was an organization with a number of mandates—not necessarily consistent with each other. He felt that it should be primarily focused on economic development. We were asked to look at the Congressional mandates for OPIC and to analyze where the organization was going. It took me about three months to complete that study. After it was published, Culver held hearings and from the report and those hearings, new legislation was introduced and passed. It was my first opportunity to contribute to a policy-making process.

The third project was commissioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was involved in hearings on the State Department authorization. John Ritch was the principal staffer I worked with; he became a very good friend. This study also got me in touch with Norville Jones, who later became staff director of that Committee. As Ritch and Jones were preparing for the hearings, they asked me to make an analysis of the Executive Branch draft legislation in order to develop some issues that the Committee should focus on. I was asked to prepare a series of questions that might be posed to the Secretary of State and other senior officials who would testify. That was my first exposure to authorizing legislation and the budget process.

I was permitted to sit on hearings. In early 1973, I was sat in on some of the Vietnam hearings. I found them very powerful; they were televised. Fulbright was a hero to many of us. There was a sense of drama and I was fascinated. It made me further interested in participating in the congressional process. I must say that I was not one who held deep suspicions of the Executive Branch. I always felt that the senior officials who appeared were interested in doing good jobs. There were misunderstandings; there were domestic
political issues, but I never felt that there were conspiracies to undermine Congress, preventing it from exercising its constitutional role. There were a number of others who did not share my sanguine outlook. Nixon and the Republicans ran the Executive Branch, while the Democrats ruled the Legislative Branch. That made fertile grounds for political games. There was considerable apprehension about the Executive's goals and directions—which I did not fully share.

I had an opportunity to watch Kissinger testify often, particularly later on when he became Secretary of State. I was almost in awe of Dr. Kissinger. He had a brilliant mind that enabled him to place issues in a context of history and geography—geopolitics. His presentations and discussions were astounding. I didn't always agree with his views—particularly on Vietnam; nevertheless, I always felt that I was in the presence of a genius. I must say in retrospect it is now clear that his testimonies were not always as full as they might have been. I probably viewed Kissinger as a foreign policy professional—in the same profession as I was. I was more interested in watching his mind at work and tried to understand how he saw the world in a geo-strategic sense. That was where my focus was as I listened to him. He did sound very much like a professor and to a degree therefore Kissinger's Congressional appearances were an extension of my education.

I had the opportunity to participate—in a minor way—in Culver's Committee mark-ups, although never physically present during the actual deliberations. I was not included in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee mark-ups. The study I had done on OPIC was published as a Committee document and some of the recommendations I made in that study were in fact adopted. It was a somewhat unusual situation for an CRS staffer, but Culver and his staff were at the time looking for help. They did not have the time to do the study. After I had completed my work, I had a lot of information at my finger tips which they found useful; they invited me to submit questions and comments and ideas which were then used in the Committee's mark-up sessions.
I was at the CRS for only six months. In the summer of 1973, I was given the opportunity of a lifetime. I was granted a Japan Foundation fellowship to live in Tokyo for a year—all expenses paid—with my new bride. I had applied for the fellowship; my work on Okinawa reversion was known in Tokyo. The Japan Foundation, a completely Japanese enterprise, had just been established. It was looking for a couple of people for their first fellowships. I had developed contacts with the Japanese Embassy staff in Washington—Yukio Satoh in particular—now the Japanese Ambassador to Australia. He came to me one day and told me about the new fellowships; he asked whether I would be interested. I certainly was; I was eager to fill in the many gaps in my knowledge of Japan. I didn't for example know the language, I hadn't lived in Japan for any extended period. I was aware of the gap. I had done my Ph.D. work on Japan issues but knew too little about the country and culture. I saw the opportunity provided by the Japan Foundation as a way to enhance my knowledge of Japan.

There is no question that my work on Okinawa raised my interest in Japan. I was attracted by the opportunity to further study Japanese culture—and the comparison of Japanese and American societies with the former so highly structured and formal. The year in Japan gave me an opportunity to round out my education on that country, which, as I mentioned, started out as a job and ended up as a real interest.

The fellowship was very flexible. Under its terms, I could do almost anything I wanted. What I ended up doing was to associate myself with Sophia University. I taught a graduate course during the second semester on US-Japan relations; that was a lot of fun. One interesting aspect of my University experience was that I was teaching in the graduate school while studying in the undergraduate program—Japanese language. I wrote an article for a Japanese quarterly and several newspaper articles. We traveled throughout Japan and to Korea. As I said, my goal was to fill in my gaps of knowledge on Japan and I think I essentially succeeded.
As I said, we traveled widely in Japan. We visited Kyushu, Hokkaido—skied on the Olympic slopes. One recollection: Mary and I were looking for the perfect onsen. We found one in the Izu Peninsula. We went there and were sitting comfortably in one of the many tubs that were available, when we heard some giggling behind us. Along came Ed Schumaker, at the time a stringer for The New York Times, who was a friend. He was carrying a camera around his neck. He snapped a few pictures and I didn't give the matter much thought. A few weeks later, I began to get letters from friends all over the US. In fact, there were pictures of Mary and me all over the front page of The New York Times's travel section sitting—discreetly—in the hot tub.

By mid-way through the year, it became clear to me that learning Japanese was a major commitment. We attended classes a couple of hours each day and studied the language a few more hours besides that. My progress after a few months made it eminently clear that to learn Japanese would take me two or three years if not more. I would have to become a Japanese scholar. That was not the road I wanted to chose. I was sincerely interested in learning about Japan, but my first love was Europe. So I gave up on the idea of being a fluent Japanese speaker. Of course I gave my lecture at Sophia in English—which was fine since the graduate school gave most of its courses in English. Most of the students were Americans; there were some Japanese. I learned enough of the language to use it in social environments; I could not have used in any professional setting, but I knew enough to be comfortable getting around. Mary learned about as much as I did, but ironically enough probably found it more beneficial because later in her life, she was a Senate staffer specializing in Asian affairs.

We lived in Shinanomachi in Tokyo in a little apartment—since torn down. The apartment consisted of a 7 # tatami mat room—the size of a one car garage. It had windows overlooking Kao Hospital. Every night, we would get the futon out and spread it on the floor. That room was a living room, a bedroom, a dining room. We had to go across the
hall for the toilet. The bath was down the street. We did not have a cultural shock despite
the un-American living accommodations. In fact, I enjoyed the living style.

I came away from Japan with a sense of a very formal society—very conscious of
hierarchy and the relationship of one individual to another. After drinking a couple of
cups of saki, they do loosen up. Then they are a different people. They are so different
from other Asian, like the Koreans. The Japanese world view was almost sheltered.
They could not think in geo-strategic terms. I think the Japanese have learned how to
behave internationally, but others obviously had concerns. One day I plotted out the
changes in Japanese foreign policies between Perry and WW II. The line had peaks
and troughs, causing some very rocky times for US-Japan relations. The Japanese are
capable of radically changing their world views, but I think that the advent and blossoming
of democracy in the post-WW II period will be a major restraint on Japanese military
involvement off-shore. I trust the Japanese.

I did develop friendships with several Japanese. I broke through the formal barrier. I found
it easier to establish a personal rapport with students than with the older generation. They
had not yet entered the professional life. I was not too much older than they were; so we
were able to communicate rather freely. I also made friends with some of the professors—
e.g. Prof. Mushakoje who was fairly western in his outlook. And there were others as well.

Even in 1973, I think it was very clear that economically Japan would rise. It was during
the period when Zbig Brzezinski wrote The Fragile Blossom. I always felt that he had
understated Japan's strength. It had a lot of staying power. Its economy, already important,
was bound to be of increasing importance in the world. It was obvious to me that Japan
was moving very rapidly; evidence of that economic surge was clearly all around us. I
was really impressed by the energy and dynamism of the people. They were willing to
work incredibly long hours; they were willing to live in ways that westerns would never find
acceptable; they saved and saved and saved and spent very little on consumption. They
placed an extremely high priority on their children's education—perhaps too much. They had all of the characteristics of a strong society.

Despite that economic strength, I felt Japan would remain constrained in terms of its security and military role. In part because of that view, I gained an increased appreciation of the importance of the US-Japan security treaty as a fundamental aspect of their orientation. The security treaty was the cardinal factor in preventing Japan from returning to its historical swings, which I mentioned earlier.

I had the opportunity to meet some of the Embassy's staff. I ran into Bill Clark once again—he now having been assigned to Tokyo. I used the Embassy staff frequently in my course. Mike Armacost, then the special assistant to the Ambassador, gave a lecture. It was clear to me then that he was a super-star in the making. I thought that the Embassy in general was doing a great job. As an academic, I looked at their performance more theoretically and I found that the staff performed well day and day out on a myriad of details, but when lecturing to my class could theorize and put the US-Japan relations as well as their day-to-day routine in a context which made it meaningful for my students—and me.

I mentioned earlier that I had an opportunity to go to Korea. That happened in early 1974. We visited Seoul and some other parts of the country. My first impression was that Korea was a lot poorer than Japan. When we traveled south to Kyongju—by bus as we did throughout the country—; we stayed in very primitive hotels—the Korean equivalent of a roikan. We had to stoke the fires to let the steam flow through pipes under the floor—that kept the room warm. We walked around Pusan, seeing cats hanging from ropes. I enjoyed those cultural encounters. I certainly did not foresee then the economic powerhouse that Korea would become. I saw only limited signs of rapid development. It was and is a divided country; I sensed that Koreans were living with a threat. In Washington you live with the fear of being mugged, in Tokyo, you live with a fear of an earthquake; in South Korea you live with a threat of a North Korea invasion. I was impressed by how
the Koreans coped with living under that threat day after day. One day we met a Korean soldier in a park. He invited Mary and me to come to his home. There I spoke Japanese with his father who had learned it while living under Japanese occupation. This family lived in a tiny little house. They served us little cloves of garlic and ran out to get us some milk. I enjoy experiences of that kind.

My general impression of Korea at the time was that it was a relatively poor country. I still have two vivid memories of that trip. One—going to the soldier's house—I have already alluded to. The house was what was then on the outskirts of Seoul. We had to walk across dirt fields to get there. The house was quite small. The family was not destitute, but not well off either. They were obviously quite friendly towards Americans and wanted to put on a “good show” for us. During the day, we found that the soldier wanted to go to the US—which is probably why we were invited to the house; he hoped we could help him achieve his ambition.

The other memory I have is of the reclining Buddha in a cave. We climbed up to the cave and saw a lot of elderly Korean women at the shrine. They were beautifully dressed in Korean chimachogeries—a sharp contrast to the drabness of the country. This to me was a visible reminder of the contrast in Korea of the new, the old, the growth and development and the traditional. But I did not sense at the time that the Koreans had yet reached the “take off” point.

During our year's sojourn in Japan, we also traveled to other Far East countries, like Vietnam, Thailand, India and Nepal. We went to Vietnam as tourists because this was the country that had had so much impact on my life and I just had to see it. We went to Saigon and surrounding areas. By summer of 1973, the war was still on, although our troops had been withdrawn. There was still some optimism in Saigon that the South could survive, but it was clear that it was a very dicey situation.
In general, through my travels, I got a fairly broad exposure to South Asia. I had been in India previously while doing the Okinawa study. The abject poverty of that country is an image that one does not forget. It was also a country of contrasts with the wealthy, well trained elite at one end of the spectrum and the “untouchables” at the other. I remember well, the dirt, the heat, the visible misery. We went to New Delhi, Agra, Jaipur. We went from Delhi to Jaipur in third class—unreserved seats—wooden benches. We went with some people who had been in the Peace Corps. It was one of those experiences that are part of youth—third class on an Indian train! I remember sleeping on the floor of the car—I was worn out—with Indian bare feet dangling in my face. It was a fun trip.

Nepal was a beautiful version of India. I remember the airport in Kathmandu well—a runway on the edge of a cliff. I have a vague memory of one aircraft which did not stop in time and was lying at the bottom of the cliff. We spent about a week in Kathmandu seeing sights and soaking up the local culture.

The year in the Far East gave me a much better appreciation for foreign cultures. I think I acquired the willingness to listen and to try to understand other perceptions—more than I might have done so otherwise. I think it is too often our approach to top issues: “What is in our interests and that is what we need to protect regardless.” The year in the Far East I think sharpened my ability to understand where another might be coming from and his or her cultural context. I should mention that I stopped in other countries as well—Israel, Greece, France etc—for a week each. I came away with a clearer sense of how large this world was, how varied it was, how many different cultures it hosts, how complex it is. Spending a week in ten different countries gave me a lot of snapshot impressions.

We did not really encounter many anti-American attitudes during this year. The US had withdrawn from Vietnam; so that period was pretty much over. We were pretty warmly received where ever we went. We were young graduate students and were able to deal on a person-to-person level. We were able to see the countries as an ordinary citizen would; we lived very frugally as I have mentioned before. We wrote a number of papers.
based on our experiences. The most prominent was on US-Japan relations. In those days, the buzz phrase was “fine tuning.” I argued that basically the relationship, by and large, was strong, but that it needed a little more firming up than the Embassy thought, although in general the paper was very supportive of US policy. That paper was published in the Japan Quarterly—a publication which I think does not exist anymore.

I think that the year in Japan serves me as a reference point because that was my last major involvement in Far East issues. As I think I always knew, my heart was really in Europe. After that one year, when working in the Executive and Legislative Branches, I concentrated on Europe and Middle East affairs—with the exception of Korea—but the year in Japan was a touchstone to which I could always return. My wife Mary of course stayed with Far East issues during her career. We both left Japan with a warm feeling towards Asia, but for me that was not enough to overcome my heritage. Mary had spent a year in Grenoble, France, but she did not have the same feeling of heritage that I had.

When we returned from Japan in 1974, both Mary and I were unemployed. The day we returned, my mother was operated on for cancer, which was a traumatic event. She lived for another two years. We searched for jobs and I found one at the Office of Management and Budget. I had talked to some people there before we had left for Tokyo and reestablished contacts when I returned. As it happened, they needed an examiner on Asian budget requests in the Economic Branch of the International Division. My year in Asia undoubtedly was helpful to my obtaining that job. The main task was the Vietnam accounts—mainly economic assistance. The one person whom I really knew was Terry Dieble—now a professor at NDU—he worked on State Department accounts on the same floor as I did. He was kind enough to introduce me to a couple of people when I was job hunting—e.g. Ed Sanders, who became my boss and Malcolm Butler. Both remain friends. We hit it off well and I got the job. Ed was looking for someone to look after OPIC; since I had done some work on that as well as Asia gave me some background on the issues. Ed,
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who had a Ph.D. was looking for someone with similar academic credentials. So all in all, I fit their requirements.

I had a fascinating couple of years at OMB. Before I left, Ed was promoted to Division Chief. There were about a dozen examiners in the Economic Branch. As I said, I worked on Vietnam, OPIC; also the International Trade Commission and the Council for Economic Policy fell in my portfolio. I also handled the Law of the Seas which turned out to be the bridge to my next job.

The OMB job had tremendous perspective. I got to see how the government really works. Money moves the government as does legislation. We were responsible for oversight in both areas. I went to an awful lot of inter-agency meetings, representing OMB even though I was quite junior at that stage. But I could deal with people at the deputy assistant secretary level and in some cases even at the assistant secretary level because they needed my approval to get money. That power gave me some standing in the meetings, even at my rank and age. So it was a great place to start a government career.

As a budget examiner, I had the opportunity every year to review agency programs under my purview. The programs fell into two categories: a) operational ones like OPIC, CIEP, ITC and b) more policy oriented programs like Vietnam and the Middle East. The first category was essentially a straightforward budget analysis: Where does the money go? What do we get for it? Sometimes, but infrequently, we might ask “why?” The second group involved, as I said, many policy considerations. For example, after having been in the Division for a year, I inherited the Middle East portfolio. I was a member of an inter-agency group that set the aid amounts for Israel after one of the Sinai agreements in 1975. That level has lived in perpetuity. The determination of that level included an analysis of the Israeli economy in some depth. We took a detailed look at the Israeli budget and made projections. Based on that analysis, we determined the resource gap that the Israelis encounter and our aid level was set to cover that gap.
The Law of the Seas and Vietnam fell into the second category. The programs in that category required budgetary and economic analyses, but also required a broader perspective if the conclusions were to have any meaning. Perhaps our budget examiner's instincts led us in the first place to look at budgetary requests with “green eye shades.” We had to overcome that tendency to look at the big picture.

On Vietnam, I dealt with the NSC and the State Bureau primarily. The principal question was: How much money was required to keep South Vietnam viable—both militarily and economically? In the summer of 1975, our aid levels were reduced substantially. But our analyses were important to the process. Graham Martin, our Ambassador in Saigon during this period, was making the case for a large aid program. His view was that a large infusion of aid immediately would have a major economic pay-off later. I didn't buy that analysis, nor did by and large my colleagues in OMB. We did not believe that economically that made sense and we did not concentrate on the political results. So we were not prepared to approve the high level of aid that Martin wanted. State, as best I can remember, supported the Ambassador. The NSC staff—Butler, Ellerman and Bob Hormats—were not vigorous in their support of Martin. But I must say that the final word on aid levels to Vietnam was determined by Congress in 1975. The administration had recommended a fairly high aid level, based on Martin's proposal, but that was substantially reduced by Congress. We shall never know whether that reduction was seen by the South Vietnamese government as a clear signal of the US' unwillingness to commit itself to a long term support for that country. Then came a rapid collapse in South Vietnam; how much of that was due to North Vietnam military pressure and how much was due to the South Vietnamese feeling of abandonment, based on the Hill's action we will never know.

I had regular contacts with Hill staffers, mostly on the Law of the Seas. At that point, the focus was on the 200 mile economic fisheries zone. Since I knew that we would eventually have to deal with draft legislation on this issue, I convened an inter-agency meeting to develop an administration position on this issue. President Ford, in the midst of a tough
election campaign, needed the support of the coastal states. He basically said that he would approve the extension of the fisheries zone to the 200 mile limit. State, in the person of John Norton Moore, took the position that the administration should favor legislation that was so bad that Ford would have to veto it. He was not in a negotiating mode. I saw the train wreck coming and tried to compose a letter, which was approved and sent to the Hill, which in essence said that if Congress had to pass the legislation then before it, it should at least make changes stipulated in the letter. Congress made a few of those changes.

I think that Moore had a different agenda than the President. John Norton Moore was a very good international lawyer; he felt very strongly about the draft legislation. He thought that there were far better approaches to the fishing limits issue; i.e. a multilateral agreement rather than a dictum from a single nation—the US. I don't want to suggest the President endorsed the Congressional direction. I was pretty sure that he had assured Congressional leaders that he would not stand in their way; publicly he was neutral on the issue. So Moore took a large risk. Moore opposed the legislation and wanted to make that pitch to the President but could not sell his views. As I said, for political reasons, Ford was not about to challenge Congress. My view was that the Ford and Moore views were bound to clash, unless the legislation was sufficiently improved to at least mollify the internationalists. I knew that the President would sign the bill as it stood at the time; I thought it was worth a try to improve it.

The Law of the Seas was incredibly complicated. It required many inter-agency meetings. People made careers out of the subject. There were negotiations going on all over the world on various aspects of the agreement—there was a lot of traveling by US officials. The complexities of the total package required the involvement of a lot of agencies, some of whom had very important stakes in the outcome. There was a man by the name Lee Ratiner who started with Commerce and then moved to Interior, who played a delicate game. Interior had a great interest in deep sea manganese nodules as a resource. He viewed his role as the protector of those resources for the US. He was very vocal in the inter-agency meetings. DoD was also well represented; it was interested in “free and
innocent” transit through various straits. So it opposed the extension of the existing three mile territorial zones. So there were a number of agencies who felt they had major stakes at play in the Law of the Seas negotiations and therefore took vigorous positions on some issues. That raised many clashes. It was very interesting to watch the inter-agency meetings with each agency taking stances; if you understood the motivations, then some of the positions taken were understandable.

It was through this process that I began to really understand the ties that various agencies had to Congressional committees, to congressmen and senators and to staffers. The senators from the Armed Services Committee were supportive of the positions taken by the military; the Commerce and Interior committees supported Ratiner. The whole process was a real lesson for me on how the government really works. I think it worthy of note that in those days OMB and the NSC worked very closely together. So we examiners were able to have a pretty good feel for where the President stood on issues of concern to them. As I said, we did meet with Hill staffers so that examiners in those days had a pretty good knowledge of the positions of the various major actors in town. That was very helpful for it allowed us to have an important voice in the decision-making process. My own contacts were mostly with staffers from the Foreign Affairs and Relations committees, but I had contacts with others as well, such as those dealing with the Interior Department.

Let me turn briefly to the Middle East. As I mentioned, as part of the Sinai agreement, we agreed to increase our assistance to Israel and Egypt. We understood that Kissinger had made that commitment. Bob Nooter, the Assistant Administrator for NEA in AID, chaired an inter-agency group to decide what a reasonable level of total assistance for Israel might be. I represented OMB on that group. We were looking at the overall financial gap that the Israelis were facing. What I didn’t realize at the time was that the levels we set back in the early 1970s, as amended after Camp David, would remain immutable forever thereafter—or at least until now—the late 1990s. We understood that the US had made a solemn commitment to Israel, but we felt strongly that we had to have a damn good economic rationale for the levels we were going to recommend. So we had to look at their accounts.
We in OMB did our own analysis which we then took to the inter-agency group. AID did the same analysis. At the end, the differences between the two was relatively minuscule—maybe $100-200 million. So I think the US government's analysis had the general support of the bureaucracy, which allowed us to send to Kissinger a recommended level of assistance approved by all.

We held several meetings with the Israelis during the years I was in OMB. They are very tough negotiators. They realized what was at stake for them. I attended their presentations when they laid out for us what they perceived to be their resource gap. My job was to be skeptical. And I was. I was looking for possible “padding” of estimates. We found several projections that were open to challenge. Nooter and his staff agreed with our assessment. So we cut the Israeli request, which they had formally submitted to Kissinger, by several hundreds of million dollars. Kissinger accepted our analysis and our recommended aid levels. We approached the Egyptian program in somewhat the same fashion, although our involvement with Egypt was just at a nascent state and we didn't have as much background on its economic situation and needs as we had on Israel.

In any case, these two programs were quite large taking up even then a large part of our total assistance program. I understood the political need to provide assistance to these two countries, but I also wanted to make sure that each program could be justified and rationalized on economic grounds—not just political ones. I was sympathetic towards development assistance as a concept—in fact, I devoted much of my subsequent career trying to get the programs approved by Congress. I have never belonged to the school that viewed assistance as necessarily “money down the drain”—either as instrument of US foreign policy or as humanitarian gesture. Assistance was and is such a small part of our budget and GNP that I was quite comfortable pushing for its approval.

After a year at OMB, I recognized the power it had as an institution. It can say “No” and then it is very difficult to reverse it. It is much harder for it to play a constructive role—to be creative, to initiate new approaches. It is essentially a government institution that has its
foot on the brake, not the accelerator. Starting new projects costs money and OMB was and is in the business of saving money. That is a very inhibiting factor in OMB taking the leadership in new enterprises.

The other OMB role, which I mentioned previously, was that of guardian of the legislative process to insure that an administration spoke with a single voice. We would review all legislative proposals as well as the lead testimonies to make sure that all was consistent with existing policies. Of course we could not control the Question and Answer session, where a lot of policy is made.

The Law of the Seas was an unique experience because the issues were non-budgetary in the main. My involvement in those deliberations came from our legislative responsibilities. OMB had a division which managed the administration's participation in the legislative process; it was a very small branch. Much of the substantive review responsibilities fell on the budget examiners. Therefore we in the budget division had close contacts with our colleagues in the legislative division as well as the NSC staffers. In fact, I think the White House staff worked closely and collegially, at least on the issues in which I was involved. In fact, my work on the Law of the Seas led to my next assignment, which was as a member of the NSC staff.

I might just briefly comment on my typical work day—which changed considerably from time to time depending on the where in the budgetary cycle we were. Toward the end of that cycle, we would spend most of our days in our offices, insuring that the budget itself was put together correctly. It was detailed, not very imaginative work, but very important because everything had to be absolutely right. During the rest of the year, we would spend considerable time with our client agencies at meetings, learning about current and upcoming issues and injecting when necessary a White House perspective. We did see most of the important message traffic—not all, but enough to enable us to keep up to date on what was going on overseas. I was satisfied that we had enough information upon which to pass judgement on budgetary and legislative proposals. If we had doubts, we
held hearings, very much like Congressional hearings. Sometime those hearings might even include the head of an agency. That allowed us to explore certain issues in depth; where necessary, we would ask for written responses. The process allowed us to explore new issues with which we were unfamiliar or old issues which needed further discussions.

My two years in OMB convinced me that that organization played a very important coordinating function, particularly on budgets development. It was a useful role and probably essential. But OMB was not a major player in the development and determination of grand strategy or high level policies. We did have a feel on what was going on in Congress and what policy clashes might develop unless certain preventive actions were taken. OMB was often seen as a very powerful agency; I think I left with some doubt about that conventional wisdom. It was a blocking agent; it was not and could not be an initiator of policy. Sometime, the blocking role gave OMB a powerful voice in the councils of government, but I think my two years in OMB gave me a much better appreciation for the importance of an organization being able to propose new policies and if skillful enough to have them adopted. OMB could not do that. Nevertheless, OMB was an incredible opportunity to learn about the internal workings of the government. The people I met—Ed Sanders, Malcolm Butler, Carole Lancaster, etc—have remained close friends; they were very talented and had interesting careers later on. OMB was not for most a permanent home; it was an opportunity to learn and then move on after two or three years.

Q: In 1976, you moved from OMB to the NSC. How did come about?

BINNENDIJK: In 1976, I moved from the Office of Management and Budget to the National Security Council. As I have mentioned, in OMB I had been responsible for the Law of the Seas work done by that agency. I had been involved in deep sea bed mining and economic zone issues, including questions concerning the relationship of those matters to US national security interests—e.g. freedom of transit, freedom of navigation, etc. I had worked closely on those issues with an NSC staff member—Commander Flynn, a naval
officer. When he was re-assigned, I was asked whether I would like to replace him. And that is how I got to the NSC staff.

I of course was at the bottom of the rung of the NSC. I was quite junior. In addition for the Law of the Seas, I was also assigned responsibility for Southern Europe. That portfolio covered Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Spain, Portugal and Italy—the European side of the Mediterranean. Having responsibility for a geographic area involves concerns for a wide range of functional issues, like arms sales and economic and military assistance.

At the NSC, I worked for Dennis Clift. Bob Gates was my colleague in that office. Dennis reported through Bill Hyland—then the Deputy NSC Advisor—to Brent Scowcroft, the NSC Advisor. Of course, in a relatively small staff such as the NSC, organizational delineation is less important than in a large institutions. We didn't pay too much attention to the hierarchal structure, but as a junior member I worked very closely with Clift.

It soon became clear to me that substantive issues look somewhat differently from the NSC perspective than they did from OMB. For example, on the Law of the Seas, while in OMB, I tended to focus on the resource issues—manganese nodules, fisheries zones, etc. I spent a lot of time reviewing draft legislative language relating to those issues, since OMB was responsible for coordinating all Executive Branch legislative proposals before submission to Congress—as well as Congressional legislative proposals—e.g. the 200 mile zone legislation which had been initiated by Congress, some suggestions on manganese modules, etc. But at the NSC, my work was more related to coordinating with the Joint Staff of DoD and State Department. That led me to focus more on such national security issues like transit through Straits and freedom of navigation.

While at the NSC, the actual Law of the Seas convention was in its final negotiating stage. During the 1974-76 period, we had a series of on-going inter-agency battles as we hammered out the US final positions on the many, many issues raised by the Law of the Seas. The main struggles were between those agencies responsible for natural resources
and those for national security. Manganese nodules was a big issue; the Third World claimed its share of these resources as a “common legacy of mankind”. That brought forth a major ideological debate which preoccupied the Executive Branch. Many of the resource agencies, like Interior, took very firm stance against Third World claims for share of the sea's resources. On the other hand, the foreign policy-national security agencies were much more interested in our own military rights or broader foreign policy concerns. There was a continual pulling and tugging between these points of view—"where you sit determines how you stand."

In the final analysis, the Law of the Seas was never ratified by the Senate, but it is now nevertheless enforced by the international community.

The Law of the Seas as everyone knows was a long and prolonged process. We still have not ratified the convention—more than twenty years after the start of the negotiations. There is a convention; having worked on it so assiduously and having shaped much of it, it would be nice if the US would now ratify it. In the mid and late 1970s, the major issue was the nodules—their exploitation and ownership. I am not sure what is holding it up today. The nodules was just one illustration at the time of the concern existing in the US about giving up any controls to an international body. That concern is of course still alive and well today; it was a major issue in the 1996 presidential campaign. In general, this was not my concern; after all we do it all the time now. I personally did not believe that the manganese nodules had that much value; so I was not too concerned by giving up control over that resource to an international body. I thought that from a military and strategic view point, we had a lot at stake on such issue as the right of free and innocent passage, as well as the opportunity to operate in the economic zones of other countries. Those were far more important issues—and advantages—for the US than the nodules. So I thought that the advantages of the treaty far outweighed the disadvantages and therefore did and still believe that it should be ratified by the US.
We may have made a mistake by assuming that our strategic and military rights would have been satisfied with or without treaty because of our power; I think that may have been more wishful thinking than reality. Our assumption led us to make the resource issues uppermost in our list of objectives, rather than the strategic and military ones. It was true that in terms of fisheries and economic zones there were major resources at stake, which we claimed. But the deep sea mining was not an important resource; our position was dictated more by the “Glomar Explorer” and CIA operations. We may in fact have been hoodwinked ourselves by the CIA's cover story. My work on the Law of the Seas brought me into contact with representatives of the private sector concerned with one phase or another of the draft treaty. These were essentially information-exchange opportunities; I was not subjected to lobbying—that came later.

I learned a lot about how the US government handles a very complicated subject like the Law of the Seas. In fact, it became a traveling road show with negotiations being held all over the world. US representatives were on the road all of the time. Country alliances changed depending on the specific issues. It was not just rich vs poor, or East vs West; sometime alliances would be formed by coastal states with similar coast lines, peninsular countries would align, etc. There were several very strange international alliances which one would not expect given the state of international affairs in the late '70s. In Washington, there were very few governmental bureaucracies which could not legitimately claim some interest in one Law of the Seas issue or another. That made coordination a very complicated task—probably one of the widest ever undertaken by an administration. I thought that our coordination efforts were more successful than most of other nations. We had a lot of talented people working on the issues, engaged in the debate. We had a pretty good inter-agency coordinating mechanisms; we had good lead negotiators who knew their briefs thoroughly, well supported by experts. I think we were well represented in international councils, despite the complicated nature of the subject and the broad participation by many, many US agencies—not to mention Congressional interests.
We did on occasion cede leadership on specific issues to another country and then we would make some of our expertise available to that country if necessary. So we were central to the development of the draft treaty. In the final analysis, the make-or-break issue was an ideological related to rights of Third World countries—the kind of considerations that Jeane Kirkpatrick tackled five years later at the UN. Much of the non-aligned Third World took an ideological position on manganese nodules; in retrospect, it was a rather silly issue. No one is mining that resource twenty years later and those nodules may never be an important resource.

Although still very junior, my work on the Law of the Seas was a good initiation to such eternal issues like Congressional-executive relations and inter-agency coordination. I was involved, both in OMB and the NSC, in trying to prevent Executive Branch representatives from straying too far from Presidential guidance—representing their own institutional perspectives rather than that of the politically elected officials and their Cabinet. There is always a tendency for the bureaucracies to represent their own narrow interests with Congressional committees, undercutting the goals of an administration. So I spent a lot of time trying to minimize that problem.

I had an opportunity to become acquainted with Congressional staff members, primarily on the 200 mile economic zone legislation, which was being considered parallel to the Law of the Seas. On that issue, I did spend a lot of time with Hill staffers, because this was a Congressional initiative. Particularly Ambassador John Norton Moore, the senior official representing the State Department on the Law of the Seas inter-agency committee, was very reluctant to extend economic and fishing zone to 200 miles. He appeared to have a strategy to make the draft legislation so bad that the President would have to veto it. Moore was a wonderful person, but in the case of the 200 mile economic zone, viewed the issue as an international lawyer—which he was; he was firmly opposed to the US moving unilaterally to control vast water areas. He knew that if the US did that, other countries would follow, raising tensions and conflicts which would have been detrimental to us as
well as the whole world. He preferred to deal with the issue in an international treaty, rather than a unilateral piece of US legislation.

So he mounted a campaign of non-cooperation with the Congress on its draft; he thought that no Executive Branch representative should assist Hill staffers in improving the draft; he hoped that it would have been so bad that the President would have been forced to veto it. That created a real problem for the bureaucrats. He didn't however count on the political context in which all legislation was being considered in 1976. President Ford was up for re-election; he needed the support of coastal states. In fact, Ford had privately told people that he would sign the legislation if re-elected. So the Executive Branch had a very senior official unwilling to improve a piece of legislation which his “boss”—the President—was supporting. That situation created a dilemma for us who were aware of the split. At the last minute, we managed to get an inter-agency group together and were able to draft a letter from the Director of OMB suggesting changes that might make the legislation more palatable. That was done at the 11th hour and I am not sure it had very much of an impact. The President signed the legislation.

One other lesson I learned from this experience was to view Congress as a partner—at least not an adversary as many of my colleagues did. I believed at the time that legislation would be enacted and that therefore it was incumbent on the members of the Executive Branch to work with the Hill to draft a bill which could be as acceptable as possible. My work at CRS familiarized me with the Congressional process—at least that used by the Foreign Relations Committee. I recognized that the Law of the Seas and the 200 mile economic zone legislation was very complicated containing provisions for the benefit of various constituencies. It was also clear to me that the legislative drafters had a lot of power. That re-emphasized my views on the importance of working with them.

As I said earlier, when I joined the NSC, Brent Scowcroft was in charge. I was there essentially for the last year of his tenure. Bill Hyland was Brent's deputy. Of greatest interest to me was the fact the Dennis Clift was responsible for both European and Soviet
matters. I worked for him. Dennis was a Europeanist, although he had spent much of his most recent career on the Law of the Seas. Bill spent a lot of time on Soviet and European matters. In the office next to me sat Bob Gates; the three of us were the Soviet and European branch of the NSC.

An NSC staffer has potentially considerable bureaucratic power—open to abuse. Brent saw his role as the “honest broker.” He was personally close to Kissinger—Kissinger having pushed for his appointment as NSC Advisor—and did not see himself or his organization as a competitor to the Secretary of State or the State Department.

Scowcroft viewed the NSC as a facilitator, which insured that the full range of options were listed in any memorandum to the President. He did not see his role as counter-balance to Kissinger. He focused much more on the process, making sure that it worked as smoothly as possible and that it served the President well. He was not the “insider” advisor that Kissinger had been. I thunk from Scowcroft's point of view, he made the right decision; he could never have competed with Kissinger.

I think Scowcroft's approach had a substantial impact on how we worked. We too viewed ourselves more as facilitators than policy developers. We of course added our own recommendations, but the President knew fully where his cabinet officials stood on any national security issue. I thought the process worked well under Scowcroft's management. I think that is the general consensus of those who have studied the NSC as it functioned over the decades.

Given the Kissinger-Scowcroft relationship, we worked very closely with the State Department. That worked well. My contacts with DoD were also very good particularly on the Law of the Seas. I had close ties to Rear Admiral Max Morris who was the key man on the Joint Chiefs on this issue. We were in almost daily contact with him.

The work day at the NSC was somewhat longer than that of OMB. The work load in OMB was seasonal; that is, during budget season, the midnight candle burned brightly. At other
times, the OMB pace was not as frantic. At the NSC, the hours were long every day. I am not sure that all our hours were totally productive. In the first place, I was rather junior; it takes a while for a newcomer to know his or her way around. Furthermore, I joined the NSC in an election year; that forced us to spend time on preparing talking points and briefing papers for the President’s campaign appearances. So a lot of our work that year was “word smithing.”

Most of my work at the NSC had to with Southern Europe. Dennis Clift handled NATO and although on the organization chart I worked for him, Southern Europe was essentially my own portfolio. This was the time when we had a “red scare” in Southern Europe—the Italian Communist Party was at the zenith of its power. There was considerable discussion in Italy about whether the Communists might be asked to join the government. The debate in the US was whether this was a threat to our national security. I must say that personally I did not view them as a great threat. I didn’t see that they were in any position to seize power in Italy or even to have great sway over Italy’s foreign policy. Even if the Communists had joined the government, I don’t think I would have panicked. There was a great difference between the Soviet and the Italian Communists. The latter was a social-democratic version of communism; they did have ties to the Internationale and their communist brethren in other countries. I would not have been very comfortable if the Italian Communists had joined the government or if they had formed the government themselves, but I didn’t think they were a threat to NATO or us.

In the eastern Mediterranean, the Turkish-Greek dispute was still raging in the aftermath of the Cyprus war of 1974. The Turkish troops had landed on the island and were occupying about one third of it. The Greek “lobby” in Congress was in full gear, trying to find ways to punish the Turks. An arms embargo on Turkey had been put into effect. In fact, in part due to Congressional pressure, the administration had chosen sides in the conflict. It was clear to me that because of our position in NATO, we had been able to prevent an escalation of
the conflict and perhaps its spread to other areas. The Cyprus issue was a relatively new one to me. I had been to Greece, but not Turkey or Cyprus.

I spent a some time catching up on the Cyprus dispute. But what happens in a case such as this, an NSC staffer does as much background work—file reading, talking to experts, etc—as he or she has time before tackling the problem before them. But you never have time to study the history of an issue at great length. By 1976, the tensions had cooled enough so that we didn't have to spend a lot of time on Cyprus. It was a minor political domestic issue and it was generally quiescent on the international front so that Cyprus did not need much NSC attention. As I said, the Hill Greek “lobby” was still active, but I spent a lot more time with it when I joined the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff later. But I do remember the Greek “lobby” in 1976 because it was my first real contact with ethnic “lobbies”. I came to realize how powerful such “lobbies” can be and how they work, generally through one or two influential Senators and Congresspersons. When a Senator focus on an issue that his colleagues find marginal to their interests, he or she can have a substantial impact. He or she can do a lot to move US policy in their direction.

Then there were a lot of smaller issues. I don't think the general public understands the time the NSC staff spends on relatively minor matters—such as an earthquake in Italy. That commanded a great deal of time and attention, both in the rescue and reconstruction phases. I think the Italian earthquake was perceived as a domestic political opportunity and therefore that brought the White House into the matter.

I worked on briefing material for President Ford as he prepared himself for the presidential candidate debates.

The domestic politics-international relations nexus reflected itself also in the Law of the Seas deliberations. But the single most important campaign event—from a foreign policy perspective—was Ford's faux pas on Poland. He said that the Poles were “free” and then did not amplify or explain his comment for too many days. Since Poland fell into Clift's area
of jurisdiction, that comment added to our workload. We all gasped when we heard the Ford statement. His talking points may have been too complicated because Ford tried to simplify the issue: Poland wanted to be free, but they were not.

I stayed in the NSC until after the election through a transition period. I witnessed the advent of Brzezinski and then moved to the Hill. I had been in the NSC for less than a year. But that period was useful to me in giving me a perspective on how presidents make decisions—at least formally. I learned what kinds of papers President Ford, at least, found useful for decision-making. I learned that it was important for options to be spelled out clearly and that each Cabinet officer's position is stipulated succinctly, but accurately. I was also able to see the impact of domestic politics on international affairs. In OMB, I had learned about the impact of resources on international affairs; at the NSC, I added some knowledge about the domestic politics-international affairs relationships.

I think that bureaucracies have a hard time handling issues that have a major domestic political component. The Law of the Seas was the prime example of this problem. A bureaucracy will tend to pursue its own narrow interests and perspective, which may not coincide with the a wider presidential view. A president has to deal with his own re-election; he has to consider his administration's position vis-a-vis members of Congress as it relates to a large web of Executive-Legislative relationships. The Ford situation was somewhat unique, both in terms of how he came to be president and in the presence of a unique Secretary of State. Kissinger was quite familiar with the various pressures that a president has to face so that the Department of State positions on various issues usually would have factored in considerations that other bureaucracies might not have—they would usually have been much more parochial.

Q: Then in early 1977, you took a position with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. How did that come about?
BINNENDIJK: When the Carter administration took office, it made major changes in the NSC. Seeing the hand-writing on the wall, I began to canvass the town for alternative employment opportunities. When the Republicans lost in November, 1976, someone said: “It is better to come in than to go out.” He was absolutely right. The transition periods are not pleasant times for the staff of a president who lost in his bid for re-election. Although I was not a political appointee, I was still vulnerable. In fact, this period was a very trying one for me in any case. My mother died in November 1976; that was an emotional burden to carry—it would have been a heavy one in any case, but when added to my employment situation, it made the post-November period a very trying one.

I had one interview with a representative of the incoming administration. That was fairly brief. In any case, they were totally focused on the issues of NSC reorganization and the filling of the senior positions. By late January or early February, I was gone. Bob Hunter, who became the senior NSC official on Europe asked me questions about the history of certain issues. By that time, I was already heading for Foreign Relations Committee—which I considered to be a better job. There were a few people—who had worked with Brzezinski before—stayed on for a while at least. Bill Hyland, I believe, remained until summer—enough time to meet his retirement requirements. He provided some continuity along with Bob Kimmitt who stayed on and a few others; he was a military officer at the time. But the turnover, as is customary in almost all White House staffs—was high between November 1976 and February 1977.

I knew the staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Bob Mantel. He and I became acquainted by working on some mutual policy concerns, while still working at OMB. These policy questions were primarily concerned with our Security Supporting Assistance programs. I knew the 150 budget account (most of foreign affairs expenditures fell into this category) pretty well. Mantel needed a person who had some background in that budget account. Bob set up some interviews for me on the Hill—with people like Norville Jones, the staff director. The interviews went well,
largely, I believe, because of my experience of having worked with budgets and legislation. I knew something about the Middle East and the security issues there. So I had the right credentials to work on security assistance for the Foreign Assistance subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee.

In fact, I went to work for Hubert Humphrey, who was the chairman of the Foreign Assistance subcommittee. He had returned to the Senate after his Vice-Presidential stint. He essentially ran the full committee from his seat as subcommittee chairman. It was a great pleasure for me to work with him in what turned out to be the last year of his life. I became his expert on Security Assistance—which became a great entry into all sorts of issues handled by the Foreign Relations Committee. It was the core of most of the foreign assistance legislation. All the arms sales request that were sent to the Committee for review fell on my desk. So it was a fantastic assignment.

The basic legislation—Arms Export Control Act—had been rewritten in 1976. We continued to refine the procedures through 1977 and 1978. As I said, I worked initially with Bob Mantel, then Chuck Meissner and later Dick McCall. All very fine public servants.

The key issue of that legislation was the Congressional role in the process. The new act gave Congress a far greater say in the arms sales and military assistance programs of the US government. So in 1977 we had a base for a new Congressional role, which we shaped and refined in subsequent years. For example, the 1976 act (Section 36b) required the administration to give Congress advance warning on any major sales programs. Congress also began to require a list of possible weapons systems that might be purchased by a recipient of military assistance. In Section 36b of the new act, a whole new process was established giving Congress the right to veto any proposed major weapons transfers—whether financed by the government or not. Although the new authority has not been used too frequently, it has played a major role in discussions of AWAC sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia and the sale of some other major weapon systems, especially to the Middle East—e.g. F-15s to Saudi, Hawks to Jordan. The Congressional
role was seen as a break against a perceived run-away military equipment sales program. Humphrey was concerned by the rising levels of sales; they had been escalating for the past few years—partly as the result of “Vietnamization”—i.e. provide the Vietnamese with sufficient weapons to be able to defend themselves—the “Nixon” doctrine. There was also a policy of strengthening the Shah so that he could become in essence the policeman in the Middle East—a vacuum left by the British withdrawal which we could not fill ourselves; so we turned the job over to the Shah. That required major arms sales. In general, the basic policy of the 1970s was to send arms rather than our own military. Without necessarily objecting to the basic policy premise, the Foreign Relations Committee did become concerned with the rising levels of arms sales and got the Senate to impose a process which it hoped might slow down arms sales.

One of the major problems seen by the Committee revolved around the Middle East and the “arms race” there. The sale of arms to an Arab country always had to be accompanied by the question: “Will this be a threat to Israel?” Israel relied then and now on its technological advantages to off-set its numerical disadvantage.

The second major question had to deal with our technological superiority. Would a sale endanger that superiority by providing an opening for an unfriendly regime to get a hold of a weapon system and reverse engineer its technology enabling it to build an effective counter-weapon—or the use of the weapon against our own troops? Those were important issues for the Committee.

There were some members of the subcommittee who were essentially opposed to any sales of military weapons. But I think the majority of the subcommittee took a balanced approach to the individual sales. Humphrey ran the full committee and Sparkman was the chairman of the subcommittee on military assistance and sales. McGovern, Javits, Case were members of the subcommittee. Javits was a special ally of Humphrey.
I mentioned the Middle East as an area of great interest to the Committee. That led to lengthy discussions about arms sales procedures which led to legislative amendments and refinements. In addition, we were very interested in Carter's arms transfer policy which, although appearing to be very restrictive, was as forthcoming as that of his predecessor. That created considerable tension between theory and practice (or stated policy and implementation). We spent a lot of time trying to figure out what the Carter administration was really trying to achieve. I must say that my attitudes toward arms sales shifted during my stint as a Congressional staffer. I started with some real skepticism about the wisdom of an arms sales program; I even thought that it might be harmful to our foreign policy. In 1977-78, I wrote a report that took me to a number of European countries. In France, I met the Director of Arms Sales in the Foreign Office. Our general attitude toward the French program was negative; we thought that the French pushed their sales much too hard. The French were quite cold-blooded about their rationale; they had to bring down the unit costs of their weapons systems, which could be most easily done by increasing sales and therefore production. At the start of our meeting, he opened that day's edition of Herald Tribune, which had a headline indicating that the US had just agreed to sell F-15s to Saudi Arabia. It was hard then to berate the French for their program since that sale violated our own export restraint policy. It became clear to me that the French viewed arms sales as a means to keep the production of French arms to a level which made it feasible to arms the French army with equipment made domestically.

I also learned quickly on this trip that the adage “If we don't sell, others will” was quite true. It was evident to me that the Europeans, in addition to the commercial advantages, saw arms sales as a vital foreign policy tool. I became convinced that it could be that for us as well, if done carefully. So my attitude towards arms sales did change. I had started with an ideological view—e.g. arms sales were inherently “bad”. I remember writing a paper for Senator Clark, which was published. In that paper, I expressed my views which at the time were quite similar to Clark's. I essentially supported a very restrictive view of arms sales—i.e. arms were just not another commodity, but could have lethal impact and therefore
the US had to be very mindful of military balance, lest it thought an arms sales somehow encouraged one party or other to go to war. Mixed in with that was also the naive view—I was still young at the time—about “merchants of death” —i.e. arms sales may not be moral. As I suggested, that earlier youthful idealism evaporated within a couple of years as I watched the way the world worked. I became convinced that in certain situations, well thought out arms sales could prevent the break-out of conflict. And then there was the French experience. I think at the end of my “apprenticeship” I had a much more realistic and balanced view of arms sales.

As I said, at the time, Carter and his administration had instituted its own arms sales restraint policy. This policy was forcefully enunciated at the beginning of his term. Later on, he sent our arms sales teams; that seemed to me to be inconsistent with the stated policy. But I did not object to the despatch of these teams; I thought their mission made sense. That apparent shift in the administration views also helped to bring me to a more sober position on arms sales.

As I mentioned, I was also intrigued by the question of whether an arms sales destabilized a region. The opponents of a sale often invoked this thesis. That was one of the arguments in opposition to military sales and assistance to Korea. The same was done in the case of Iran. At the time, we were trying to strengthen Iran to withstand pressure from Iraq which we viewed with some suspicion. I think that argument may have resonated with some Committee members in some cases; it didn't make any dent if the issue was aid to Israel. Personally, I think that there are situations in which arms sales can be destabilizing as there are cases when it can bring a balance of power to a region and reduce the potential of a conflict outbreak. So I look at this issue on a case by case basis.

The Foreign Relations Committee staff—Jeff Geoff and Bob Mantel—wrote a very good report, before I got to the Committee, on Iran, focusing on ability of that country to absorb all the new weapon systems as well as the economic impact of Iran's arms acquisition program on the Iranian people. It turned out that the Kemp-Mantel predictions turned out
to be very accurate a few years later. That report touched on many issues involved in sensitive arms sales.

I think that the members of the subcommittee also became less opposed to arms sales as a general concept, although they were quite clearly disturbed by some specific cases. I mentioned earlier, the AWACs sale to Iran; that was a big issue, not because it might have jeopardize the security of the state of Israel (although in retrospect, it might just have done that) but because of concerns about technology transfer; i.e. the transfer of highly sophisticated technology might fall into the wrong hands—including the Soviets. That was Senator John Culver's baby; he really was concerned about that proposed sale.

In fact, I think that the intra-committee debate on arms sales became essentially a debate about our Middle East policy, including the question how to best protect our interests in the region without jeopardizing Israel's security. Much of the debate therefore had to do with Saudi Arabia and the F-15s sale, which really became the crunch point of the debate. Of course, the ideological debate was very much connected with domestic politics. Both the AWAC and the F-15s sales were my first opportunity to watch at close range the impact of one on the other. I watched AIPAC (the premier American lobby for Israel) and others lobby on arms sales to Arab countries. It became clear to me that these interest groups have direct access to Committee members and bear considerable weight. They had long standing personal relationships to Committee members; in some cases, they had common political interests—same constituencies. And there is always the factor of monetary contributions to campaigns. So I learned early that lobbyists were not people to dismissed lightly. The biggest change for me, psychologically, was to come from an academic background and from OMB—in both cases, I like to think, that issues are approached analytically where there is usually a “right” solution or at least a “right” approach- -to a politically charged world, like Congress, where analysis is only one factor in a very complicated set of parameters that have to be taken into consideration. The world of the Hill was political; it was personal. I could not have existed in that atmosphere as just an analyst; I would have been chewed up. I had to pay considerable attention to the
political dimensions of an issue. In some cases, the analysis was just done to support a predetermined outcome; in another cases, I like to think that the analysis led to the final judgement.

It was during the debate about this AWACs sale to Iran that I really came to appreciate how Hubert Humphrey worked. I staffed him on this issue and watched how he used his own forceful personality and contacts to create some mechanisms which would ease Culver's concerns—i.e. a conditional sale. That ability to satisfy all parties enabled the US government to proceed with approval of a sales contract—it actually never was consummated.

Culver was an extremely cautious person. He was probably very concerned about the risks of technology transfers. But it was also a very good political issue for him. He was a young senator, anxious to find a niche for himself and on the AWACs matter, there was an issue that he could pursue on his own. In this case, as I said, it turned out that he was probably correct; that is, if the technology had been provided the Iranians, it may well have fallen into unfriendly hands. It should also note that there weren't many defense production facilities in his state.

I had almost daily contacts with representatives of the defense industry. They would come to see me, but I also sought them out on occasions because I needed information from them. I would call them for technical details on one weapons system or another. They were always forthcoming, although when the information was proprietary, I would be asked what I intended to do with. They knew that we had become an important player in the process who could block any sales that might be proposed; that made them quite prepared to provide us the requested information. In high tech cases, like the F-15s and the AWACs, we had very good cooperation from Boeing and other manufacturers.

It was not very surprising that the defense industry tried to influence us. The provision of information allowed us on the staff to make their case with our principals. By and large,
I thought that their Washington representation was fairly effective. The lobbying was conducted not only by the Washington offices of various manufacturers, but also by trade associations and other institutions who lobbied on behalf of their constituents.

I don't remember in this time period ever turning down a sale proposal outright. We did modify a number of them—most often during the 90 day waiting pre-submission. For example, that was the case of the F-15s for Saudi Arabia—an issue I remember well because I was one of the two staffers that worked on it for a long time—the other being Bill Richardson, later Congressmen Richardson and now our Ambassador at the UN. Bill and I took a trip to Saudi Arabia, spending about a week there. We went to Tabuk—the Saudi airbase not too far from Israel. We wrote a report which resulted in a number of conditions being attached to the sale by Congress, including the prohibition of stationing the planes at Tabuk. We also required that the planes could not have enhanced fuel tanks which would have given them the ability to fly and hover over Israel from most of their airbases. The conditions were primarily intended to prevent the planes from being used against Israel. These were example of some of the restrictions that Congress placed on certain sales, giving it an important say in the arms sales process and providing a consensus behind specific sales.

The second contentious sale to Saudi Arabia was the Reagan administration's proposal for an AWAC sale. I managed both sales for the Foreign Relations Committee. There were different actors in each sale. In the F-15s case, Frank Church was the chairman. In the second case, it was Chuck Percy in charge. In both cases, as I have suggested before, the key issue was whether the sale would endanger the security of Israel, including the question of whether the sales would materially change the arms balance in the region. We faced the question of whether it would be possible to either neutralize the weapon systems in case of conflict or at least limit the damage that the systems might inflict—through some technical fix. I personally approached the issue with an appreciation of the importance of Saudi Arabia to our national interests and those of our European and Japanese allies. I felt that it was important to buttress Saudi Arabia in a rapidly changing political climate in
the Gulf area. In the case of the fighter planes, our manufacturer had competition—e.g. the French Mirages. In the case of the AWAC, the British Nimrod was not in the same technical league. I think the competitive angle made some difference in the argument; it was certainly used by the proponents of the sales—e.g. it would be American technology over which we had some control. In case of the AWAC, there was strong argument made that we controlled the computer tapes and that we could suspend sale of that vital component if the airplane was used in ways contrary to our interests. Furthermore, it would be many years before the Saudis could support the AWAC from their own resources; in the meantime our crews would have to provide that support giving the US additional leverage. For many years, without US support, the AWAC could not fly. Similar arguments were made on the F-15s, although the facts were not as compelling. But looking back on all of these arguments, I think an important point was missed. In fact these two sales, painful as they might have been at the time politically for Senators like Chuck Percy—he probably lost the 1984 election because of his support of the Saudi sales—proved to be providential in 1990-1991 with “Desert Storm” because the two sales provided a commonality of equipment and a basis for the joint operations that resulted in Iraq's quick defeat. The infrastructure that the Saudis built for their AWAC and for their F-15s provide a base on which we built for our “Desert Storm” forces. We also gained a decade of relationships with the Saudi military and political leadership which was invaluable. I doubt that “Desert Storm” could have been conducted as effectively, or at all, had it not been for those two arms sales in '70s and '80s. Back in those decades, there were very few, if any, who foresaw a “Desert Storm”, although in both cases, a threat from the north of Saudi Arabia was considered as probable—in the F-15s case, it was Iraq who was perceived as the potential aggressor and in the AWAC case, it was Iran that was foreseen as the potential problem. We felt that the Saudis should have been given the tools to defend themselves from the threat from the North. So we did a vague unease about the threats that Saudi faced, but I don't think anyone really foresaw anything like “Desert Storm.”
Having seen the process from both the Executive and Legislative Branches, it was clear that the Congressional involvement made life more difficult for the bureaucracy—especially if there are a lot of politicians involved in the decision. But I think in retrospect and if one looks at the broader perspective, one has to conclude that there are sales that require broad national support—or at least force a decision to be made within a broad democratic society and politics. That was certainly true of the F-15 and AWAC sales to Saudi Arabia. This is an excellent example of how the Foundling Fathers want the system of checks and balances to work.

There is no question in mind that arms sales are more than just a commercial transaction. They are an important aspect of our foreign policy. Let me again refer to our sales to Saudi Arabia. We sold major weapon systems, but we sold a lot more than that. Through the sales, we solidified a relationship between our countries. The Saudis built facilities for these weapon systems; they learned how to use American arms through various US training programs. I was and am a strong proponent of IMET (International Military Education and Training). I did work on inserting a human rights component in the military training program, but that was primarily to fine tune a highly cost effective instrument.

Human rights did not become an issue until Jimmy Carter took office, by which time I was working for the Senate. Carter had championed the issue during the presidential campaign. It was an ideological issue which suited Carter's civil rights background. So he alerted people to it, particularly since the '70s was a period when we were supporting some autocrats—in the name of “containment”. Those autocrats didn't always behave “properly”. That raised the policy tension; on the one hand we needed them for our national security, but on the other, they were abusing their citizens. In some ways, it was the Democratic members of Congress that held Carter's feet to the fire—or at least pushing certain reluctant parts of his administration. Senator Dick Clark and some others were very supportive of Carter's policy. They probably pushed the administration even further than it might have wished by, for example, demanding an annual report on the
human rights policies of all aid recipient countries. They also passed legislation to try to institutionalize the human rights policy and therefore make it more difficult for subsequent administrations to reverse course.

There were major disputes in the administration on this issue—even within State Department. Some Members sided with Pat Derian, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, and her supporters in the Department of State in her efforts to apply human rights standards more vigorously to our foreign policy. She insisted on being consulted on all bilateral and multilateral relations. I thought it was important to make a human rights' case, but not to the point where it might undercut our national security interests. I think that on most issues, I probably was in the camp of the regional bureaus as they tried to defend themselves against Derian's vigorous pursuit of changes in US policy towards those countries she found in violation of her human rights standards. But in areas like Latin America, I think in hindsight the Carter human rights policy was not correct, but was instrumental in bringing to all the nations on that continent a democratic political process.

For example, in Argentina where we had a major problem with the “disappeared”, but which was not a country that was of vital importance to us strategically, I was quite comfortable with our efforts to get the message to the military junta that we opposed their system of governance. I remember the day legislation passed on the Senate floor to sanction Argentina by cutting off all arms sales to that country; I thought that was a very appropriate action, even though at the time we did not have a full understanding of how bad the violations really were. The same thing happen later with Chile; I also approved of that. I found it interesting that four years later, in the Reagan administration, Jeane Kirkpatrick used the same analysis, but reached a conclusion 180% opposite from Carter. She in fact drew a distinction between autocrats and totalitarian dictators, giving the former a greater benefit of the doubt, particularly if they were siding with us in the Cold War. This
was one of the great debates of the Cold War. Pat Derian and human rights vs Jeane Kirkpatrick and anti-communism.

The Korea case was somewhat different. I didn't believe that the US could overlook human rights abuses perpetrated by President Park; we in fact saved the life of Kim Dae Jung. But we had in the late 1970s about 40,000 American troops—and many dependents—in Korea with commitments to send more in case of an enemy attack. So that brought different considerations into play. I thought we had to push for better treatment of certain political prisoners, but to the point when we might jeopardize US-ROK relations or require the reduction of our military presence in that country. In the Korea case, the security situation had to seen very high on our policy agenda.

The Korea issue was one of the first major issues that was assigned to me by Hubert Humphrey, who took a very personal interest in this matter. Carter developed, during the presidential campaign, a view that South Korea had accumulated adequate forces to provide for its own security defense. So he did not accept that his policy of US troop withdrawal in five years, based in part at least, on human rights issues, might jeopardize the security of ROK. There may have also been a “Vietnam syndrome” involved in Carter's views. This factor should not be underestimated; in the post Vietnam era, there was a considerable isolationist feeling in the US. People were looking for situations which might risk the lives of American “boys and girls.” And there was Korea. Barry Bleckman, then an advisor to candidate Carter, was, I believe, the strongest proponent of troop withdrawal. He had done some studies and I think he convinced Carter that the South was strong enough to defend itself. It was true that the South was thriving. It was coming out of a long period when it depended on US aid to survive. It was clearly becoming an economic power. It was obvious that the South was a far more powerful economic power than the North. But that was not the full story; it was also obvious that the North had a sizeable military—larger than the South's—and had much of its army forward deployed, ready to
pounce. Furthermore, Seoul, the South's capital, was very exposed and a target that the North might have overrun quickly, despite its economic disadvantage.

In 1977, General Singlaub, Chief of Staff to our CINC in Korea, spoke out, not once, but twice, against the President's troop withdrawal proposal and was therefore released from the Army. In addition, the intelligence community had been asked to make a re-assessment of North Korea's military capabilities. Its report indicated that the North's strength was in fact greater than had been estimated and that in light of new forward deployments, it was in a good military position to launch a strike against the South. One day in the summer of 1977, the Foreign Relations Committee staff was given a CIA briefing. The CIA conclusion, essentially, was that a troop withdrawal over the next five years, would be an invitation to start a war on the Peninsula. I took notes on the briefing as did a newly retired Marine Corps lieutenant general—Herb Beckington—who was working with me on this issue. I wrote a report to the Committee based on the CIA briefing. A couple of days later, Phil Habib, then the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs appeared before the Committee together with the Deputy Director of CIA—a closed session briefing attended by the whole Committee. My report was available to all members. Before the witnesses could even start their briefing, Senator Clifford Case took the floor. He read my report into the Committee record. At that stage, the administration witnesses decided not to testify and withdrew from the briefing, bringing the session to a close right then and there. That episode wetted Humphrey's interest because he was quite hawkish on foreign policy issues. So he charged Beckington and me to pursue the Carter proposal until it had been resolved satisfactorily.

We went to Korea, spending three weeks in briefings, discussions and site inspections. After our trip, we wrote a report, first classified and then declassified, which was published as the “Humphrey-Glenn” report. Unfortunately, the publication was delayed so that by the time it was issued, Humphrey had passed away. But the draft had been circulated and “leaked”; the “Washington Star” carried a big story about it under banner headlines—something along the lines “Humphrey and Glenn oppose Carter on US troop withdrawal
from South Korea.” I didn’t leak the report, but I almost got fired nonetheless. I believe that our report did have an impact and contributed to Carter changing his mind in 1979. The Committee in fact said that troop withdrawal was a bad idea; undoubtedly there were people in the administration who said the same thing, but I think this was a case in which the Senate pushed the President in the right direction. As I have said, I think the Committee was right; troop withdrawal was a bad idea.

During the process of drafting our report, we were in constant contact with the administration, both in the policy making community and the intelligence community. We found very few who really supported Carter. There were some Foreign Service officers who did their best to defend the policy, but when pushed, it was clear they were very nervous about it. In Korea, the defense of the Carter policy was barely evident; there the concern was even higher than it was in Washington. The Embassy opposed to the policy to a large degree; the UN Command was completely opposed as were the Koreans, of course.

I think there are at least two lessons to be drawn from this episode. In the first place, the weight of the evidence was so overwhelming against troop withdrawal; I think the administration representatives behaved very correctly. They used the Congress to defeat a proposal which made very little sense. Once it was clear where Beckington and I were heading, we got maximum cooperation from administration officials, giving us all the information we wanted. In fact, we were inundated. The other lesson I learned is that one has to be very careful in translating campaign rhetoric into official administration policy, especially on foreign policy issues. I don't think that candidate Carter's campaign statements were adequately reviewed and analyzed before they became President Carter's policy. We have seen that syndrome subsequently, but this was my first encounter with what I consider an unfortunate process. So I learned a lesson, which was reinforced by my experiences with the Carter arms transfer policy. A new administration needs to weigh very carefully all of the proposals that candidates may have made in the heat of a campaign during which they tend to take ideological positions to satisfy certain
constituencies which may not make any sense as a responsible administration position. Since the Carter administration, as I have suggested, I have seen that mistake made over and over again—the latest being perhaps Clinton and China policy.

Some Senators, like Dick Clark, supported strong US stands against human rights abuses. They felt that those issues needed to be brought to the attention of the American public. So they supported legislation which forced public disclosure and discussion of human rights violations—such as the legislative provision that required an annual report on the human rights situations in all countries receiving US aid. That legislation was passed during my first year on the Committee. Then there were other Senators, such as John Glenn, who insisted that other considerations also be taken into account when looking at our relationships to countries such as Korea. Chairman Humphrey was very liberal on domestic issues; he was much more conservative on national security issues. So in the year I worked for him, I saw him as having a balanced view of US interests. He paid attention to questions of military balance and national interests, besides human rights.

While on the subject of military balances, let me talk a little about the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) agreements which took up much of my time. The SALT II debates that took place in 1978-79 are the ones I can recollect most vividly. I spent hundreds of hours in my office and the Committee hearings, preparing for and listening to testimonies, Committee discussions and drafting legislation. By this time, Frank Church had become chairman of the Committee. SALT II was under negotiation at the time, but the Committee felt—rightly so—that on a treaty of this importance, it should maintain an almost daily watch. Committee members were not part of the US negotiating team, as they were in subsequent START negotiations, but we were continually briefed on the status of the negotiations. Later on, an “Arms Control” working group was established which gave Congress a much greater role in the negotiations. In fact the Committee was faced in 1979 by a choice: take up SALT or the Panama Canal treaty. It decided to focus on the latter first—which was probably the fatal blow to SALT.
As I said, the Committee spent a lot of time on SALT, even though in the final analysis it officially discussed the Panama Canal treaty first, as I said. These sessions certainly changed the consensus in the Committee. We had votes to pass it and to send it to the Senate floor for ratification. If that had happened, I think the Senate would have ratified it. Then came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which killed all hopes of a treaty ratification. The process was also delayed by Senator Frank Church who was in Idaho campaigning when he was told about a “new” Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. His response to reports of the Soviet brigade was to postpone SALT on the senate floor. He acted without benefit of committee staff and committed what in my view was a serious strategic blunder.

I must say that arms control was a relatively new field for me. I was only peripherally involved in the issue when in the Executive Branch. I had studied the subject at Fletcher and I had some understanding of the weapon systems involved, but I was far from an expert. But I learned rapidly in the 1978-79 period. The Executive Branch, as I mentioned, did a good job of keeping us posted and providing us with briefings on the various issues that SALT was confronting. Secretary Vance appeared before the Committee on an almost regular basis; Les Gelb was there as well during the Carter administration. The briefings were thorough; I think it is fair to say that by the time the Committee was ready to work on the draft treaty, it was quite familiar with all the issues. I remember the day when Vance appeared to brief the committee in March 1977, just before going to Moscow. It was a disastrous negotiation which set the whole process back a couple of years. I think we need to define the word “briefing”. When an administration witness appears before any Congressional committee, he or she can expect to hear the views of the members; that turns “briefings” into a type of “consultation”. I am not sure that policy changes because of the members' inputs; I can't recall any major changes that were made in US positions on SALT issues as result of Congressional briefings, although perhaps the administration's views were shaped by what it already knew of members' positions.
But in the case of arms sales, members' views certainly had an impact. Let me just illustrate that by recalling the proposed sale of F-5 Es to Morocco. That was a classic example of how Executive-Legislature consultations should be conducted. Bob Flaten, then a deputy assistant secretary for Congressional Relations under Brian Atwood, and some of his colleagues came to see us to tell us that the administration was considering approving such sale. They gave us a range of options they were considering and asked for Committee advice. The Committee asked for some time to think about the issue. It sent Pauline Baker, Stan Simbevitch and me to Morocco to investigate. After visiting Algeria and the Spanish Sahara we wrote a report, which recommended an alternative solution, although all three of us had different recommendations. The Committee discussed our report and voted to support my recommendation, which was the “middle” option—go ahead with the sales with some restrictions. Church and Javits jointly signed a letter on behalf of the Committee to Vance, making its views known and basically that was the position that the administration adopted in the final analysis. This was a case in which the administration worked very closely with the Committee to develop a position which was not too far from its preferred option. I think if the sale notification had been sent to Congress without advance consultation it would have created a much greater stir and would have raised many issues that would have in the short term at least been seen by the Moroccans as “unfriendly”.

My experience in both the Executive and Legislative Branches suggests that there are two fundamental rules that the bureaucracy should follow: a) stay in constant touch with key Congressional committee staffs, don't appear only when you need them; b) be prepared to bargain. I had to learn the latter lesson on several occasions. Politicians need to have “victories” to take home to their constituencies; if you anticipate their wishes and draft legislation to satisfy their requirements, you deny them the opportunity to take credit for some changes that they were able to effect. In fact, I think that there are times when an administration is well advised to submit legislation which is more rigid than the situation might require in the anticipation that it will be “watered” down in the bargaining process,
coming out where the administration wanted to be in the first place and at the same time
giving the politicians a victory. It is important that members of Congress be able to walk
away with some concessions—as long as they are reasonable—so that they can return to
their constituencies with some concrete evidence of their influence.

On the legislative side, the principals and their staffs need information—full and accurate.
Secondly, committees have to have staffs that are knowledgeable so that they can
pursue issues with some sophistication. But no one in Congress should wish to see the
information provided by the Executive end up in the media. Confidentiality is essential.
We had some real problems with this issue in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
A couple of staffers were fired for leaking information to the media. A staff that is not
trusted becomes irrelevant; the Executive will not provide it with needed information
thereby rendering it totally ineffective. When it comes to maintaining confidentiality, some
Congressional committees did that better than others. The Intelligence committees have
been historically very good on this score. Foreign Relations has historically had a bad record.

There is no question that ethnic politics play an important role in the foreign policy process.
There is no way to avoid that in our democracy. That influence however needs to be
limited somewhat. Committees have to be balanced between those who represent ethnic
blocks and those who have a broader perspective. A member should not be representing
exclusively the interests of just one ethnic group; he or she should also be mindful of the
needs of the country as a totality. I am sure we will return to this issue when I discuss
Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relationships and the Middle East.

Let me reflect briefly on what I learned as a staffer. One, you need to win and hold the
confidence of your senator. Two, you need to have a certain level of technical knowledge
—or you need to learn it quickly when needed because senators will have technical
questions and their confidence in you will rise and fall depending on their perceptions
of your knowledge base. Three, you have to have some sense of the political dynamics
which may play on any particular issue. Four, some senators look for different things in people; some come to an issue without having prejudged it and therefore are looking for staff input; others just want staffers who will implement their views without questioning. That difference in approach forces a staffer to decide the kind of person he or she is. There are many who work on the Hill primarily to follow their own agendas—or they work for a senator who has a similar agenda to theirs; then there other staffers, like myself, who view themselves as servants of the committee, and as such a servant of a broader constituencies and issues and interests. I think that in the eight years I spent with the Foreign Relations Committee, I probably spent more time preventing bad outcomes than working on legislation that might achieve positive results. By “bad outcomes”, I refer to amendments proposed by senators who were trying to serve particularly narrow constituencies. Those pieces of legislation were usually drafted very sloppily, were not well considered and most often would have had unintended negative consequences. Although my main task was to insure passage of legislation, I tried to make sure that it was the right legislation. I had to develop a sense of where people were coming from—both from the Legislative and Executive Branches. Since I knew that passage of legislation required a consensus, I found myself often trying to tame wild ideas, either by shaping them to make them acceptable or pushing to see them rejected outright. There is no shortage of wild ideas in the halls of Congress—at least that was my experience.

When I got to the Committee in 1977, the Committee staff was a single unit. There was no majority or minority staff. There were also very few people on senators' personal staffs which devoted themselves exclusively to foreign affairs. Most members did not have sufficient funds to have a member of their staffs focused exclusively or even primarily on foreign affairs. There were some, but relatively few. Then in 1979, when Javits became the ranking minority senator on the Committee, a minority staff was created. He did that because other Republicans—Helms and others—forced him to do it. That created a bifurcated Committee staff, with all of the consequences of such action. Pete Lakeland, the newly appointed minority staff director, turned out to be a good guy to work with—basically
a centrist who was sometimes a little cantankerous. Lakeland had been a Foreign Service Officer who had worked on Javits' personal staff. Regardless of Lakeland's willingness to cooperate, the long range impact of the 1979 management change was a politicalization of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff.

Then in 1980 or 1981, an amendment was passed which created personal representatives of members (PRM). That enabled all members of the Committee to employ on a full time basis a staffer to work on foreign affairs. The new system was probably intended to give each member more “clout” on foreign policy issues by giving each a staffer who could specialize in that area.

As I said before, some members had done that earlier using other resources, but in the early 1980s, funds were actually appropriated for the purposes of employing foreign affairs specialists on every member's personal staff. That created a whole new constituency with which the Committee staff had to deal. That was a tremendous complication because all these new staffers had to justify their existence by drafting amendments, which the Committee staff had to review and comment on. These new staffers also became a barrier to free flowing dialogues between the member and the Committee staff. For example, during my first four years on the staff, we used to draft most of the questions that members might ask during a hearing. After 1980, those questions had to be filtered through the PRMs, which was not very satisfactory from the Committee's staff's point of view, although perfectly legitimate. As manager of some hearings, I would have preferred obviously to be able to control the whole process, but after 1980 that was not really possible. Senators obviously have the right to bring their own perspectives to the hearing room and to use their personal staffs as they saw fit. We could always rely on the Chairman and some members to raise issues that we felt were important, so that the Committee staff was not totally out of the ball game. The other side of that coin was a much greater danger; that is, issues would be raised for which the staff was not fully prepared or issues might be raised which were not appropriate for a public fora. The administration's witness could be counted
on to suggest that the issue be pursued in a private session which would take care of the immediate problem.

There was little similarity between the staff I joined in 1977 and the one I left in 1985. By 1985, the staff was politicized surrounded by individual senator's staff members—all looking to justify their raison d'etre. Those developments changed the legislative process from a fairly effective one managed by a small cohesive staff to a chaotic situation with too many players having too many different agendas and masters to serve.

We all had direct access to members—even after the reorganization—if you knew them well enough. Congress is highly personalized; so that if a member wants to use a certain staffer, he will go directly to that staffer bypassing any organizational charts that may have been established. So sometimes you have Democratic staffers doing work for Republican Senators or Republican staffers working for Democratic Senators. Party labels in a committee situation have little significance. It was much more difficult for staffers to develop relationships with new Senators or Senators with whom they may not have had any relationship previously. That was particularly true after the reorganization because then members hired their “experts” for their personal staffs and then those staffers become the spokesperson. So the reorganization did create barriers between members and the committee staff to the detriment I suspect of the committee's work because staffers were not as cognizant as before of members' views and desires. From the perspective of a member, the new system gave them him or her more resources, but I think the system became overloaded with all these new participants to the detriment of the Committee's work.

With the new staff members trying to make names for themselves and prove their worth, the committee staff was kept busy just trying to keep track of what various people were trying to do—avoiding duplication, arbitrating between disputing staffers, etc—and as I said, trying to deflect the dumbest ideas. The Foreign Assistance Act is a good illustration. Whenever that bill came up for review, the staffers and their principals would always
add so many amendments that eventually the Committee could not pass any legislation. In the late 1970s, foreign aid bills were passed as they came up for consideration; we passed one in 1981. After that, no Foreign Assistance authorizing legislation was passed while I was on the Committee staff—the mid 1980s. Senator Lugar finally passed a bill in 1985. I think that was clear evidence that the reorganization of the Committee and the changed legislative process became a barrier to the passage of important foreign policy legislation. The administration in that time period was Republican; the Senate was run by Republicans, but many Democratic Senators were able to weigh down the legislation with their own pet amendments. I also think that by the early 1980s, the administration recognized that it did not need authorizing legislation. The foreign assistance programs proceeded on the basis or appropriations. Since the Foreign Relations Committee could not get its act together, it was effectively cut out of the legislative process. Under Secretary of State Bill Schneider was good at working the appropriations process in a way which excluded the authorizing committee.

Let me just briefly expand on Salt II and the Foreign Relations Committee work on that. The Committee first hired Rick Inderfurth as deputy director. He had been Zbig Brzezinski's special assistant; on the NSC he had worked much of his time on the Salt II treaty, so that he knew the subject matter very well. When he joined the Committee staff, he set up a small working group which included Eric Newsom, Rich Davis and others. I was bogged down on a lot of other legislation, but I attended most of the meetings of the group and did some work for it. The group generated an enormous volume of paper-work. The Committee hired some experts in addition—people like Ed Lutwak who worked as consultant to Howard Baker. The Committee hired some consultants as well to do some specific piece of work. So a lot of expertise was being accumulated quickly by the Committee in preparation for hearings on SALT II. There must have been well more than 100 witnesses appearing during the hearings. I think it is fair to say that by the time the hearings were essentially over, the Committee had lots of information—from witnesses, from the Inderfurth group, from hired consultants. When it came to vote, the
Committee had enough information to make an informed judgement. There were a number of members who took enough time to learn the details of an arms control agreement, but there was just too much to know to expect all members to be thoroughly familiar with all aspects. So the members began to look at SALT II in light of their unique interests. For example, Senator Stone looked at the treaty from a Cuban angle—e.g. Cuban expatriates in Florida—which was somewhat irrelevant to the treaty, but that is the way he approached the issue. John Glenn specialized in verification, etc. Joe Biden tended to rebut arguments against the treaty that had just been made by Baker. I think most of this happen by accident; I don't recall Chairman Church ever making specific assignments to individual Committee members.

The Salt treaty is a good illustration of problems any legislature has when confronted with issues of a highly technical nature. It takes a lot of time to learn the intricacies of various weapon systems. What usually happens is that individual members become “experts” on one esoteric matter or another and become the Committee's spokesperson on that issue —i.e. other members rely on the judgement of their “expert” colleague. So a Committee has a reed to lean on and that it can worry about the domestic political pressures and the international strategic dynamics. I think by and large, committees than tend to come up with reasonable legislative solutions. I think we would have ratified SALT II had it not been for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the “Soviet brigade” in Cuba.

Of course, a SALT-like process starts with government-to-government negotiations. It is not clear to me that in SALT II, administrations dealt with the issues always in the most intelligent way. So the legislature does the best it can with an imperfect instrument, recognizing that the process is not perfect from beginning to end. But as I said, the end of the SALT II process would have been successful had it not been for an unrelated event.

When faced with a complex matter like SALT, members have to rely on staff to do the spade work. Members than have to have enough confidence in that staff to accept its findings and at least most of its recommendations. The staff provides the expertise
and must provide competent answers to members' questions. It is also the committee staff's responsibility to keep the individual members' staffers informed. During the SALT proceedings, we had almost daily briefings for staffers of Senators who were not members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Some of these briefings were held together with members of the Executive Branch. When there was a mark-up on any piece of legislation, we would bring the Executive Branch representatives together with our staff and the PRMs of Committee Senators for foreign aid legislation. I would often chair those sessions. We would review documents together and exchange views so that all parties had an idea where the others were coming from. That was helpful to me and to my Committee staff colleagues because we then had a better idea on what amendments we might expect from Committee members.

Of course, discussions of legislation dealing with arms control brought us in close contact with the Armed Service Committee. That relationship was sometimes contentious, especially in the first four years of the Reagan administration. Then there were a lot of "turf" fights between the two committees. John Tower, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, was very aggressive. So we had a lot of fights over jurisdiction, some on the senate floor. On SALT II, jurisdiction was assigned to the Foreign Relations Committee, but the Armed Services Committee acted as if it had jurisdiction—had hearings, voted on the legislation, submitted a report, etc.

If the issue is one of Committee jurisdiction, the staff is often more zealous trying to protect its principals "turf" than the principals. I can recall several meetings that I attended where Chairmen Percy and Tower tried to straighten out jurisdictional problems. These were always in addition to the meetings that the two staffs held trying to iron out as many of the disputes as we could. Not all issues needed to be ratified by the two Chairmen; after a while a good staffer knows his principal well enough to know which matters must be raised with him or her and which can be settled at lower levels. It shouldn't take a good staffer too long to understand which issues need a Senator's personal involvement, which just require that information be passed on and which need not to be brought to his or her
attention at all. One thing that a staffer should never allow: never have another Senator have information that your principal did not have. That would be a cardinal sin. If an issue was likely to be raised with one principal by another, a staffer better be sure that his principal knew something about it.

Let me make a few comments about foreign aid in general. As I said, after 1981, the Committee could not pass authorizing legislation—too many competing views. There were specific foreign aid programs such as the one to Israel that grew dramatically during my tenure on the Committee staff. Dick McCall and I drafted the legislation that followed the Camp David accords. That established aid levels for Israel and Egypt that have essentially been maintained ever since. The ratio of the size of the two programs was set in that act. Once the aid programs had reached that very high level, the Israeli “lobby “ became our best ally in trying to get Congressional approval of the aid package. Of course, once it became clear that the authorizing committees were “paper tigers”—i.e. unable to pass aid legislation—, the “lobby” focused on the appropriations committees which then actually approved the funding levels.

I must say that Hubert Humphrey was a wonder on the Senate floor. I saw him cajole people into voting for foreign assistance. Harry Byrd would always submit an amendment to substantially reduce the size of the bill; by the time Humphrey was done, the cut was minuscule, but he kept Byrd happy. Humphrey was just beautiful to watch in action. He was a firm believer in the concept of foreign aid, for humanitarian reasons and for economic development and for national security concerns. He was the kind of guy who could do that—cut through all the issues and deal on a personal level with differing individuals, who in one way or another would be drawn into the process and would assist Humphreys in the achievement of his objectives.

Frank Church was very different. He took the chairmanship of the Committee very close to election time. He was nervous about his chances of re-election, with good reason. He therefore saw his role as making a sufficiently large reduction in the assistance programs
to enable him to appear before his constituency making the case that he was using his power as Committee chairman to save them money or to cut waste or stop sending the taxpayer's money overseas. He was therefore not a proponent of foreign aid; his interest was primarily in reducing the size of the programs. As I said, his re-election weighed heavily on his mind, but even before that Church was not a great supporter of foreign aid. I don't think that Church felt that foreign aid was of great benefit to the US; he certainly did not have the same views about the programs as Hubert Humphrey did.

There were a number of Committee members that a staffer could always approach for help—such as “Mac” Mathias. He was very helpful on issues dealing with the World Bank and related international financial institutions, which did not have much support on the Committee. Mathias was always willing to provide support on those issues—we would give him talking points as he was rushing to the Senate floor to participate in the foreign assistance debate. I think that neither the Committee nor the Senate had a bias against the UN or international institutions in general, but the international financial institutions were a particular problem. One of the problems was that usually the budgetary request for these institutions were quite large because they would need replenishment after each period of a few years. IDA (International Development Assistance), which provided loans on very generous terms, was high on the agenda of those who opposed the international financial institutions. IDA requests would often be cut because the Senate could not see an immediate pay-off for the US from these funds. So it would make substantial cuts in the administration's request. By and large, the Democrats on the Foreign Relations Committee were more supportive of multi-lateral approaches to foreign assistance—as compared to bilateral. The Republicans were just the opposite preferring the bilateral approach. That is a generalization, but I think fairly represents a difference of approaches between members of both parties. We often had battles over allocations to individual countries. The Committee generally made reduction in the administration's requests either to show its willingness to make cuts or because it was unhappy with the policies of specific countries. For example, the Committee would almost always cut assistance to Turkey—primarily
at the urging of the Greek “lobby”—sometimes there were even Turkish transgressions that might have justified some reductions. We had battles over grant aid and over the 7:10 aid ratio between Greece and Turkey. As I said, most of the battles in the Committee were about the level of assistance programs to specific countries. There was no general “isolationist” trend, as some observers suggest exists today.

If there was an area of general concern, it was about military assistance—certainly among the Democrats. They were more suspicious of military assistance then economic aid, primarily because much of the military assistance was being provided to autocratic regimes, whose human rights record left much to be desired. There were a few members of the Committee that were philosophically opposed to foreign assistance, but most of that opposition arose during the floor debate from Senators who were not members of the Committee—like Harry Byrd. Those Senators would never vote for foreign aid under any circumstances; they spent their time on the floor criticizing one aspect of the program or another, trying to bring down the level of assistance whenever possible.

I must say that to maintain that there was a consensus on the Committee on overall US foreign policy objectives, as might be expressed in legislation, would be an overstatement. A Committee makes its views known in legislation mark-up sessions. These are often bargaining sessions in which broad foreign policy objectives become almost irrelevant to the specific issues that needed to be addressed by the Committee. A bill would finally be cobbled together which would be reported to the Senate floor. Along with the bill, the Committee would also issue a report which would be used to justify and rationalize the need for the legislation. That report was principally staff -drafted, with individual Senators being asked to approve specific language dealing with issues of concern to them. But a “Committee report” is essentially a report written by the staff; it is an opportunity for a general statement of purpose of the legislation. In the case of foreign assistance, the report would begin with making a case for the programs—both in general and country by country (for the most important countries). Our reports in the late ’70s and early ’80s would
include commentary on the results achieved by the country programs to date and justify the new levels as a reflection of continued progress toward some stated objectives.

We would make the argument that economic assistance—including supporting assistance—was justified in part at least by its importance to the US national security—by providing certain countries with economic development programs that were intended to stem the “Communist tide”. In retrospect, I am not sure that that was a valid argument, but we made it at the time. I think, again in retrospect, that the argument that some of the military assistance was indeed helpful in a Cold War context. There were undoubtedly some cases of economic assistance—such as Point Four and the Marshall Plan—where it could be demonstrated that the spread of Communism was probably prevented by such assistance, but the cases would be very few because the infusion of aid had to be of such magnitude that the US could afford only a few efforts of such kind. Korea is a good example of such effort. There a combination of our assistance and multi-lateral assistance along with economic reform made a difference. The assistance was large enough and the domestic economic leadership strong enough to prevent a collapse. But most of our country programs were too small to make much of an impact on the political orientation of the leadership; these were programs in areas of the world which were of marginal interest to us. So I think in retrospect, the cases where economic assistance was a key ingredient in stopping a potential communist take-over were few and far between—although those cases were of great significance to our national interests—e.g. Western Europe, Korea, Egypt, Greece and Turkey.

I traveled to many countries where we had assistance programs. I have come to the conclusion that such assistance can make a difference if the US is prepared to make a significant contribution—as in Egypt, for example. Year after year—after Camp David—, we have provided roughly $750 million of economic assistance to that country. Now one can go to Egypt and notice that an infrastructure has been created—a water system a sewerage system, a road system. It works; one can function now in Cairo and in Egypt in general. Many of the prevalent diseases have been eradicated. Whether that progress
will guarantee Egypt's friendship in perpetuity, I don't know. A case can be made that the government is still insufficiently concerned with the common Egyptian and that the Muslim Brotherhood has shown far greater concern, but it is clear that without our assistance, Egypt would have been in deep trouble a long time ago. Of that, I am positive. So in the case of Egypt, our economic assistance has made a major difference.

Where we had smaller programs, we undoubtedly saved some lives. We fed some starving people, but we had probably very little impact on the economic policies of the country or on its general economic development. Where a program works hand-in-glove with international financial institutions and with other assistance programs and is directed to bringing about basic economic reforms, that has an impact and over time brings some welcomed political change, as in certain Latin American countries. On that continent, we now have some 33 democracies with essentially market-oriented economic systems; I believe that US assistance was useful in bringing political and economic change in these countries over a long period of time. In Africa, on the other hand, I don't think our assistance has made much of a difference. We have provided aid there for humanitarian reasons, but it had no impact on fundamental political or economic orientation. We did provide large amounts of aid to Vietnam, but its impact was over-ridden by armed conflict.

As I gained seniority on the Committee staff, my contacts with the Executive Branch increased. I gained a position which enabled me to deal with office directors and deputy assistant secretaries, and sometime even assistant secretaries; they would return my phone calls, particularly as they got to know me. I worked with both State and Defense. It of course was to their advantage to talk to me if they wanted to influence the legislation we were drafting. So I gained a good overview of how the Executive Branch worked. I am not sure that seniority was as important to the Executive Branch people as the staffer's recognized ability to influence legislation and individual legislators. A young staffer who is recognized as an influential person with a senator will be courted by the Executive Branch as much as someone who may have been on the staff for many years. It is the ability of the staffer to be influential that makes the difference as far as the Executive
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Branch is concerned. The hierarchy on Congressional staffs is entirely different than it is in the Executive Branch. In the ladder, you have titles that denote your standing in the pecking order. On the Hill, the measure is entirely different; your position in that hierarchy is entirely dependent on your personal relationships with one or more of the principals. People have learned that and react correspondingly.

The Legislative-Executive Branch relationships, at staff level, was a two way street. I would sometime initiate a dialogue; at other times, it was the Executive Branch representative who would do so. As people become more and more intimately acquainted with each other, the contacts become more and more routine. It might vary from period to period. During a mark-up period, for example, would have a stack of 20-30 phone calls notices on my desk because I would be managing the passage of legislation of interest to a large number of people, who were anxious to get their views to you, most usually on specific sections.

I developed a deep institutional loyalty to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the almost ten years I worked there. So I came to view myself as a protector of the institution and its prerogatives. Perhaps because of that, there often developed a certain build-in tension between my own position and attitudes and that of Executive Branch officials and of other committees. We defended different institutions and perspectives. Very often legislation had as much to do with that issue—"turf"—as it did with substance. "Turf" battles were everlasting. I felt the need to defend the Committee's prerogatives. So I am sure that there were a number of tense relationships that were caused by our employment. At the same time, I hope I was also perceived as being fair and even-handed, not captured by ideology or an ethnic lobby. So on the one hand, I was very "turf" conscious, but I tried my best to approach issues with an open mind as far as the substance was concerned. I tried to use the analytical skills that I developed in academia and OMB even though I worked in a highly politically charged atmosphere where other factors beyond analysis were very important.
As far as “turf” was concerned, there were two sets of issues. The first had to do with the Senate itself and its prerogatives vis-a-vis the Executive Branch. The 1970s-1980s were a period when it was fashionable to write and talk about the “Imperial Presidency” and the power shift that had allegedly taken place, giving the Executive Branch primacy over the Legislative Branch. This view began to be expressed even before Carter when the Executive and Legislative Branches were run by the same political party, the Democrats. After the two branches were run by different parties, the attitudes that were developed about the Executive Branch during the Nixon-Ford years did not change and carried over into the Carter years and even into the Reagan presidency. There was a sense that legislation which would provide more power to the Legislative Branch had to be passed. The War Powers Resolution is one example of this. Another is Section 36 (b) of the Arms Export Control Act, which I discussed earlier, was a good example of that. It set up mechanisms which would automatically give the Congress and its relevant committees final jurisdiction over what had been an executive responsibility. There were several instances of such actions. It is true that 36 (b) was not initially a “turf” question but stemmed from a concern on the part of a number of Senators about the “mindless” arms sales program managed by the Executive; but it turned out to be a “turf” issue because final jurisdiction shifted to the Legislative Branch. That “turf” issue became very important to subsequent elaborations of 36(b), like the Javits amendment which required that the Executive Branch submit an annual list of arms sales that would take place in the ensuing twelve months. This was a compromise that I designed as an alternative to a much more onerous amendment which would have required annual authorization for all arms sales. This was another effort by the Senate to get information on arms sales in order to have greater control on that process; that is the essence of a “turf” battle. I think that the revisions of the Arms Export Control Act were a legitimate exercise of Congressional over-sight responsibilities, within certain constraints. I must admit that some of it got silly. A lot of information was sent to us at Congressional request which was never used; that was a waste of everybody's time. But when we were notified of a major arms sale to a sensitive region or country, like to certain countries in the Middle East which might be
threat to Israel, that sent out early warning signals and was a valuable contribution by the Legislative Branch to the arms sales process. I felt that if I was going to be effective as a Senate staffer I would need to know about these issues at the earliest possible moment. These key arms sales represented major policy questions which were properly under the purview of the Legislative Branch and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee specifically.

It turned out that after long and painful debates that the Senate's involvement helped produce a process, whether the Executive liked it or not, which led a national decision that allowed the sales to go forward. The AWAC sales approval depended on one or two votes; they were very dramatic final votes with every member of the Senate present sitting in their seats awaiting the outcome. There was a process that led to national decisions. They were the right decisions reflecting the original wishes of the administration, ratified by the people's representatives. Big important sales needed the approval of the Legislature to make it legitimate. Frankly, if that process had not been in place, the sales might have been approved by the administration, but those actions might have been overturned by the legislature. That was not a far-out scenario; I think it could have happened that way. Even if the sales themselves would not have been blocked, the legislature might have found more circuitous ways to make its displeasure known both to the administration and the recipient countries. By having the process in place, the right decision was reached by the whole US government.

The question of Committee jurisdiction—in the case we are discussing between Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees and the Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees—is often about “gray” areas. In this particular case, there were issues that had to do with the US military; e.g. arms sales that might effect readiness. So there will be legitimate areas of over-lap. In our case, we also had to contend with John Tower, who was much more conservative than Chuck Percy. He may have felt that Percy was not adequately defending “true conservative” Republican positions. He used his role as Committee chairman to counter-balance what he considered Percy's over-liberal stance.
on some issues. As for arms sales, we would normally discuss all the major ones with my counterparts on the Armed Services Committee, even if they had no official voice. But it was important to know what their views were—which often reflected the Pentagon's views. In some cases, such as the AWAC's case, the Armed Services Committee supported the Foreign Relations Committee's position and that was of course of great help to us. Tower's ability to turn Senator Cohen around was crucial to obtaining Senate approval in 1981-82. The Tower/Percy alliance made it possible to get approval.

These jurisdictional fights were usually started at staff level. Then the principals would get involved and if they couldn't resolve it, the issue on a couple of occasions actually ended up on the Senate floor with a vote deciding Committee jurisdiction. We generally lost on the floor because Tower had better contacts with his colleagues than did Percy. The hot battles dealt with the question of which Committee would have responsibility for a certain issue.

On the question of SFR Committee relationship to the Appropriations Committee depended to a large degree on the authorizing committee's ability to get its legislation passed. During the 1977-81, the SFR Committee was able get its legislation passed. That minimized the problems with the Appropriations Committee because they would generally follow the dictates of the authorizing legislation—generally, although there were some periodic disagreements. But the situation was one of two functioning, able committees. By the early-1980s, the SFRC, was emasculated. The last time the SFR Committee passed legislation was in 1981 with the Senate approval of the foreign aid bill. It was not until 1985, with Lugar in the chair, that the SFRC passed new legislation. So there was a four year hiatus during which basic authorizing legislation could not pass the Senate. That was Howard Baker's doing; he was the Majority leader. In addition, the SFRC had enough moderate Republicans on it to allow the Democrats to control the Committee's agenda. So a lot of legislation was reported out by the Committee, but in the view of the Reagan administration and the Senate leadership, it had been approved by a “Democratic-controlled” Committee and therefore not acceptable. So the administration worked with the
leadership and the Committee's proposed legislation was just laid aside—it never came to the vote. So the responsibility for passing necessary legislation on such matters as foreign assistance fell to the Appropriations Committee. The administration and the leadership were very effective. Bill Schneider, then the Department of State's Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, managed that process deliberatively and beautifully—from his point of view. I really admired his strategy, which in effect, gutted the SFRC—maybe it was deserved. Historians will have to look at that. In any case, Schneider designed a strategy to work with the Appropriations Committee and the majority leader, bypassing and undercutting the SFRC. So the diminution of the SFRC was a large extent the result of a conscious administration strategy. The Committee and the staff were fully aware of this strategy, but couldn't or wouldn't change its point of view.

But what I saw during my nine years working for the Foreign Relations Committee was a slow, but steady erosion of the powers of that Committee. It happened for a number of reasons. First, it had to do with the nature of the membership of the Committee. In the 1970s, the Foreign Relations Committee was the prestigious Committee. It was known as that both within the Senate and in the media. By the mid 1980s, that aura had vanished. People like John Glenn left the Committee. The other reason had to do with the staff. When I got there, the Committee staff was relatively bipartisan—one staff for all of the members. The Republicans had a few positions, but the employment for all positions was done on a collegial basis—i.e. with the approval of the senior members of the Committee. In 1978-79, that changed with the creation of a majority staff and a minority staff. That did a lot of damage. Furthermore, as I have discussed earlier, soon each Senator hired his own “foreign affairs” expert. I think my views of the that change and its consequences are reflected fully in my earlier comments. The employment of PRMs was a bad move! Sometime too much staff, particularly if hired helter-skelter, can be counter-productive.

There may also have been some connection between the decline of the prestige of the Foreign Relations Committee and the changing mood about foreign affairs in the country. Glenn left because he saw that power had shifted to the Armed Services Committee.
and also perhaps he was more interested in the work of that Committee. The nature of
the issues confronting the Foreign Relations Committee changed over the decade. In
the 1970s, it dealt with large issues like SALT—handled by Humphrey, Case, Javits,
McGovern in the Senate—well known public figures. By the mid-1980s, the issues were
not that “large”. They were more parochial. A lot of the members lost interest in Committee
work; they didn't spend as much time on Committee work as they used to.

I don't want to be too pessimistic about the future of the Foreign Relations Committee.
It is still possible that another “giant”—like Fulbright or Humphrey—will rise to head that
Committee. But it also needs the right set of issues to allow that “giant” to make his or
her mark—issues dealing with war or peace, nuclear arms control. Let me illustrate the
importance of the “right” issues to a Committee's standing. Before I even went to work
for the SFRC, I did some work on Vietnam. That was an issue that divided the nation.
Chairman Fulbright held hearings, reviewed proposed legislation, revising and amending
it. Even though most of that legislation never passed, it did capture the interest of the
country. The hearings were televised; the nation was engaged. Similarly, the SALT treaty
was a major topic of interest to the country because it was central to the relationships
between the world's two super-powers. How would that relationship be managed in the
most important of all issues: the nuclear arms race? By 1984-85, I don't think we were
looking at issues of the same magnitude. They probably were not available to be reviewed.
There was a long stall on arms control, with no draft treaties to be reviewed by the Senate.
We spent a lot of time on nominations, which tended to become highly personalized. The
nomination process for high ranking officials in the State Department and ambassadors
became the back-door way to raise substantive issues; people were hurt very badly in that
process. Take the fight in the Committee on Lefever in the early 1980s and Fulbright's
televised hearings on Vietnam and you can just see the contrast between the two eras.
There was also the John Tower phenomenon which I described earlier. No question that
an aggressive chairman of the Armed Services Committee had an impact on the status of
the Foreign Relations Committee.
Q: I would like to continue the dialogue on your experiences while serving on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Let us talk about Greece, Turkey and Cyprus during the period 1977-87. What are your recollections about the Committee's deliberations about that area of the world?

BINNENDIJK: By the time I went to work for the Committee, Turkey had invaded Cyprus and we had subsequently responded by invoking an arms transfer embargo on that country, although some easing of our assistance to Turkey had been ordered. As I recall it, the debates, led largely by Senator Sarbanes, focused on a variety of issues, mostly concerning foreign assistance. There were others on the Committee that had an interest in Greek-Turkey relationships, but it was Sarbanes that took the lead and coalesced a majority. I think there were a number of Senators who had pressures from their constituencies—primarily from their Greek-American voters. Alliances were built by, for example, the Greek and Israel lobbies.

The first issue was whether Turkey should be provided any further grant aid. This was, as were many other possibilities, punitive measures for the invasion of Cyprus. The Executive Branch was essentially looking at the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus situation through a NATO prism—i.e. two vital members of the alliance fighting over a third country. Congress, on the other hand, was more concerned by Turkey's aggression—i.e. Sarbanes' view—and was trying to impose constraints on Turkey and the Executive Branch by insisting that the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus be given greater attention by US' foreign policy makers. Sarbanes and others chose the assistance process as a means to accomplish their objective. So they focused initially on grant aid, insisting that if there was to be any at all, it be as small as possible. There were many efforts made to eliminate the MAP (Military Assistance Program), which was grant aid. There were also efforts made to limit excess military end items transferred to Turkey.

There were other issues such as the ratio of assistance being devoted to Greece and Turkey. That became known as the 7:10 ratio applicable to all assistance to both
countries—the ten being assistance to Turkey. The Greek lobby wanted that ratio to be institutionalized. The Turks—and the Executive Branch—opposed that formulation. I think that the anti-ratio effort was mistaken because it locked in perpetuity—or what is perpetuity in governmental affairs—high levels of Turkish aid. So for that reason, I supported the ratio.

I was on the Committee staff when the arms embargo was lifted. In the Senate, that effort was led by Senator Byrd, strongly supported by the Executive Branch. He proposed a complex amendment that spelled out a lot of conditions which the Turks had to meet in an effort to gain Senate support for the lifting of the arms embargo. In the final analysis, the Senate concurred and the embargo was lifted. I felt that the lifting of the embargo was the correct move because I thought it was engendering a deep chasm between Turkey and NATO and eroding our ability to influence Turkey. The Cold War was still on and that had had to play a significant factor in our policy development. However, I primarily felt that if we had any chance of playing significant role in preventing the outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and Greece, we had to be seen by both as even-handed and understanding of both points of views. Only then, could we, when the time came, step in to cool the tensions between the two.

The Senate actions against Turkey were not so much based on the view that Turkey was responsible for the events in the Aegean Sea, but on the incontrovertible fact that Turkey had invaded Cyprus. The message that we were trying to send that the use of force was not an acceptable way to settle international disputes without necessarily passing judgement on the merits of the case.

I felt that at the time that the situation on Cyprus was a mixed picture. Just prior to the invasion, there were Greek Cypriots, led by Archbishop Makarios, who were strongly nationalistic and who supported “enosis”—the unification of Greece and Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots obviously reacted to this trend and were concerned that their enclaves could be attacked and over-run. That fear brought the Turkish military to the island to
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protect their own. Whether the invasion was justified or whether the Turks took more territory than warranted by their assertion that their purpose was essentially to protect their own nationals is debate that could be held forever. I don't think it was clear cut case of an invasion by one power of another country without justification. I certainly did not support the invasion, but I think I understood the background, which had a logic supporting it.

I did travel to the countries involved—a couple of times to Greece, once to Cyprus and once to Turkey. The Committee held a lot of hearings, so that we became quite familiar with the subject. The Greek lobby certainly made its views known and provided us with information, as did the Executive Branch. So there was no lack of information. The reason why the issue became so contentious in the US was due to perceptions, which are not always based on facts. The Greece-Turkey-Cyprus imbroglio was a good illustration of the role of a domestic lobby in international affairs.

We had lots of contacts with the Greek and Turkish embassies. The latter was particularly effective. It used to host events to which I was often invited. Representatives of both embassies would come to brief us; the Turkish Embassy had a lot of active political officers who spent a lot of time with us on the Committee staff. The Greeks focused more on Sarbanes and other senators as well as their personal staffs. In part that was due to the fact that the Turks did not have a spokesman among the Senators, unlike the Greeks. Byrd was probably was as close to a spokesman for the Turks as there was, although his motivation was due more for a concern for NATO and the need to keep all of our allies as strong as possible.

The Cyprus issue is still not resolved, thirty years after the invasion. I think it will continue to linger and fester. Both countries are still part of NATO; we have good relationships with both. That allows us to intervene at moment of crisis to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, as we did recently. It is the maintenance of our relationships with both that is the strategic linchpin to maintain some stability in the region. Every administration makes an effort to bring some resolution to the Cyprus problem, but my gut feeling is that in fact a resolution
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has been reached at least on the ground. The UN is not happy—it requires an on-going peace-keeping force. People are still from time to time killed on the “green line”—the dividing line between the Greek and Turkish parts of Cyprus. But there are times when communities through their actions demonstrated that they can't live together. In such cases, separations are not necessarily the worst solution. I would of course much prefer to see a multi-ethnic community living in harmony, but if that is not possible, I will settle for separation to reduce the violence and tensions.

In 1980, I wrote a paper on the role of Turkey in NATO. I have consistently held that the US should not take any actions which might isolate Turkey—a country which I felt was vital for the defense of NATO's southern flank. Turkey is already living apart from Europe because of the religious, ethnic and other differences. I always felt that it was very important for NATO to keep Turkey in the “European” family in light of its strategic value as well as the importance of NATO continuing having some leverage to minimize the possibility of open conflict between Greece and Turkey. For those reasons, I was always concerned about the embargo although I recognized that there wasn't much that could be done about it given Sarbanes' position. On the other hand, I though it was important for the embargo to be lifted in the right way. It should not have been lifted without some guarantees. There was value in maintaining some balances like the 7:10 ratio.

I should note that there were some other footnotes to history, such as the annual $25 million aid program to Cyprus. Almost every year, the administration would send a budget request which did not include a Cyprus program and Sarbanes would dutifully have a program inserted in the final budget bill—it was sort of “guilt”money because he thought that since the US was not going to do anything about reuniting that country, some payment was appropriate. I went to Cyprus in the late '70s and reviewed the need for that program. I didn't see many needy refugees—which had been the rationale for the program initially. Their new housing looked like Reston. Nevertheless, the money was appropriated annually an Sarbanes' request.
When I started working for the Committee, I was a Democratic staffer. I therefore backstopped the Democratic members, including Sarbanes. During my last four years, I worked for the majority members—Sarbanes was in the minority by that time. We probably after 1982 had perhaps a slightly tenser relationship, but I must say that Sarbanes is one of the brightest senators I have ever met. He is truly a deep thinker, an excellent lawyer—I would always wish to have him on my side. He and I discussed Greek-Turkey-Cyprus frequently, but he was never willing to really examine his basic premises. I don't think Sarbanes was ever willing to discuss the strategic considerations on which we differed substantially, as I have suggested earlier. He knew that, but that did not interfere with our discussion on tactical issues—e.g. how to get some things done. I loyally helped him to do that, even if I didn't necessarily agree with his fundamental thrust.

The staff's relationship with each senator varied considerably. Over time, as I mentioned before, we spent less and less time with the principals and more and more with their personal staffs. But I had a good relationship with a number of senators, including Sarbanes. I never felt that he excluded me, even when I was working for the Republican majority. He used to call me periodically over the eight to nine year period I served on the Committee staff.

I have one final thought on the Greek-Turkish relationship and that is that it has actually worked out. We now have a reasonably good relationship with both countries. We eliminated the embargo, over the objections of the Greek lobby, without causing too much of a ripple. We continued to provide acceptable levels of assistance to both countries. All of these actions placed us in a position to play a positive peace-keeping role when the situations required it. So in retrospect, despite all the domestic political tensions and conflict, I think a useful resolution was achieved. It may not have been the result that the contestants may have hoped for, but peace has been maintained in the area and NATO was not weakened. The outcome of the dispute in the US Senate is a good example of the workings of the US political process, with its checks and balances and the compromise.
of competing views. There is no grand design to Congress' deliberations and decisions; there is no Henry Kissinger sitting in Congress imposing his world view on the elected representatives. There are various political pressures that play off each other day in and day out; there are some strategic thinkers that have a vision which they try to sell to their colleagues; and there are others that take one side or another for one reason or another. All of these factors play out in the political caldron that is the Congress and hopefully lead the country in the right direction. In the Greece-Turkey matter, I think that is what happened.

Let me spend a few minutes now discussing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Middle East in the ten year period I served on the Hill. During the Lebanon invasion, a Likud government was in power in Israel. That did create some division in the Committee, but in general, Israel did enjoy considerable support. The “good feeling” was certainly enhanced by the Camp David process of the end of the 1970s. The Committee approved high levels of assistance to both Israel and Egypt. In the case of the Lebanon invasion, the Israelis had given the Committee plenty of notice. It is true that they didn't in so many words say that they would invade Lebanon, but in their briefings of some Committee members, they made a strong case for action in light of the continual security threat that their population on the northern borders was enduring. The committee did not discourage them or suggest that an invasion of Lebanon would be counter-productive.

The Israelis were very effective in making their views known and accepted by the Committee. I used to see them all the time. The Embassy worked the Hill very effectively and so did AIPAC (the American-Israel Political Action Committee). When the invasion came, I certainly was not surprised nor should have been any of the principals and staff who had been briefed by the Israelis. I did have a negative reaction; I thought that the Israelis had gone beyond acceptable bounds particularly when they moved into Beirut. The Israelis did suffer a major backlash for their action. Members of Congress expressed considerable concern; there were some consideration of reducing assistance levels, even if only a token account. But AIPAC was extremely effective, calling in all sorts of chips.
For example, an amendment was being discussed that would have reduced assistance to Israel of $50 million (out of $3 billion); AIPAC managed to kill it by putting on a “full court press.” I am sure that a number of senators had private conversations with the Israeli Ambassador and other high ranking Embassy officials during which they expressed their unhappiness with Israeli policy in Lebanon. I let my Israeli Embassy contacts know my views, making quite sure that my interlocutors knew that I was speaking for myself although I was certain that I was reflecting Senator Percy's concerns.

Personally, I was of course fully supportive of Camp David. I drafted the assistance implementation legislation. Camp David was a key triumph of American diplomacy. My views on the Middle East were that it was important for the US to maintain a good relationship with both sides—Arab countries and Israel. It was not an equal distance relationship because we were so much closer to Israel, but I felt that it was vital for us to maintain enough credibility among the Arab nations, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to enable us to play the role of the “honest broker.” It was a similar role to that that I envisaged for us in the Greece-Turkey relationships. We have in fact maintained that balance and have therefore been able to keep some semblance of peace in the area, including an Israel-Jordan peace treaty and some modus vivendi between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

I had some ambivalence about our Iran policy while the Shah was in power. On the one hand, he was seen as a strong ally—a strategic counterweight to some parts of the Arab world which were flirting with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, I always had an adverse reaction to the Shah's authoritative regime which included major violations of human rights by a repressive secret police. So I was uncomfortable with our relations with Iran. In retrospect, I think I was probably both adequately analytical about Iran's role before the Shah's fall. That is, I probably did not worry sufficiently about “Iran after the Shah.” In general, I don't think the US government paid enough attention about the outcome of a Shah overthrow; had it, we might have been to prevent or at least ameliorate the drastic effects of the transition that took place. The SFRC was very interested in Iran; even in
1977, when the AWACs arms sale proposal was being reviewed by the Committee and the Senate, there was considerable unease about the Shah and our relationships with Iran. Those concerns were expressed most vigorously by Senator Culver, but others made their ambivalence known during the hearings on the arms sale. But, as I said, we did not worry enough about “what after the Shah?” I was caught by surprise by the Shah's downfall; I had not expected such a vehement religious movement to emerge in opposition.

The Shah's fall left one major legacy; the Committee and other senators became very sensitive to situations like Iran because everyone was anxious to avoid another foreign policy disaster. The Shah's fall was followed by the hostage taking, which was a very dramatic even in our history. David Newsom, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, appeared often before the Committee briefing it on the status of the hostages and our efforts to get them back. After the hostage crisis, I think Iran pretty much disappeared from our horizon; I think it was essentially written off, but as I said, we focused on averting similar disasters in places like Morocco and Egypt or somewhere else.

Personally, I think I played some role in the development of the US position in the Middle East. I pushed very hard for an assistance package to Egypt as well as the arms sales to Saudi Arabia, some of which I have discussed earlier. I think probably that it was the latter matter that engaged most in the Middle East and I think that the Senate approval of those sales were a key component of the ability of the US to maintain good relationships with both sides. I had frequent conversations with diplomats from key Arab countries, as part of maintaining credible contacts with both sides. I was always mindful that in any contacts with foreign diplomats a Senate Foreign Relations staffer had to be quite circumspect in the information he or she passes along. So often we would talk about legislative concepts and ideas, such as the F-15s and AWAC sales. In both cases, I traveled to Saudi Arabia to write an investigative report for the Committee. In the course of that process, we began to develop ideas on the limitations that might be imposed in order to make the sale acceptable to the Senate. For example, the F-15s were limited in their fueling capacity to minimize their use against Israel without restricting their legitimate function as defensive
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weapons for the Saudis. We also insisted that they not be forward-based in Tabuk where they might be a serious threat to Israel. Also there were limitations on the hard points and multiple racks for the bombs which they carried on the grounds that the F-15 was a defensive weapon and not one that should be used as an attack bomber. There were several conditions of that kind which made the sale at least acceptable to a majority of Senators and a minor threat to Israel. To the best of my recollection, the original F-15s administration arms sale proposal had no restrictions. Quite often the administration would do something like that. It would send us a proposed sale with some language describing the weapon system involved and the reason for the sale, but there were no prohibitions or restrictions mentioned. It was not a bad tactic on the part of the administration. In some cases, it allowed Congress to play the restraining role. The administration knew what objections its proposals would meet on the Hill; it was open about what follow-on sales might occur, but would not suggest or recommend any limitations,. It was perfectly happy to let Congress play the negative role; that was politically important because it gave the Senate a role to play. Since this role playing was done usually in a cooperative fashion, I found no fault with the process. That is in fact the process prescribed by the Constitution and US foreign policy has often been implements by this “good cop-bad cop” routine. As I have said, I have no objections to that process, especially when we are dealing with a country like Israel which has some staunch American supporters. Those Americans need to demonstrate that they are “players” in the process. The roles that an administration and the Senate play gives the US greater flexibility in determining policy, often to the benefit of our national interest.

In the arm sales cases I was involved, I don't think that the administration in fact was too unhappy with any of the constraints that the Senate imposed, despite any public outcries it might have made. In fact, some of the limitations were subsequently lifted over time. By putting constraints on some of the sales, it gave comfort to some of our allies and friends who genuinely might have felt threatened and yet enabled the sale to proceed. To me the actual sale to the Saudis were not nearly as important as their approval which developed a
sense of trust and some military capability which later was not an insignificant factor in the Gulf War. These sales are a perfect illustration of the importance of a process that permits the participation of a number of voices. I don't know that the sales to the Saudis could ever have been made had it not been for the Senate's involvement; the administration may have approved them, but I think the chances would have better than even that legislation would have been introduced and probably approved by Congress to bar those sales—Congress would have been so outraged by the exclusionary process that it would have voted against the sales regardless of their merits. The involvement of the Senate before final approval prevented any negative actions from being taken to bar the sales. My main point is that process is important and that foreign policy objectives are very difficult to reach without a proper process—one that permits the participation of a number of differing voices.

In that connection, I long ago accepted that “lobbies” are part of the real world. In fact, they play a legitimate role. I am a Dutch-American and therefore I undoubtedly have some biases in favor of the Netherlands. Many other Americans favor their country of origin and that is part of this country's strength. What is important is that this factor not be the only consideration. It might be one vector which needs to be put into the decision-making process which encompasses many other ones. At the end of the day, the decision will have taken all the factors into account. That is what happens in our decision-making process—all factors are taken into account at some stage or another. The ExecutiveBranch sometimes finds itself in opposition to the desire of an ethnic “lobby.” But it should be noted that the Executive Branch is itself a “lobby” on the Hill—in fact, a very formidable one. So many of the decisions in the Senate came after all of the arguments of the differing “lobbies” had been weighed. Often the Senate's conclusions tried to give some satisfaction to a number of differing points of view as in the case of the Saudi arms sales where the sales were approved but with limitations to meet the legitimate concerns of a number of players. The fact that there was considerable debate prior to the decision made
I think the final judgement acceptable to most if not all; they may not have liked it, but they knew that their voices had been heard and their views weighed. That is a plus.

There were times when I may have been concerned by the differing decibels from the “lobbies.” There were of course “lobbies” that were much better organized and financed than others and therefore their voices were heard more distinctly. In at least one situation, I found that a “lobby” had gone directly to my Senator's constituents to complain about my activities or views. Those constituents called the Senator to ask that my activities be reined in. But I accepted that as part of the political process and was not unduly exercised about it. It happens more frequently on policy issues, but again I consider that a legitimate use of the American political process. I have found that in some cases where a strong “lobby” is pushing its view vigorously, it creates counter-pressures, either from the administration or for example the nascent Arab “lobby” which developed while I was still working for the Senate. When we were working on the assistance legislation, we would invite representatives of the various “lobbies”—including the Arab one—to testify. So I think the foreign policy process, messy as it is, is useful and produces at the end of the day right outcomes most of the time; it may sometimes be too public although that is also an important factor in building consensus.

This is not to say that there were days when I was irritated with some of the “lobbies”; I am sure I was not the only one that felt that way. But it never reached the point when I would have said: “Bar the door; don't let them in anymore!”

In the Lebanon crisis, the State Department played a useful role in the Senate debate. I think I can generalize and say that I found the Department's input during my ten years on the Hill as useful. By and large, it kept us pretty well informed about its concerns and views. If it didn't, we had other sources of information which were ready and willing to cooperate with us. I am sure that there were times when the Committee felt that it might not be getting the full story from the Department. I was generally pleased with the information that the Department provided on ceratin arms sales; it was the Defense
Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) that at times was not sufficiently forthcoming. There were other staffers who seemed to have greater skepticism about the information we were receiving from State; they tended to go to other sources for information and did not rely on the Department. I think I had greater trust in the Department—and the administration in general—than some of my colleagues. Occasionally, I may have felt that I was not getting the full story, but by and large, I found that if approached correctly, the Department of State was forthcoming.

Much of my day-to-day contacts with the Department of State was conducted through its Office for Congressional Relations (H). Unfortunately, that staff was not always fully informed about issues and events. The best information was to be found in the geographic offices or sometimes in one of the functional offices. We used H to serve as conduits to set up meetings with the real experts in the Department; that was effective. By and large, I found the officials of the Department quite willing to spend time with me and to give their views. I didn't always use H as a conduit; after a while, I knew who the knowledgeable people were and I used then to contact them directly. There were times when a more formal contact was appropriate or useful; then H was the vehicle. For example, when engaged in a Committee investigation which would result in a report, then H was the channel that I used. By and large, as I suggested, I was served well by the Department.

I traveled widely on Committee business. I sometimes found that the emphasis in the field was somewhat different than that expounded by the Washington headquarters. For example, in Korea, there was a greater concern, particularly among our military, about Carter's troop withdrawal proposal than was expressed by the Pentagon and the State Department. Another example was Morocco which I visited in 1980. A number of Washington people were predicting the fall of the King. In Rabat, I found a degree of stability which was unexpected, based on Washington briefings. It is these nuances that made field trips certainly useful and perhaps even essential.
Sometimes I would travel with the Chairman of the SFRC. But by and large I found that much less useful that my solo forays. I think that may well have been the general feeling of the Committee staff. The PRMs of course most often traveled with their principals; they often found it useful. But if someone was really interested in getting a sense of what was happening in one corner of the world and was trying to develop some sensible analysis and recommendations, then I found it to be better to be on your own because I could then set my own agenda. I used to work long hours during the visits, trying to get anywhere from 6 to ten meetings each day. I would work during all meals, either meeting or doing research. But being by myself, I could ask the questions I was interested in, see who I thought would be useful and in general set my own agenda. If you accompanying a Senator, it is his or her agenda that will govern the day and one might not end up with as productive as visit as you might if you had designed your schedule yourself. Politically, accompanying a senator might have more value, but not substantively.

I think that I had sufficient knowledgeable of a subject matter from hearings and travel. I would before leaving for a trip be briefed by the Executive Branch, including the intelligence community. I made a special point of seeing the Station Chief at every post I visited. So I had a lot of perspectives before and during the trips, including those of leading local citizens from both the government and the opposition. I am sure that I didn't know all there was to know, but I felt comfortable that I understood the general parameters of an issue—at least enough to draft and push for sensible legislation. I want to stress that my field trips were invaluable to complete the picture. As much good information as I collected in Washington, it would have been incomplete. The only reason for example that I think I had a good feel for Morocco and the issues there is because I was able to spend a week in that country with our diplomats there. Washington had received reports from those diplomats which were of course very useful, but unless you talked to them in the field, I don't think I would have been able to taste the full flavor of the situation. You can not, I think, develop policies just from back in the capital; overseas representation is essential. I
relied heavily on our people overseas to complete the picture for me; without them, I don't think my analysis would have been as complete.

I might make a comment here about administration witnesses' public testimony. In general, I don't think it was very useful. In some cases, especially when discussing arms control negotiations, the testimony was very useful and appreciated by the members of the Committee. By and large, useful information was only obtained in the question and answer sessions or through private conversations with administration people. Public testimony, which by its very nature, is highly circumscribed is not a very useful input into policy development. There were some exceptions, but in general, public testimony was not very useful. Closed sessions and private conversation, on the other hand, did elicit important information and did contribute to the development of foreign policy in the US Senate.

Despite the shortcomings of public sessions, I think it is important that they be held because a public record needs to be fully developed in a democracy. The public record becomes the basis for much of the legislation that is passed. I think that an outsider can often see the genesis of legislation in the public record. As a staffer, it was rare that something was said by an administration witness which came as “news.” I would not have been doing my job adequately if I or my principals had been caught unaware by testimony very often. By the time testimony was provided, the Committee was usually well aware of the issue and had pretty much decided on its course of action, although sometimes such testimony effected tactics—e.g. the phrasing of an amendment or an approach to issue resolution. But rarely did public testimony effect the outcome of Committee deliberations. But the public of course was in a different situation. It had to rely on the public record and for that reason, open testimony is essential.

I did on occasions advise witnesses on the general thrust of questions that might be raised by Committee members. I did that when there was not a major controversy. When there was a major controversy, I did not forewarn witnesses because to do so would have been a breach of my responsibility to my employers. When the purpose of a hearing was to
gather information, to try to build a record in support of a shared executive-legislative goals, then I thought it was useful for the witnesses to be prepared so that the public record would be supportive of the Committee's subsequent legislative actions. Before every hearing for which I was responsible, I would prepare a memorandum for every member of the Committee summarizing what the hearing was about and what questions might be raised. The personal staffer would then take that memorandum and tailor it for his or her principal. I had two roles really when it came to hearings: I was the responsible staffer for the Committee as well as being the principal staff man for the Chairman. So very often I would prepare two memos: one for the whole Committee and another for the Chairman with questions that I thought he should raise. The average memo was probably three-four pages long with another page or two of questions attached. I would have to be prepared for these hearings which imposed discipline on my activities. Sometimes, although not too often, there were revelations made during the hearings that were unexpected, but not generally. Usually, I knew the issue (s) well enough not to be surprised by the testimony of the Executive Branch witnesses.

I don't recall at the moment of any hearings during which a witness blatantly lied. Clearly, the testimony was slanted in favor of his or her point of view, but no outright lies. There may have been occasions when relevant facts that might not have fit the witness' case may have been left out, but usually we would have a member of the Committee raise a question which would fill the gap. Passing notes to the principals was a great game; it worked very well. Members were very responsive to notes passed to them by staff. If one senator would not, then pass the same question to one of his colleagues. That was our role; to make sure that all the right questions were posed so that all members had a full record.

It might be useful at this stage to make a few comments about “closed” sessions. These sessions were much more informal. Sometimes the number of staffers would be limited. Of course, the restriction on use of classified material was lifted for these meetings. I can recall only one or two sessions which resulted in “leaks.” When that happened, the
Chairman had the matter investigated and in fact a couple of people lost their jobs when it was found that they were the sources of the “leaks.” Most often these “closed” sessions were called to discuss classified matters—briefings on status of negotiations, intelligence findings, etc.—although at times there were meetings held in preparation for mark-up sessions or for other organizational purposes—to prepare the Committee members for what might transpire in public session. I found those sessions much more useful than the public meetings. We got a lot of good information during those “closed” hearings.

I think it is fair to say that the Committee’s relationship with the intelligence community was very good. We had access to most information; the Committee received the National Intelligence Daily (NID) ever day, where it was available under security restrictions to the members and the cleared staff. Generally, the Committee's staff was cleared to read the NIDs, but the PRMs were not. I would often go to CIA for briefings as well as DIA. Sometimes, we would ask intelligence officers to come to our offices for informal discussions. Very often, the Director of CIA or one of the NIOs (National Intelligence Officers) would come to brief the Committee or one of its members. During the SALT hearings, the NIO for Strategic Forces was a critical contributor to the Committee's deliberations in closed sessions; he discussed his assessment of the strategic balance.

I found that working with the Executive Branch from a Congressional Office is a lot different than working with it from the inside. There were a lot of disparate views, which didn't surprise me having worked in OMB and the NSC. But I had to work a little harder because I had to figure where each agency stood on a specific issue. Sometimes that led to some confusion about the position of the Executive Branch on an issue. On the other hand, if one was really interested in understanding an issue thoroughly, then it was important to listen to the varying views so that one could reach an independent judgement.

I found it harder to judge whether the views expressed by different agencies were essentially due to different substantive judgements or whether the “turf” issue was the predominant factor that led to disagreements. “Turf” was seldom an issue in the
perspectives and information we received from the intelligence community. I accepted those views by and large as based in the best analysis that the community could generate. If State or Defense were at odds with other views, then perhaps “turf” was a consideration. I had considerable inter-action with the NSC; there I found that if I had known the official from previous contacts, then the information was more useful. But the NSC is generally spread rather thin and therefore if useful I would contact the NSC after I had gathered as much information as I could from other sources. By that time, I would know where each agency stood on an issue; the NSC staff would wrap it up with its political spin.

My most vivid memory of the Iran hostage crisis was the phone call I got at 2:30 a.m. informing me that the rescue efforts had failed. The call was made by Rick Inderfurth, my colleague on the Committee staff; he had been alerted by some one in the Executive Branch. To the best of my recollection, there had not been any prior consultations with the SFRC. There was some speculation that some action was in the works, but I don't believe that any one from the Executive Branch either consulted or briefed the SFRC or any member of Congress, for that matter. This was a rare exception; I can not remember any other administrative action which caught us by surprise. But the Iran hostage rescue operation depended so much on secrecy that I was not surprised nor upset that we had not been briefed ahead of time. There are situations, such as covert operations, which probably should be closely held to a few individuals in the Executive Branch. I would think that the top congressional leadership together with the Chairman and ranking member of the Intelligence Committee should also be briefed, but I would certainly not urge that wider briefings take place. There are procedures for consultation that are included in the intelligence legislation. There should be a couple of responsible members who should be briefed on all covert actions; those members must represent the two parties to keep operations out of the domestic political realm. I think it is both prudent and correct to insist that some members be briefed on all covert actions. Sometimes, of course, timing may not permit that; there may be times when events just happen too quickly to allow for briefings. But except in the most extraordinary circumstances key Congressional members
must be kept up to date; who those members might be, can be debated, but some one in Congress should be informed. The Committee had an interest in terrorism stemming back to times prior to my employment on the staff. Most of it as related to the activities of the PLO, although much of that effort was targeted against Israel. But starting in the early 1980s, our embassies became targets; the SFRC held many hearings on the challenges of terrorism. I don't remember that the Committee studied Islamic fundamentalism before the fall of the Shah. After that, there was more interest in the phenomenon among Committee members. There was a general sense that fundamentalism was dangerous; it was growing and becoming a real threat to other leaders in the Arab world. That was probably an over-reaction because I think only Sudan really fell under the fundamentalist sway; other countries managed to avoid rule by the fundamentalists, although a number of countries such as Algeria and Egypt certainly have had their security threatened by those elements. But after the Shah's downfall, there was a sense that a “domino” effect might take place; it didn't happen, but it was a great concern at the time.

I viewed at the time Islamic fundamentalism as a region-wide challenge that could be exported from country to country quite easily. I must say that my views have changed since the mid-1980s. In looking at the issue now, while there is an export element to it, I think it is essentially a country specific phenomenon. The Committee's interest in Islamic fundamentalism is an illustration of how a Congress focuses on one issue or another. Islamic fundamentalism was not a “hot” issue for the US public. But a Committee's agenda is driven by a variety of factors. In the case of SFRC, obviously world events is one driving force. Another, and perhaps the most important, was the Executive Branch's agenda. Usually that agenda needed implementing legislation or action which forced the SFRC to focus on the issue—whether it was a bill or review of a proposed arms sale or a proposed treaty. These were issues which required immediate attention.

Less successful has been the SFRC attempt to involve itself in long range planning. Annually, the Secretary of State would appear to give his or her “State of the World” overview. That presentation did give Committee members an opportunity to take a broad
view of US foreign policy. It didn't always work. On a couple of occasions, the staff tried to do some broader geo-strategic thinking, but during the time I worked for the Committee, the US was deeply enmeshed in the Cold War so that the broad outline of US interests was pretty well established and not subject to revision. Members during these State of the World sessions tended to focus on specific pet issues. There may have been differences on implementation of the Cold War strategy, but there was not much debate about the bipolar world and where it was going. There wasn't much concern shown for what might happen after the end of the Cold War. Its abrupt end I think caught almost everybody unprepared.

As a general proposition, I think it is unrealistic to expect the Congress or any foreign relations Committee to become very engaged in long range planning or strategy development. The members just don't have the time for that kind of intellectual exercise. All members are bogged down worrying about myriads of issues that need immediate attention; thinking about the world ten years hence is a luxury that the present political process just does not allow. Occasionally, there may be senator who wishes to take the time to be engaged in such activity; a subcommittee may sometimes worry about the direction of one region of the world. But to be engaged in a global long range plan would require an extraordinary senator who would be willing to let important day to day matters slide for a while; that would be a rare person indeed. Staff can't really engage in that kind of activity either. A staff can write up reports, which it does in spades, but its work is also driven by daily events. I think it is fair to say that senators expect the Executive Branch to have a long range plan or goals; when such plans seem not to be evident, I think I can remember two or three hearings when the SFRC tried to force the administration to give some thought to either developing a long range strategy or to revising the one it was working with. I have also seen Congress putting in place—or trying to—a mechanism which will force an administration to think about longer range considerations. For example, today we have a process called the “Quadrennial Strategy Review” which will be undertaken by the administration in the forthcoming year. To a large degree, that process
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was sponsored by Congress. This is an illustration on a Congressionally mandated long range policy planning process. But Congress is really not suited to undertake such a program itself. Serious policy planning requires a full time effort over an extended period of time with a staff dedicated to such analysis; even in the Executive Branch, long range planning is very hard to come by. Such planning needs time and relevance while being in the decision making loop; that is very hard to achieve in the Executive Branch; it is virtually impossible in the Legislative Branch. Unless a cabinet officer makes a conscious effort to relate his or her daily decisions into the long range framework, then planning staff will be irrelevant. If it is to be relevant, it needs to be at the secretary's side day and day out which means that most likely the long range planning effort will suffer. It is not impossible to do, but it is very, very difficult. There have been some secretaries that have been inclined to long range planning and then there were some successful efforts made, but it has been a rare occasions. I think it is not impossible to expect a congressional committee to contribute to an administration's long range planning effort by pushing certain legislation, but Congress is fundamentally a political organization driven by the Executive Branch and the world’s agendas. It is very hard to conceive a situation in which Congress would initiate and push its own long range agenda.

I have been asked by some what my perceptions are of the impact of the Vietnam war on the SFRC. I went to work for the Committee a couple of years after we had withdrawn from Vietnam. During my service in the Executive Branch, I had worked often on that problem and had spent considerable time on the Hill discussing the issue. I think that the after-effect of Vietnam was quite profound. I found a sense that it was an imperial presidency that sucked us into Vietnam; the consequence of that analysis was obviously a greater need for congressional oversight and engagement in foreign policy to prevent similar catastrophes from occurring. I also found a sense in Congress that it needed to have instruments of power which were not available to it in pre-Vietnam days. There was a major effort in Congress during the 1973-79 period—books have been written about it—to enhance the Congressional tools for influencing foreign policy—for example, vetoes

Interview with Hans Binnendijk, 1996 http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000087
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over arms sales, intelligence oversight, new uses of the confirmation process to force administrations to change direction.

The Vietnam war undoubtedly had a major impact on my views of US foreign policy. First of all, I thought that the US had gone into Vietnam with good intentions. But we screwed it very badly. We stumbled into a losing battle; we paid much too high a domestic cost. We probably should not have been involved militarily in the first place. Once becoming involved, we constrained the military, thereby preventing it from fighting the war as it may have wished to.

The Vietnam experience did not make me more isolationist. It enhanced my support for “engagement.” It did reemphasize to me the importance of viewing the world and its ebbs and flows in non-ideological terms. I think we became entangled in Vietnam because we perceived that north-south struggle in ideological terms rather than country specific or regional terms. I became very cautious about ideological positions. It forced me to analyze issues with through “real politik” lenses—removed as far as possible from ideological colorations. Vietnam probably made me more careful about supporting military intervention as the first policy choice. I became much more cautious about the use of military power and more judicious, hopefully, about its use at any time. I also became convinced that once the US commits itself to the use of force, that it should seek to win with decisive force. When we use force, we must be sure that we can and will win. That is not in my view an isolationist stance. It may in fact require us to become engaged in world events at a much earlier stage—through diplomacy—than has been true in the past both so that the issue can be better understood and so that a resolution can be found before the use of arms is necessary.

Vietnam undoubtedly had a major impact on the SFRC. There was a continual concern for Executive Branch foreign policy designs that might push us into another Vietnam. I suppose that a certain tinge of neo-isolationism developed in the Committee. That may have been one of the drives behind the desire on the part of some members to enhance
their own foreign policy capabilities—through the employment of personal “experts.” I think by the early 1980s, those concerns had dissipated to a great extent partly I think because the Republicans controlled the White House giving the Republican members of Congress more confidence that foreign policy would be handled “correctly.” Vietnam became a “black hole” in the 1980s. No one on the SFRC worried about our relationships with that country. In the late 1970s, some attention had to paid to Cambodia because of the genocide that was taking place there. But I think in general, after the helicopters brought the last people off the Embassy's roof top, the Congress pretty much buried that part of history. Of course, as I said before, no one wanted to repeat that experience in other parts of the world, but Vietnam disappeared from the agenda. I don't remember any questions about Vietnam being raised in the 1980s while I was working for the SFRC.

Let me turn now briefly to the subject of arms control. And let me begin with a discussion of the process which tended to vary depending on the specific arms control issue that was up for debate. One process dealt with treaties, like SALT II. The other concerned an arms sales, which was also included in the broad spectrum of arms control, albeit on regional rather than global basis. The rules which govern a legislative body's behavior varied considerably in those two illustrations.

In the case of SALT II—a proposed treaty—the rules required a set of very formal hearings. A treaty usually is not a “stand alone “ issue, but rather is linked to a various other considerations, which were not necessarily a part of the treaty. For example, in SALT II, the politics of specific senators like Howard Baker whose position on SALT II was determined the minute he voted for the Panama Canal treaty. There are many issues of that kind involved in a treaty approval process. We had well over hundred witnesses representing all views of the American public; many of the witnesses were chosen by the staff, but we also had witnesses suggested to us by individual senators. The staff supported the treaty and therefore was very accommodating to senators' requests so not
to jeopardize support from the principals. So if a senator wanted to hear certain people, the staff was inclined to go along.

The point man on SALT II on the Committee staff was Rick Inderfurth—just recently named as Assistant Secretary for South Asia, after having served with Secretary Albright at the UN. During the 1977-79 period, Rick had been a special assistant to Zbig Brzezinski. He moved to the SFRC staff primarily to get the SALT II treaty ratified. He put together a very good staff team consisting of a number of specialists. I was there as an adjunct, since I devoted most of my time to arms sales. It was this team's basic job to sell the treaty to the Senate.

It was clear almost from the outset that Chairman Frank Church was going to support the treaty. He was up for re-election and under fire. In light of the Chairman's position and our own sentiments, the staff felt that it was its responsibility to get the treaty ratified. We analyzed the treaty at great length and wrote a lengthy report on it, but we always stressed the positive. We knew that there were a number of members of the SFRC that were going to oppose it.

I should note that SALT II was one of the first major issues facing the SFRC under the two staff system—i.e. a majority staff and a minority one. Before this time—1979—, as I have mentioned earlier, we had one staff to serve all members. The Democratic staff was by and large committed to ratification. So I think we did not look for ways to “improve” the treaty; we would have been satisfied with passage of the draft as submitted. We knew that we would be required to make an analysis, as we indeed did, recognizing that when that was circulated, the opponents of the treaty would use it for their own purposes. So the opponents had plenty of opportunities to make their case, both directly and through witnesses. The Republican staff hired a couple of consultants to raise the anti-treaty issues.
Subsequently, the Senate, perhaps having learned from the SALT II process, formed the “Arms Control Advisers Group” consisting of members from both the SFRC and the Armed services Committee. Those senators monitored very closely the START process, in part because many senators had complained that they had not been kept sufficiently advised during the SALT II negotiations. The group was not part of the US delegation, but it did go to Geneva, for example, to keep in touch with the process; the senators were continually engaged in the various START issues and I think in the final analysis, it did make a difference. I think that the concept of a senate panel to maintain continual contact with negotiations is a very good one. The senators did not negotiate, but they were certainly familiar with the issues, having heard views expressed from all negotiating delegations. They did give advice, but certainly were not decision-makers, but undoubtedly having participated to a certain extent in the process, were generally very supportive of the START draft when it was submitted for ratification. The advisory panel had a couple of staffers, representing both parties, to assist it and they became instrumental when it came time for ratification. I am a firm believer that early participation by the legislature is very useful to the development of a smooth and successful process.

After we had held the many hearings, came the mark-up part of the process. Amendments were divided into three categories—depending on whether they were binding. One category included amendments that if approved would have required renegotiations. Another included “understandings”—that is, unilateral interpretations of the treaty language. Some of these “understandings” would require notification to other treaty parties, but not their acceptance. We had a large number of amendments that the SFRC had to consider. Categorization made consideration more manageable. All amendments were considered. I think that the weight of the testimony provided by witnesses and the discussions during mark-up led me to the conclusion that SALT II would have been ratified, although with a large number of “understandings”. No “killer” amendments were likely to be passed. The testimonies, particularly from military experts, led the majority of
the senators to conclude that the treaty was not as radical as the START treaty was; that it would not do much harm, but was important step in the general disarmament process.

But before the treaty could be approved, Frank Church, while in Idaho, received a call from David Newsom, Under Secretary of State, who reported that intelligence sources had advised that a Soviet combat brigade had been spotted in Cuba. We later found that the brigade had been in Cuba all along, but had just been detected. Frank Church panicked and ordered that the treaty review process be halted. During this delay, the Soviets compounded the problem by invading Afghanistan. That put an end to all considerations of SALT II because there developed a consensus in the Senate that no one would have supported an arms control treaty with the Soviets.

As the specter of Afghanistan retreated from consciousness, Reagan became President. He certainly was not going to push the treaty. Then the question became: how do we abide by the provisions without ratifying it? Arrangements were agreed upon to insure that neither side undercut the treaty; on the US side, this policy was developed by the administration consultations with the SFRC. By this time, Senator Percy had become Chairman; he was pushing to make as much of SALT II binding through some type of ratified agreements, but the administration did not wish to go that far. So, as I said, we finally agreed not to take any steps that would have been inconsistent with the draft treaty; that in fact meant that much of SALT II, although not all, was informally implemented, although never ratified. In my experience, that was a unique situation.

My experience on the Hill suggests that the Constitutional responsibility placed on the Congress in the treaty ratification process is usually exercised by senators depending on their personal ideological views, on how their position on the treaty would be perceived by political allies, on how one's constituents would react. Some good senators considered the impact of the treaty on US national interests. That may sound too facile, but many senators had pre-ordained views of international relations and reacted almost viscerally to proposed treaties or other administration proposals. They would respond quickly to the
proposals before them partly from their own ideology and partly to what they believed their allies and constituent might have concluded. Their examination of the treaty provisions were somewhat cursory.

There were some members who delved into the treaty details. In my experience, I found that individual senators would focus on one aspect or another of the proposed treaty or legislation. That made the work-load for each senator much more manageable; I don't think any one of them could ever had had enough time to become experts on each and every bit of legislation that was presented to them. For example, John Glenn focused on verification, Dick Stone on Cuba. I think the senators chose the issues of greatest interest to them; there were occasions when the Chairman would ask one to focus on one aspect or another. Senator Biden, for example, who was a very quick learner on very complex and technical issues, was asked to focus on a couple of issues which had become very contentious. I remember that it became Biden's role to undo whatever Howard Baker was trying to accomplish. So Baker would ask questions of the witnesses; it was Biden's role to make sure that the responses were rebutted either by that witness or a subsequent one. Biden was very good at that.

The Committee staff did from time to time have conversations with Soviet diplomats—never in any great detail. I remember only one or two conversations that I had, which, as I recall it, were generated by Soviet representatives. They were mostly interested on monitoring progress being made by the SFRC on the treaty. These conversations were not unusual; SFRC staff used to have many contacts with foreign diplomats. Most embassies have a senior political officer—sometimes even the Political Counselor—who specialized in congressional liaison. In the 1970s-80s, staffers could still accept luncheons; so we often had lunch with the diplomats. These meetings focused most often on the information that the diplomats wanted to have, but sometimes we did get some useful insights in the position of a foreign country. I thought that this was a very useful process, both because it provided us with valuable insights and nuances and because it gave the diplomats a better understanding of the “real” Washington world—which is not always how one bureaucrat or
even two might describe it. I think it is important for foreign diplomats to be exposed to all participants in the decision-making process so that they might accurately interpret to their governments what is happening in Washington. It eliminates or reduces the chances for surprises. We were of course much more circumspect with the Soviets than we might have been with the British; we were very careful about what information we did give out to them.

I remember one meeting I had with two Soviet diplomats in the late 1970s—at a Chinese restaurant. After we finished the meal, we were served fortune cookies. I was together with one of my colleagues whose fortune read: “Every man has an enemy.” Mine read: “The man in whom you didn’t confide will never betray you.” It shows that there is something to be said for the fortune cookies insights! They came to us at a very opportune time; I have never violated the advice that my cookie had.

All members of the SFRC were provided a very detailed report, such as was drafted by Inderfurth, Davis and Gussman for the SALT II review. They wrote a detailed section-by-section analysis which senators could use for their own deliberations. This report was in addition to the many briefings papers that were written in preparation for the hearings. The committee report, which would have been written at the conclusion of hearings and prior to Senate floor consideration of legislation would also have a section-by-section analysis. So senators did not lack information when it came time to consider proposed legislation.

The START II process was a prolonged one. There were several months of hearings, then a mark-up, then the delays caused by the events I mentioned earlier and then of course no final action.

While on the subject of START II, let me just briefly comment on the SFRC's attitude toward the Soviet Union. The invasion of Afghanistan made a profound difference. It changed the attitude of the administration and of Congress. After that, I think views of the Soviet Union hardened. It certainly reduced options available to both the administration and Congress. The American public was so outraged that no political leader could take
anything but a hard line. Reagan probably would have taken a hard line anyway, but Afghanistan certainly made it more palatable to the public. It made more dangerous for more liberal senators to be seen as “soft” on the Soviet Union.

We are a nation governed by its citizens. Senators are the people's representatives. So they must take into account their constituents' views and that has an effect on foreign policy. I worry sometimes when I think senators reflect to too great an extent the views of “lobbies” who may have only very narrow interests. Lobbyists must be listened to since they do represent constituencies and often have interesting and sometimes even valuable information. But the people's representatives can not be captured by the lobbyists because then the will of the people might be ignored. The power of the “lobbies” has always been present; sometimes it is more than at other times, but there are some very effective “lobbyists.”

In the arms sales process, there were a number of lobbyists who represented various weapon and equipment manufacturers. That was fine; they had views that should have been heard; they just needed to be balanced with other ones. In the fact, the American League for Exports and Security Assistance was created while I worked for the SFRC; that became the main “lobby” for arms manufacturers who were interested in overseas sales. Then there were the ethnic “lobbies” which I have already discussed. AIPAC in particular was very effective, followed closely behind by the Greek “lobby.” Both had direct impact on arms sales and security assistance policies and directions, from the limitations on the arms sold to the Arab countries to the Turkish arms embargo and levels of assistance. Every year there was a new issue with regard to Turkey—e.g. provision of grant assistance, sale of surplus military equipment, the 7-10 ratio, etc. The Greek “lobby” was always on top of these issues pushing their point of view very effectively. These activities are a legitimate part of the democratic process; these “lobbies” have every right to represent as forcefully as they can the views of the Greek-American or American Jewish community. I just believe that when the time comes for the Senate to make its solemn judgement that those voices be heard along with others and that in the final analysis, a balance be struck which make
US national security interests the principal factor in the decision-making process. In some cases, the national interest coincided with the views of the “lobbies”; that makes the judgement easy to make. For example, I think the imposition of the first Turkish embargo in 1976 was a correct call from both the view of the US national interests and the Greek “lobby.” On the other hand, there were situations in which the “lobbies’” views were just too narrow.

After the first arms embargo was imposed, then there came an annual debate on what programs were to be included under that general rubric. There was a steady erosion in the 1976 embargo and finally a repeal of the whole policy led by Senator Byrd. By that time, I supported the repeal. The Congress came to that conclusion much later than the Executive Branch; it had been pushing for repeal of the embargo for sometime before Congress actually took action. The question of why the Legislative and Executive Branch may have seen the US national interests differently is a very interesting one. I suspect that part of the answer lies in the power and effectiveness of the “lobbies” in Congress. In the embargo issue, the Greek “lobby” had, as spokesmen, two senior Congressmen; there was no question that Sarbanes and Brademas had the ears of many of their colleagues. Their views played right into the general view on the Hill that in 1976 at least it was in our interest to keep some pressure on the Turks to resolve the Cyprus problem. Congress, perhaps more that the administration, felt that the division of Cyprus should not be permitted to stand. That made Congress perhaps more willing to maintain pressure on Turkey. The administration was more interested in maintaining cohesion on the southern NATO flank—in the context of the Cold War. It was therefore more willing to accept the de facto division of Cyprus. So we did in the Turkey case two different emphases.

The Turkey embargo I think is an illustration of a broader truth. My experience suggests that Republican administrations, as well as the permanent bureaucracies, such as the Foreign Service, tend to be more real politik in the formulation of foreign policy than Democratic administrations and legislators. When such ideological concepts like human rights are injected in the development of foreign policy—concepts that may well interfere
with “good” relations with another country—the bureaucracy is likely to try to find ways to minimize any impact that these goals might make. To a large degree, this reflects the mind-set of the State Department officialdom, much of which has been trained in schools for international affairs and led by such stellar proponents of real politik like Henry Kissinger. On the other hand, the politicians in Congress and their staffs have an entirely different mind set. They are more sensitive to value-oriented issues, like human rights, the environment, etc—issues on which they took firm positions to win their elections. Campaigns, to a large degree, revolve around the issues of “values”; it should not be too surprising therefore that members of Congress will reflect their ideology as they examine foreign policy and US national interests. Bureaucrats on the other will focus much more on the “power” equation and the importance of good US-foreign country relations—“don't rock the boat.” I don't want to suggest that good politicians ignore the importance of good relations; they are quite cognizant of the importance of that goal, but may not be willing to compromise the values to the same extent for the sake of those relations as a bureaucracy, like State Department, might. After all, it should not come as a great surprise if a State country desk officer places “good” relations at the top of his or her agenda; a decline in that relationship might well be perceived by the officer, and perhaps even his superiors, as a failure. I don't think a Senate staffer cares that much about “good” relations, but he or she does care—passionately at times—about the “disappearing” ones in Argentina or the tortured citizens in other countries or Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. So I think the roles that bureaucrats and politicians and their staffers play does make a difference in the perception of national interests.

A congressional committee staff tends to be a little more “professional” that a personal staffer. That is to say, the predilections of a member of Congress will have more influence on a personal staffer than it will on committee staff. The latter is likely to reflect to a greater extent the views of the administration; that is in great part a function of their background. Many committee staffers are former members of the Executive Branch, whereas the personal staff was often a member of the campaign staff or had been hired for other
reasons than their expertise in foreign policy or other subjects. At least, that was true in my days on the Hill. Their employment, both initially and subsequently, depended on their loyalty to their principal. The committee staff, on the other hand, although obviously interested in the re-election of the chairman, was not tied to his future. Most often, the committee staffer was employed because of his or her knowledge of a particular subject matter—more often than not acquired while working in the Executive Branch. That difference in background gave committee staffers a different perspective from that of the personal staffer. I think that a committee staffer is likely to provide a more “balanced” view—for the lack of a better word.

As a senior member of the Committee staff, my greatest achievement of my eight years of service was probably to stop a lot of dumb ideas. That may seem to be a strange retrospective, but has validity. Senators get ideas from a lot of different sources: constituents, lobbyists, the front page of newspaper, etc. Senators quite often don't really care whether their amendments are adopted; in fact, in many cases, they probably hope that will not be. But it is important to them to be able to tell a constituent that an effort was made to obtain approval of an amendment which may have been submitted at the suggestion of the constituent or as a legislative answer to a problem that the constituent might have had. Sometimes, the amendment is proposed because a senator believes his or her idea to be a solution to a problem or a reflection of some deeply felt feelings. In fact, some of the amendments might have moved a good idea forward, but the way the amendment was worded might have had negative consequences because the strategy had not been adequately considered. So often, I would find myself taking the idea and then drafting an amendment that would have pushed the idea forward. On the amendments that had no merit at all, I did my best to try to kill them.

There are a number of ways to kill an amendment. The simplest way was to try to convince the sponsor that it was not a good idea. Failing that we would to try to get enough senators to vote against it. Or we might find a senator who was willing to table a substitute amendment which would have eviscerated the original one. No amendments
ever died of neglect because the sponsor would usually be at a mark-up session and might ask about his or her proposed amendment. If an amendment were neglected, it was probably by conscious decision by the sponsor. A lot of the amendments were dropped in a Senate-House conference when a lot of horse-trading takes place. In fact, the conference was the real decision-maker on a bill. There a committee chairman or often the staff was able to kill bad ideas. In probably 80%-90% of the cases, issues are resolved at staff level during joint meetings that the House and Senate committee staffs held prior to formal conference sessions. The other decisions were resolved during the conference. The process does not leave as much power to the staff as it might appear from that description. A good staffer will know where his or her chairman—or the committee majority—stand on an issue; it is up to that staffer to resolve the matter in accordance with is or her chairman's views. A staffer will not push for the deletion of a proposed amendment if he or she knows that the chairman or the committee majority wants that amendment included in the final bill. A good staffer must have a good sense where his or her committee and chairman stand. If on the other hand, an amendment is supported only by a handful of senators, then you have to explain to the sponsor why the amendment was dropped in conference. Sometimes, an amendment would have to be reworded if it was to be accepted by the other body's committee; we would then explain to the sponsor why the redrafting was necessary. If he or she was a member of conference committee, then the sponsor could always try to obtain approval of the original amendment; if the sponsor was not a member of the conference, he or she could always ask one of the conference members to take up the issue. So a sponsor always had an opportunity to redress actions taken by the staffers.

Before the actual conference took place, the staff of each committee would brief the principals or the personal staff of a senator. Generally, there would be a meeting of the whole committee—usually a senator would be represented by a personal staffer—at which time the staff would brief on its negotiations with staffers of the committee from the other body. In general, I think a major effort was always made by committee staff to insure
that the members were up-to-date on the status of legislation and particularly on issues which were of interest to him or her.

As I said before, the number of personal staffers increased measurably during my eight years on the Hill. In 1977, the committee staff was essentially bipartisan and served each member directly. There were very few people on senators' personal staff who dealt exclusively with foreign affairs. By mid-1980, the committee had a majority staff and a minority one and each senator had at least one foreign policy “expert” on his or her staff. This development was the result in part at least to the growth of a much more partisan approach to foreign policy; in part to the desire of some individual senators to be better represented. So they voted to spend more Senate money to hire these “experts” on their personal staffs.

The relationship between the Committee and the personal staff was difficult at times. I think there was some resentment at some level on the part of the Committee staff because there were times when the PRs would block access to their principal. More important, however, was the fact that these PRs did represent their principals and the Committee staff had to court them because they had their principal's ears. I think by the mid-1980s, I spent most of my time talking and listening to the PRs, briefing them on our activities, what issues the Committee had on its agenda. I was constantly briefing them on one matter or another. There were a number of them who focused only on a select number of issues; they had an agenda—either their principal's or their own—which drove them. Some of that attention was focused on Latin America, in which I was not very much involved. Vietnam was over by the time I reported to the Hill and nobody wanted to revisit it, but its lingering effect on our foreign policy was palpable. As I said earlier, one effect was to encourage the Senate and the Congress to be much more involved in the foreign affairs process—a check on the Executive.

I earlier discussed the arms control process. Let me now talk a little bit about the arms sales process. Before I joined the Committee staff, legislation had been passed that
required all major arms sales to be proposed to Congress which then had 30 days to take legislative action if it felt the sale to be contrary to US interests (Section 36 b of the Arms Export Control Act). The procedure was questionable from a Constitutional perspective; I am not sure that those doubts have yet been resolved. But it was a key mechanism which drove the Congressional involvement in arms sales—a very key ingredient of foreign policy in those days. It allowed the expression of some national interests which to that point had not been articulated. It should be noted that the policy positions taken by the Senate in 1976 and 1977 on arms sales became incorporated to a large extent in President Carter's arms sales policy of 1978. So the new mechanisms not only became platforms for the development of new arms sales policies, but also allowed greater Congressional involvement in the process.

Since the key legislation had been passed in 1976, the process when I joined the Committee staff was still quite new. Carter had just become President and announced a new arms sales restraint policy. In theory, therefore, the Congress and the President were on the same wave length. Both were interested in restraint—particularly on sales that might have a destabilizing effect on regional power balances.

The important aspect of the process was early warning because once a proposal had been submitted to Congress, it was very difficult to veto it; too much publicity took place in the submission process. All sorts of symbolic implications for the buying country would be discussed which made Congressional disapproval very hard to be expressed. So it became vital that the Senate be advised of a proposed sale long before the official administration notification was sent to the Hill. In fact, there were very few sales that were contested under Sect 36 (b)—the F-15 sale to the Saudis, the AWAC sale to Saudi Arabia, Hawk sale to Jordan (the terms of which were agreed upon before submission), the AWAC sale to Iran (which was withdrawn before it was to be consummated). Those were the major sales that triggered vast Congressional interest. They were all sales to Middle East countries and therefore all had implications for Israel. All issues surrounding these sales were settled before they had be voted on, with the exception of the AWAC sale to Saudi
Arabia. A classic example of this process was Hubert Humphrey's management of the proposed AWAC sale to Iran. He allowed it to be passed by the Senate but only after a long delay; by which time the Shah had been overthrown and the sale never went forward. Senator John Culver opposed the sale. In forging a compromise, Humphrey insisted that the administration follow six or so changes in the original sale proposal. Once that agreement had been forged, the Senate was then ready to approve the sale and did so. The changes in fact were ideas that the Committee staff developed—Steve Bryan and me. These criteria were developed in cooperation with representatives of the administration and were intended to assuage the reasonable concerns expressed by Culver and some others. The changes we proposed which the administration found acceptable were part of the sale package and allowed that proposal to go forward—that is no proposal of disapproval was submitted for Senate vote because most of the opponents felt that the package that we put together was quite reasonable. That AWAC sale proposal and the process it went through became a precedent for later submissions. As I said, that AWAC proposal never came to a vote. In fact there were only the major sales to Saudi Arabia that did come to a vote in the Senate. Those were dramatic votes; all senators were present, the debate was vigorous on both sides and then the roll call vote with all senators voting one by one. Very dramatic.

But as I said, most of the sales went unnoticed; where there were problems they were usually resolved by Committee staff and the administration. In order to minimize the debate on sale proposals was to obtain early notification. We imposed a classified pre-notification period so that the formal thirty day period was extended by another 30 days. If there were any objections, the most timely intervention would be in the pre-notification period before lines hardened under scrutiny resulting from a public submission. Reviewing the proposal in secret eliminated the potential embarrassment that might accrue to both the buying country and us if a public debate were to ensue after the official submission. Eventually, this pre-notification period was extended by imposing a requirement—called the “Javits list”—which required the administration to submit a list of potential sales to
take effect in the following twelve months period. This proposal was the brainchild of Pete Lakeland, Javits' foreign policy staffer, and his principal. In fact, at one stage, I think Javits and Lakeland actually wanted the list to be approved in legislation, limiting the administration to those potential sales. I thought that was a dumb idea, but I did see the value in an early warning process. The Javits-Lakeland proposal was a good illustration of the point I made earlier—a dumb proposal to achieve a worthwhile goal. This was a case in which I redrafted the proposed legislation mandating the “Javits list” without making it restrictive or requiring legislative approval. So after that the administration submitted annually a classified list of potential major sales for the following year. That became an early warning list; it worked for a while, although I don't know if that practice is still followed today.

The important part of this discussion is that Congress was plowing new ground with this arms sales process. We developed new mechanisms to allow Congress to control the sales process—a key ingredient in our foreign policy. It was the Vietnam syndrome that both drove and allowed Congress—and the Senate specifically—to participate more aggressively in foreign affairs. These new mechanisms allowed Congress to have a greater voice in the development of foreign policy. The arms sales process was just an illustration of this new Congressional oversight interest in foreign affairs. However, I should also note that to the best of my recollection, arms sales increased year after year while I served on the SFRC staff. I remember doing a report in the late 1970s which concluded that the restraint policy was not working. I think that this steady increase continued into the Reagan administration, although by that time I had moved on to work on other foreign affairs issues. In my view, restraint is not necessarily something one measures by dollar signs. I have never objected to arms sales per se; in fact, I would like to see more—just as any commercial transaction. But I object strenuously to sales that disrupt regional balances or which might have unintended consequences. If a sale proposal runs those risks, then before it is approved there should be a national debate on its merits. For example, I did believe that in the case of the AWAC sale to Saudi Arabia—painful as it was
—an important decision had been made. As I said earlier, I think our military capabilities during “Desert Storm” would have been seriously reduced had we not approved the AWAC sale. It was very useful that a national debate took place. If the President had unilaterally approved the sale or if it had been slipped through Congress in the middle of the night, there would have ensued a major uproar in Congress with damaging consequences to our relations with Saudi Arabia and the Arab countries. Sect 36 (b) in fact served as a safety valve which permitted all view to get a hearing.

So we had an arms sales process that worked. It focused the Senate's attention on some very important foreign policy decisions, using an established mechanism and not an ad hoc procedure designed for a specific sale proposal. Everybody knew what the rules were; they were followed in an orderly fashion, allowing a national debate culminating in a final vote. In the Saudi's case, this process established a new working relationships between them and us. The sales decisions opened a way to work with the Saudis that allowed us to be interoperable with them. They built a large number of bases for the F-15s; they flew their own AWACs and became familiar with our own advanced weapons systems. When “Desert Storm” came along, the Saudis had built an infrastructure which allowed us to use their facilities without change and made our two forces completely compatible. We talked the same language; their pilots could interact with ours—they had often trained with them. All of these factors became vital when we entered “Desert Storm.” We had a base to operate from and a military ally who was on the same wave length as we were.

I don't think that anyone in the late 1970s and early 1980s could foresee “Desert Storm”, but I think it was clear to us that the stability of the region needed bolstering. Our focus at the time was Iran which was then seen as Saudi's main threat; the enemy changed in the ensuing ten year period, but the basic policy assumption—i.e. that we had a stake in the survival of an independent Saudi Arabia—was as valid then as it became later and is still today. Saudi Arabia did not have the military capability to withstand an Iranian attack; it was clear that it needed to be beefed up and that we had to work with them. Even if
“Desert Storm” specifically was not foreseen, the general outlines of potential problems in the area were.

I did considerable amount of work on Egypt and Morocco because of our arms sales programs to those countries. I think I had some impact on the F-5 sale to Morocco. The Committee sent to Morocco as part of a small team that I led to do a report for it on the situation in North Africa and the Sahara. That was a classic example of how consultations should take place. Bob Flaten was the Executive Branch expert on this sale. He and others were quite open about the decision which the Executive Branch was about to make. The US government was going to sell the F-5s despite the fact that they would be used by the Moroccan military to attach the Polisario. I was sent to examine the desirability of such a sale. We went and then wrote a 35 page report—which was never published because it was classified. We had three different recommendations—one from each member of my group. In the final analysis, my recommendation was accepted and the sale was consummated.

The issue of “regional stability” has been debated for many years. I think that we know enough about certain areas to feel comfortable approving arms sales without running too great a risk of “unintended circumstances.” That is not true for all areas. But in the Middle East, everybody paid a lot of attention to that area. So if we didn't perceive an unintended consequence, the Israelis would bring it to our attention. But as I said there may have been other areas of the world where we ran somewhat higher risks, but the sales to those areas were not large. We had our own constraints on sales to Latin America; countries in some other areas could not afford major purchases nor had the technical know-how to handle our more sophisticated weapon systems.. So sales outside the Middle East were less of a risk, although we were not as familiar with all factors as we were in the Middle East.

I wrote many, many papers during my SFRC employment. Classification was certainly one restraint. There were others at times, when I would need the staff director's approval to
write on a certain issue; when I was in charge of oversight hearings, I would use my best judgement. I would generally show the draft to a number of people and get their reactions. I would almost always show it to some people in the Department of State and sometimes I would get the reactions of the intelligence community. This was not a “clearance: process; my papers could not be censored, but I did certainly take the comments I received into consideration in the preparation of the final text. It is always useful to find out ahead of time, before a paper is published, where I might have been off-base or where I might have made a mistake. I should add that no one pushed me to write these papers; that was due to my own predilections. I had one very simple rule: whenever I traveled, I wanted a product.

In some cases, as I suggested, the product might not have been publishable—classification or other impediments. But I always felt that if tax-payers were going to pay my way, I owed them a product. Ironically, that goal forced me to work extraordinarily hard during my travels. Knowing that I would write something forced me to get that one last interview, to make that one more field trip, etc. I think I worked extremely hard on my trips to gather information. There is no question that my approach enable me to learn a lot more than might have been the case otherwise. It was an intense educational process. Even today, I follow that process; if I travel, I write about it afterwards and I firmly believe that both I and my colleagues need to publish our findings and views. If the material is not suitable for publication, then at least I will send a memo to Secretary of State or Defense or to members of their staff. But my first objective has been and is today to publish.

This process forced me to organize my thinking. It gives me a venue to broadcast the information I gather and a platform to express my views, in the hopes to influence others. Since these trips are time consuming and labor intensive, it is not surprising that I would like to think that they have some impact on policy development. I have never taken the time to review my papers to see how they stand up to the test of time; I will leave that to
my retirement. Fortunately, most of the papers I wrote for the SFRC have been together in one publication.

The trips were incredibly useful to me. I could not have done my job without them. As I said, I saw much of my role on the SFRC staff as a “blocker of bad ideas”; the basis for my judgements in many cases was my travels and first hand observations. That led me mostly to places which I felt were important to the national interest. I found visited places because the ability to see the problems at first hand made it much more meaningful. There were some cases, such as Korea, where the information in Washington—or at least the emphasis—was different in the field than it was in Washington. The commanders in the field reinforced the tilt in the intelligence community assessment which ran counter to the Carter administration policy. That was one of the reason why Chairman Humphreys asked to go to Korea. Our conclusion was that the intelligence community analysis was much more on the mark than the Carter administration troop withdrawal policy, which would have been too great a gamble.

In the AWAC sale to Saudi Arabia, we did not realize the distances involved until we saw them for ourselves on the ground. We also became more aware of the importance of AWAC in a the defense of a huge country like Saudi Arabia.I tried as much as possible to travel alone. There were of course occasions when I went with a senator or a delegation. I never found that as satisfactory as my solo journeys because it was the principals who set the agenda for the visit, leaving me little opportunity to pursue issues of interest to me. The reports I wrote after those trips were their reports reflecting their perspectives and conclusions. My trips were more of an investigating nature; I asked questions that a principal might not.

I think I was given access to all classified information that I requested. If I did not see some document, it was because I did not ask for it. I had clearance to read all documents; I read the NID (the National Intelligence Daily) every day. I don't remember anyone ever denying me access to any document; I was never denied a document on the basis of “executive
privilege” or for some other reason. I may not have seen personal memoranda from one executive branch official to a cabinet officer, but then no one else saw those either. I think the executive branch officials understood that I would not misuse their documents; so they would let me read a memorandum or paper in their offices if I could not take it out.

In general, I think that I had good relations with the Executive Branch. There were undoubtedly some who did not share my views and were probably unhappy with some of my work, but I tried to act in such a manner that I could retain their confidence. I felt that good relations with the Executive Branch were important; after all, I had started my career there. I recognized expertise and professionalism and was happy to get the advice and opinions from those who had it. I think I got good support from members of the Executive Branch, particularly overseas. Embassies were quite forthcoming and gave me a lot of good information and support. I had a lot of great people as “control” officers; many went on to become ambassadors. I think many of the embassy people went out of their way to help me—getting appointments, etc.

During my years of service for the SFRC, my perception of the Executive Branch's foreign policy management capability varied over time. I think the Carter administration was much looser in its style than the Reagan administration. That is not necessarily a negative comment depending on the circumstances. There were times when I felt that the DSAA was essentially a salesman for US arms manufacturers. The State Department was a little more circumspect. But these were more question of emphasis; I don't remember ever seeing anarchy in the process. There were times when an agency would try to “lobby” me for one point of view. There were times when we got different perspectives from executive agencies. For example, often we read the CIA analyses which moved into a direction inconsistent with administration policy—e.g. Korea. The differences among agencies was more pronounced in the defense field where a service might well come and support the procurement of a weapons system that the Secretary of Defense had recently vetoed. But I don't remember that happening in the foreign policy area.
I think the Congressional review process worked well in the 1977-85 period. There had been an imbalance in the 1965-75 period in the foreign policy process, with the Executive Branch having too free a hand. In my time on the Hill, that imbalance was redressed. I think that was probably a good thing. I can't think of too many cases when things went dramatically wrong as consequence of SFRC action. The AWAC sale to Iran went through Committee but not until after it raised serious questions about the nature of the Shah's regime—which not too long thereafter resulted in the downfall of the Shah. I have already discussed our work on bolstering Saudi Arabia's military capability and the importance of that work on subsequent history. In Korea, we contributed to the over-turn of Carter's troop withdrawal policy. SALT II would have gone forward to the benefit of all if there had not been a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Committee was right on human rights abusers—the violators in Chile and Argentina were thrown out a few years later. We did the right thing in terminating arms sales to those repressive regimes. Hubert Humphrey convinced the Senate to pass amendments of disapproval of the “dirty” war in Argentina in 1977. The administration did not much like it at the time, but it was the right stance. So I think it is fair to say that the SFRC reached the right conclusions on all the major foreign policy issues facing it.

Q: In 1985, you were appointed Director for the Center for Studies in Foreign Affairs, which was located in the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State. How did that come about?

BINNENDIJK: Senator Percy had lost his election in November, 1984. My wife, Mary, had also worked for Percy; so his loss put both of us on the street. Senator Mac Mathias—R.Md—asked me whether I would be interested in joining his staff of a while. That was just a temporary job. So I started to look around and someone told me that there was vacancy at the Center. I went to see Steve Low, the Director of FSI, whom I had known slightly. Steve and I hit it off and he offered me the position of Director of the Center.
When I took over, the Center was a small operation, without much sense of direction. It had been clear from my conversations with Steve that I would be permitted to shape the Center into what I saw as an opportunity for it. It was a challenge; I looked forward to taking an institution and move it along the lines that I drew.

I saw the Center serving as a connection between the professionals of the State Department and the academic world or any sources that could shed some new light on a particular problem faced by the professionals. We used a number of different instruments to reach this goal: seminars, conferences, publications, diplomatic simulations—i.e. “war games”. The latter was a real innovation for the Department. It was a technique that the Defense Department had used for many years, but it had never been applied to the diplomatic process. That was one of my major successes. I think that the idea of “diplomatic role playing” probably started from some conversations I had with Linc Bloomfield, a professor at MIT. I thought that the simulation process had merit; I had been involved in it and other kinds of exercises in the military. I had been to Newport, for example to participate in global “war games.”

The Department had nothing along those lines. I thought it would be a very helpful tool for analysis. It was sort of a policy planning exercise intended to force people to think of different possible future scenarios and the US response to certain new situations.

I found varying degrees of resistance to this new initiative. The general attitude of the Foreign Service was to spend as little time in that environment as possible; it didn't lead to a promotion. The culture of the State Department, very much unlike that in the Defense Department, does not reward training or academic pursuits. I believe that this attitude manifested itself with some of the activities in which I was engaged. I found that people always seemed to have trouble to find time for my seminars or conferences, even if it took them away from their desks for only one day. I dealt with that by engaging assistant secretaries and their deputies; if they would show up for the simulations and conferences, then their staffs were less reluctant to do the same. The reactions of the
assistant secretaries to some of my initiatives varied from official to official. Some of them were quite imaginative; others were more pedantic and resistant. The more sensitive the issue—in political terms—was, the greater the resistance to simulations primarily because of concerns that the fact that the Department was running simulations might leak to the public and raise major concerns in the country affected. But in many cases, we had very good reception from senior officials. We would offer to have the bureaus involved shape the simulations. As I said, once a senior official agreed to come, so would his or her staff and others, making often for a very lively and I think useful day of policy exploration. The simulations were always inter-agency and often we would also include people from outside the bureaucracy who had special expertise in the issue to be examined. The “outsiders” were of course sworn to secrecy and I think added new dimensions not usually available to the bureaucracy.

I think the diplomatic simulations were very useful. That was the feedback we were getting from senior Department officials; it was not unusual for some of them to call me up and ask that I schedule some more on different issues of interests to them. But I think the preponderance of the initiatives came from us. I think we had some very interesting simulations. In some cases, people did come back to us to report that the exercise had made a difference in policy formulation. The simulation process is a very powerful methodology. The Center did not copy the Defense model exactly; that is, we did not have “Blue” and “Red” teams which would tackle the problem presented to them. Our exercises were very dynamic, with lots of role playing. We did one on South Korea; we asked some senior Department officials to play the role of various senior Korean officials. This was done just prior to the 1987 elections. I remember Bill Clark—then the senior deputy assistant secretary in FE—playing the role of President Chun Doo Hwan. Jay Taylor played Kim Dae Jung. We wanted free play to represent the real world as best we could. Clark and Taylor held press conference, congressional hearings, etc—all the activities that might happen in the real world. All the participants played their roles with real earnestness and played hard. In this particular game, Chun—Clark—ordered his
police to grab Kim—Taylor—just as he was about to begin his press conference. Some of the players just went up and grabbed Taylor and put him in a closet. That indicated to me that the participants had really taken their roles to heart. I must say that this happen often during the simulations. It helped the bureaucrats to view the problem from a different perspective which is the real value of simulations.

We of course wrote up each simulation in a brief memo to the secretary, but that was not nearly as important as the lessons learned by the participants. We ran a simulation on the re-flagging of the Kuwaiti vessels in the Persian Gulf. This was played a week before the final decision was made and many of the key decision makers participated. I think that simulation had an impact.

In general, I think the Center made a very valuable contribution to policy development. Organizations of that kind are very useful; I see that today with the Institute for National Strategic Studies. In fact, the Center I think had even a greater impact because I could get to assistant secretaries and their deputies—and in some cases even to an under secretary. We had the capability of focusing on the problems of the moment, which were of immediate concern to the policy maker. So I think we had a significant impact; it was a very low cost investment for the Department—the simulation aspect of the Center required just a couple of people and is still going today.

I mentioned that we began a publication house, which produces a series on negotiations and a series on authoritative regimes in transition. It provided a home for a number of senior Foreign Service officers who wished to have a “sabbatical.” For example, Monty Stearns, our Ambassador to the Ivory Coast first and then Greece, spent a year at the Center. He was typical of the officers who spent time with us—usually ex-ambassadors who would devote some time to writing about their experiences or researching issues of interests to them. Most of the our publications were dynamic in nature; we would take the transcripts of a symposium or a work-shop and edited them down to meaningful publications. We had a wonderful editor who was able to take the raw material and turn
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it into very interesting documents. One of us would then make a final editorial review and write an introduction, all of which would be published soon thereafter. We wrote a lot about the nature of negotiations. I worked on one called “National Negotiating Styles” which still today generates calls from people who want more information on that topic. The publication looks at the way six key countries negotiate. I still meet people today who tell me that they are using the material in their courses.

We also published a study on “Authoritarian Regimes in Transition” which a number of people applauded. In the mid-1980s, there were a number of countries undergoing this transition. We refer today to the major spurt in the number of democratic regimes around the world; I think much of that began in the mid-1980s—e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Spain and Portugal a little earlier, the Philippines. We thought it would be interesting to do a series of symposia on that subject after Jeane Kirkpatrick had written her thesis on “dictators and double standards.” i.e. authoritarian is better than totalitarian and therefore we should not press authoritarian regimes because they may then become dictatorial. I think our conclusions were in some respect a rejection of her thesis. In fact, by the mid-1980s, regimes were moving toward democratic form, not dictatorial. Military regimes were falling because they could not meet the people’s aspirations. So we studied the process of transition from dictatorial to democratic. It was a real challenge for our foreign policy because it was very hard to determine at any specific point in time where a country stood in that transition process. It generally does not happen smoothly. Indicators develop, but may not be properly read and we often found one morning that the leader that we had been supporting had been overthrown. The new government represented too often people with whom we had very little, if any, contact. So our symposia were focused on the transition process to see what indicators might be watched which would provide a clue about future events and to see whether there was any commonality among transitions that had taken place. The indicators that we were interested in were clues that might tell us how long a dictator might last. We learned that the legitimacy of a dictator can erode quickly and that it was important to watch the indicators carefully in order not to be
surprised when the downfall came. I have often wondered whether we could have applied the lessons learned from the fall of authoritative dictators to the events in Easter Europe and the Soviet Union as their totalitarian regimes fell. I think that the same process that brought the downfall of the Shah also occurred in Central and Eastern Europe. All of the indicators that we had isolated in our study were I think replicated in that part of the world.

As I have suggested before, I am a great fan of the written word and therefore publications. Ideas really count. I think they can have an impact on society. I know that today's fashion is to go the Internet, allegedly making publications some kind of dinosaurs. I still believe in the power of the printed page. If we had a short term impact with the simulations, we had a longer term impact with our publications, although I must readily admit that the State Department culture is “publication resistant.” Our program was an anomaly. I tried to replicate—in a very modest way—a think-tank, like CSIS or Brookings. The publication aspect obviously did not take because the program was terminated soon after I left, much to my regret. It was not particularly expensive; it had considerable impact both on the Department and the academic community.

As I said, we sponsored conferences and seminars. Some of that was already being done when I got to FSI. But it was minuscule. As in the case of simulations and publications, I pushed hard for an expansion of the Department's efforts. So we held a lot of conferences, most of them in our FSI building in Rosslyn. This was also a low cost operation. Typically, we would sponsor a one day symposium; we would try to bring in four or five outside speakers—often from out of town. That would provide some fresh insights for the benefit of the officials who usually didn't have the opportunity to hear them.

I think it is fair to say that most of the Center's efforts in the three areas I have described were self-initiated. Occasionally, some one in the Department would come to me with a suggestion or request for a specific program, but most often the topics and tools —conferences, simulations or publications—were self-generated. This was a further indication to me that the Department's culture was a closed one and primarily one that
was inward looking. It tends to focus on the immediate; the planning horizons in general are measured in days or weeks, at best, rather than months or years. The target is the next event: a ministerial meeting or the next secretarial speech or today's crisis. These immediate events absorb all the Department's energies. I observed the same phenomenon when I served later on the Department's Policy Planning Staff, I don't know what the consequences of this process is on our foreign policy. I think the Department is in general very good at managing the political impact of the immediate; it needs to do a lot more work on integrating the defense and economic dimensions of a crisis or a policy-making process with the political. It also suffers greatly from the absence of a good long-range policy development process. It has essentially no vision of where our foreign policy should be going. That problem became particularly acute and noticeable after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. We don't have the vision to fill the vacuum left by the events of the late 1980s. That needs to be addressed so that the US can come to grips with a new international order.

So there is a gap in the foreign policy development process. As I will mention later, we tried in Policy Planning to fill that gap, but frankly that was generally a futile exercise. There are other institutions in government that focus on issues beyond the immediate horizons, including my present organization. The defense community in general tends to plan more and better that its foreign policy counter-part. That is due in part to the nature of defense programs with long lead procurement requirements. State doesn't have “programs”; AID does as well as USIA. State focuses on policy, which is relatively short term and does not require a long term vision. Defense is organized to think about the future and many of its people are trained to think about strategy, which by its very nature already requires a longer term horizon. Defense people are rewarded for thinking strategically and about the world two or three decades in the future. DoD establishes institutions—and funds them—to worry about the world of tomorrow. I can see that very clearly by comparing the way I am financially supported today at the Institute with the pittances that were allocated to me at the Center for Studies in Foreign Affairs in the late
1980s. I am very grateful to Steve Low for the valiant battles he used to fight on our behalf, but I think the best evidence of the remarkable difference in State and Defense cultures is to see what happened to the Center after Steve and I left FSI. It was terminated.

As I indicated, Steve Low was very supportive of our efforts. We had minimal conflict with the bureaucracy. Charlie Bray succeeded Low and he was fantastic. After Charlie, came Brandon Grove who was also very good, although I left soon after his arrival. Brandon had been at the Center for a while as a senior fellow so that he was quite familiar with our programs. All three directors were very supportive; I could not have asked for a better group of bosses. We of course had to fight every year for every dollar, but that is not unusual in a bureaucracy. I was very sorry that the Center was closed after I left, for reasons that had nothing to do with the merits of its programs. There were people like Steve, Charlie and Brandon who had a broad enough vision to see the merits of a Center-like program, but apparently there were too many others who lacked that foresight.

I was able to increase the funding for the Center while I was its director. Of course, I always felt that I could wisely use more, but the Center was not a resource-intensive operation—putting on a good symposium is not a costly operation. It costs even less to put on a good diplomatic simulation. We could publish a book that had an impact for less than $5,000. So the Center was an inexpensive operation—particularly if compared to what DoD might spend on a similar program. But the returns on policy development, if programs are conducted properly, can be substantial. I left the Center in 1987, not out of frustration, but rather because an opportunity arose that I just could not refuse. I really enjoyed my two years at FSI, even if the Rosslyn facilities left something to be desired. I left fundamentally because I felt the need to broaden my knowledge and expertise in strategic studies and in European security issues. I wanted to further develop fields of expertise in which I could excel. Up to 1987, I had dabbled in a lot of areas; it was time to concentrate on one or two. I saw IISS (the Institute for International Strategic Studies)
in London as an opportunity to achieve a goal. So my departure from the Center was not because of dissatisfaction, but because I saw other opportunities which attracted me.

Q: So in 1987, you went to London to join the IISS staff. Tell us a little about that experience.

BINNENDIJK: The IISS was a center for strategic thinkers from all over the world. It was a great place to meet a lot of the world's leading intellectuals and planners and to share views with them. IISS was truly an international institute. It was a child of the Cold War; it was started to provide an opportunity to better understand the dynamics of nuclear deterrence and to provide a location for people to gather to think, discuss and exchange views on that issue.

Over time, IISS went beyond nuclear issues and balance of forces. The staff and the visiting scholars represented fifteen or twenty different nationalities. The governing board had members from many different countries. Its annual conference is held in different parts of the world and provides an opportunity to discuss cutting-edge issues. IISS is an opinion-molding institution. The views expressed in its publications or at its conference do make a difference. It is independent, self-sustaining; it had a small endowment and its own building—although it is now in the process of moving to another location. All of these assets gave the Institute a sense of independence, analytical expertise and sophistication and made it a powerful and unique place in international relations.

Some people view IISS as part of academia. It is not; it is very practical, with little or no “ivory-tower” tinge. The people who work there are sought by the media after for comments on current events. During my three a half years as Director of Studies, the Cold War ended; that made it even more interesting to be there.

The Institute is headed by a Director, who is appointed for a five year term. While I was there, there was Deputy Director—a position filled by an Englishman—usually a former Brigadier General or senior Colonel. The key American position was the Director of
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Studies, which as I indicated was my position, although later I was also given the title of a deputy director. The staff consisted of a group of expert clusters. For example, the “military balance” group was staffed by former British military officers who served at the Institute for 5-10 years. The core of the staff was the research associates who stayed at the Institute for a year or so, pursuing an area of interest of them. From their analysis would come a Adelphi paper—a 70-90 page thorough examination of a specific issue. Those papers were supposed to be highly polished and impact making documents.

The researchers were viewed as part of the staff; they were paid employees. Occasionally, we would commission a non-resident to undertake an analysis on a specific subject. Our main interest was to obtain a good product. We sought a wide range of expertise so that most of the issues could be tackled in-house. We held weekly meeting, which I found particularly stimulating; we would bring in a speaker to talk to the some of the directing staff and the research associates about a current issue.

We also had short term researchers, who stayed at IISS for less than a year. For example, we contracted with Sam Huntington to spend three months with us during which he wrote a major “Survival” article for us and did some other work. I had a great deal of flexibility to pull experts in from all over for any period of time I deemed necessary—or for which they were available.

As Director of Studies, my main preoccupations were, first of all, to raise money. There was very little in-house financing available, so that all of the major efforts required foundation support. This fund raising activity was a true test of the acceptance of our products in a free market. I would try to see what foundations were interested in or conversely, which of our research programs one of them would support. I would start with the development of a research program. Then would come the proposal drafting and its submission to potential donors. The requests focused on specific studies and in some cases specific researchers. We had some requests for general support, but my main focus was on funds for specific research programs. We raised considerable amounts of money,
some from the US—e.g. Ford, Rockefeller, Smith-Richardson—and some from other countries—e.g. Volkswagen.

A lot of the ideas for topics came from discussions with members of the board. Lot came from media focus. The topics fell into the mid to long range span because since the papers took approximately one year to prepare, we were not really geared up for quick analyses. We did not at the time have a rapid reaction capability, beyond the comments one of us would make to the media. IISS does have that capability now, called “strategic comments”, which is very similar to what we do at the Institute for National Strategic Studies in a program called “strategic forum.” We issue short papers which can hit the street quickly.

My second task was to edit “Survival”—an IISS journal. That did include papers written within two to three months.

As I said, I was at IISS just as the Cold War ended. In a sense, that was very frustrating because many of the projects we had underway had be scrapped after 1989. The subject matters no further fitted the post Cold War mold. That was painful because we had to terminate a lot of research, much which had been underway for a number of months. But I think no one would really have cared for products which discussed the Cold War or issues immediately related to that.

I must say that working for a semi-academic institution such as IISS does change your perspective. You tend to focus much more on tomorrow and the day after rather that today. One does not get caught up in the day-to-day decision-making process; you have an opportunity to see where a cluster of decisions might take the world. For me, it was my first exposure to serious media commentary. During the Gulf War, I was on BBC and ITN pretty constantly. That exposure gave me a very different mind set; I would listen to news reports closely and critically knowing that soon thereafter I would be in the public eye commenting on the latest events. That is very hard work; hopefully, even creative, sometime a little scary.
I found that the British and Japanese media paid better than the American one. The British have an entirely different approach to the use of expert knowledge. They view the commentator as part of their team. Once they got to know you, they would repeatedly call you. Sometimes they would call in advance to warn the commentator about the subject matter and perhaps even some angles that might be discussed. They made a conscious effort not to surprise the commentator or to put him or her on the spot; they did their best to make the commentator feel at ease and comfortable—to be part of the reporting team. The goal was to make the expert part of the production team unlike the US media which at times makes the expert an adversary and treats him or her like an antagonistic witness.

IISS had strong relationships with the British Foreign Office, the Foreign Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defense. We would often have the Permanent Secretary of one of the Departments and his immediate staff at our conferences. They would often call us for consultations. I remember being the only American in an all-British meeting discussing British policies. Our offices were very close to Whitehall and other Ministries; that made communications easier. I think that in Washington there was and continuous to be a high respect for IISS. So when I traveled back to the US it would not be unusual for an under secretary of State or Defense—Bob Kimmitt or Paul Wolfowitz—to meet with me and my colleagues for an hour or so. They would be interested in IISS views and findings and what was going on in Europe. There were organizations like the Strategic Defense Office in the Pentagon did use the Institute. Whenever the three star general in charge of that Office would come through London he was often scheduled to spend a couple of hours with us. So there were places in the US bureaucracy that would methodically use IISS.

We had some contacts with some continental bureaucracies. There used to be periodic meetings among the British, French and German policy planners or political directors who would spend the better part of a day consulting among themselves and with IISS. The Institute would arrange a day’s program, sometimes started by a brief commentary from in Institute member. Then the participants would take over. This was another situation in
which I might have been the only American in the room. Sometimes they discussed the attitudes of European leaders toward the US and US policy, which always made for an education for me.

I think the British tended to use the Institute very aggressively—much more than the State Department would have interfaced with a comparable American institution. The European bureaucracies were much more likely to use academic or semi-academic institutions, in part because they were so small that they had to rely on outside input into their policy development process. There were also “old school ties” because as I mentioned the Institute had a number of retired military officers on its staff. Occasionally, we would provide shelter to a British diplomat for a year's sabbatical. That also helped cement ties between the Institute and the British bureaucracy.

I think all the evidence would lead one to conclude that IISS is a powerful force in the development of British foreign and defense policies. It provides that long-range planning element missing in most bureaucracies. IISS was paid heed. It is not clear how influence is exercised; we would throw out ideas and some were used, but is not always easy to determine genesis or cause and effect. We would put our ideas on paper, we would discuss them in public; they would be circulated and might be built back into the government's views. So IISS helped to form opinion and that is a powerful force for policy formulation.

The donor community in the late 1980s was still anxious to fund analyses in the security and foreign affairs areas. It saw the changes happening in Europe and thought it was worthwhile financing efforts to shed some light on those changes. So if one was creative in putting proposals together, one could obtain financing. That has changed; it is now much tougher to get foundation funding for efforts in the international policy arena. I think the donor community expected to see products for their contributions: i.e. publications (e.g. the Adelphi series was well regarded and of the donor knew that such a paper would be the end result of the contribution made, that carried a lot of weight). The IISS has a
broad membership of about 3,000 people world wide. They are the opinion leaders and shapers in 80-90 countries. An Adelphi paper would have world-wide readership and an almost guaranteed impact. Having that vehicle was powerful in terms of fund raising; it was important to the donors that their resources support products that had an impact.

Sometimes, representatives of the donor community participated in our programs. They were quite knowledgeable about our programs. By and large they tended to follow our activities. Each foundation normally had an international affairs office; that staff usually tries to develop its own niche and becomes very familiar with the issues in that segment of the foreign affairs field. For example, Rockefeller Brothers concentrated on non-proliferation; Volkswagen on the other hand focused on associating young German scholars with the global security studies community. So Volkswagen would fund German scholars to spend time at IISS—the subject matter was not as important as the ties developed by those scholars. Over time, I learned in what each potential donor might be interested. When it came time to fund a specific project, we had a pretty good idea which donor might be interested.

Personally, I found the three and a half years at IISS very rewarding. I think I did acquire considerable knowledge of the strategic studies field—primarily European security studies; e.g NATO and its operations, understanding the European military and the countries' strategic views. I learned a lot about the Soviet Union and later Russia and its modus vivendi and view points. For three and half years, I wrote a lot about strategic nuclear issues arising from the military balance. My base was woefully inadequate—I had been spread so thin at the SFRC that I didn't have the opportunity to become an expert on any issue—so that my learning curve had to be quite steep at the beginning. But I had to learn all the ins and outs of those issues if I were to do my job satisfactorily. I think I did become quite knowledgeable about strategic issues; I think I achieved my goal in that respect.

I am sure that I learned some things during the three and a half years which I wish I would have known while working for the SFRC. I acquired some depth of knowledge,
but I don't think that the Committee's deliberations and decisions would have been different if it had known what I later learned at IISS. There may be important background information that might get lost in the hectic pace of the Committee, but I can't say that it would have been material to the Committee's decisions. I did while at IISS greatly improve my understanding of the nature of the international system and some of the details of strategic nuclear weapons. I was totally immersed in European security issues; I had insights available to few people outside of governments through the meetings I mentioned with the political directors of various ministries—invaluable.

I would probably been able to serve the senators better had I been at IISS first, but I don't think it was a crucial issue. It is a fact that people tend to go to work for Congress early in their careers—the pay is not that good, the hours can be very long and it is a quick way to become involved in major issues. Staffers tend to be young and aggressive, but may not be entirely intellectually mature. I think the congressional system attracts very bright young people who might be more useful if they had seasoned a little more. They tend to become more concerned with their personal agenda and the impact they might have on decisions that in acquiring knowledge in depth and maturity. I am sure that committees and senators would benefit from having more “grayer heads” on their staffs; there are some staffers that are employed toward the end of their careers, but in general that is not the case. I mentioned earlier that I spent most of my time on the SFRC staff putting out fires—knocking down bad ideas. Many of those ideas came from young, eager, bright staffers trying to make a mark without too much concern about their methods. More seasoned staffers would probably not have the same motivations and probably would make a valuable contribution to congressional deliberations and the process.

I think my IISS stint was useful for my subsequent work, with the Department's Policy Planning Staff and here at the Institute for National Security Affairs, which in many ways is DoD's in-house IISS. In fact, I think my IISS experience has probably most useful in this
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present assignment at the INSA; it allowed me to make some changes here with some comfort in light of my IISS experience.

My three and a half years in London brought me into touch with an international community of people with similar interests which is well established, is influential with many governments around the world, communicates well among its members—especially today with all the modern communication technology. My ability to participate in this circle, which includes some very sophisticated analysts—e.g. Kaiser from Germany—has been very useful. I still exchange views with many of the contacts I made while at IISS; I try to maintain contact with as many of the “circle” members as I can, when I can. I try to attend IISS conferences to keep up with both people and ideas. I continue to maintain contacts with people in institutions like the INSA around the world, many of whom I met when first working with IISS, e.g. Nishihara of Japan. My contacts with him enable us to open a relationships with NIDS which was his old institute in Japan.

As I said, IISS was and is close to the British bureaucracy. The British government has fostered other think tanks like Chatham House, the International Service Institute, a new center at King’s College into which they put a lot of money. The British bureaucracies uses these non-governmental capabilities very well. In Germany, there is Eben Hausen—an in-house think tank near Munich. It does a lot of long range planning for the German Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry. Japan is different, I think; there are very few private sector think tanks. NIDS is actually part of the Self-Defense Forces, financed by the Government. In France there are a couple—best known is probably IFRI, which has pretty close ties to the Foreign Ministry. In the US, there are a number of well-developed think-tanks like CSIS. David Abshire has developed a great formula to integrate industry, congress, heavy hitters like Kissinger and Brzezinski. CSIS sets up working groups, sometimes called commissions which include a lot of powerful people, which, with the help of very good staff support, issue reports and recommendations on a wide variety of issues. CSIS is a great operation, which I think has a far greater impact on government than any other outside group has. It is probably true that a Republican administration might also
turn to a group such as the Heritage Foundation or the American Enterprise Institute while Democrats might turn more to Brookings, but as a on-going institution that has influence on governmental foreign policy and national security policies day in and day out, I don't think anything beats CSIS.

Q: In 1991, you returned to the US and went to work for Georgetown University as Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. How did that come about?

BINNENDIJK: Having spent three and half years in London, it was time to come home. The children needed to come home for an American education. I had to be dragged back; London was the perfect place to serve my interests and life-style. I had known Peter Krogh for a long time starting in the late 1960s when he was an assistant dean at the Fletcher School; he had done a wonderful job at Georgetown as Dean of the School of Foreign Service. He invited me to lunch with him at his house and suggested that I apply for the job, which had just been vacated by David Newsom. It sounded like a great opportunity and I was delighted when I was chosen.

David had built a very good Institute, focused especially on the foreign policy implementation process. I thought that I could build on that core and enlarge it in some new directions. I wanted to be more active in terms of publications, conferences, etc. That was the challenge and I looked forward to it.

I plunged in, as is my style, to move in several directions at once. I tried to use each of the senior staff—many of whom were ex-Foreign Service officers—as force multipliers to undertake a number of different projects. For example, we wrote a report on the future of the Foreign Service. That made a pretty big splash when released in 1992. We undertook a study of nuclear arms control which also got wide coverage in the media. I was trying to cover a broad range of issues, all of them directed to an effort to influence policy development—which had been my core goal for many years.
At the end of two years, I think we did have an impact on that goal. We were able to get a number of studies into the public fora where they had to be considered. We got good press coverage for many of our efforts. I think we did manage to change some people's thinking. We did one series on Russia which I think had a powerful impact. We did this at a time when the government's attitude towards Russia was changing. So we brought together a number of experts on Russia from both inside and outside government. We hosted a series of lunches which culminated in two reports, both of which got wide press coverage. Nixon spoke out in support of a change of US attitude towards Russia by supporting its nascent democratic movement. That was basically our message as well and I think it had an impact on US policy.

This Russian program was typical in format of the kinds of programs we developed at Georgetown: series of lunches attended by experts in Washington. These lunches were always well attended, in part because these experts saw them as opportunities to see some of their colleagues and to exchange information and views with them at the lunch. The sessions were sufficiently structured so that the conversations before, during and after the meal focused on vital issues and were productive for the participants. I think these sessions had an impact; the opportunity to interact with friends and colleagues had very positive results.

The Institute's relationship with the rest of school worked out pretty well. I worked very hard to try to make the Institute a part of the school. I went out of my way to solicit ideas from the faculty and to engage it as much as I could in the Institute's activities. I got good feed-back from the faculty; I think they appreciated the outreach. I think the faculty also began to see the Institute as a player in the policy development field. Our publications went far beyond the campus; our meetings were attended by a large number of people from various organizations around town. I would try to link up our activities with the Georgetown faculty involved in that area. For example, the Russian program I discussed
was developed in cooperation with the faculty dealing with Russia. So we served as a venue for them to engage with people involved in similar studies elsewhere.

After my experience at Georgetown, I had seen foreign policy being developed in three major institutions of society: the bureaucracy—both in the executive and legislative fields, academia and think-tanks. In many ways, if done right, the non-governmental players can have a major influence in the US—much more than in other parts of the world. I don't think there is another city like Washington where the non-governmental—the think tanks, the NGOs, academia—institutions, staffed to a large degree by former government practitioners, are so involved in the issues of the day, whether it is through publications, including such things as OP-ED pieces, or the orally, through meetings and even congressional testimony. This non-governmental group is very important to the formation of public opinion. I don't think you can find a comparable situation anywhere else in the world.

If you look at other Western countries or Japan, you will find that the ministries have much more leeway in their operations. They are not nearly as constrained as American agencies are by the opinions of non-government elite groups. The American bureaucracy is bound to a large extent by those opinions. It has to continually be concerned by what Kissinger or Brzezinski will say, what will be said on the Sunday morning talk shows, how will group A or B react. It is not only the foreign policy elites who have a powerful voice, but so do special interest groups. The expressions of these various voices greatly reduces the flexibility of our State Department; it is far more constrained than its sister institutions in other capitals. I have reached the conclusion that American non-governmental institutions have far greater long range impact than comparable organizations in other countries. They are very good at identifying problems, focusing on them, bringing them to public attention, injecting them into legislative debate and consideration, etc. For example, recently CSIS completed a good study on what it called “the coming defense train wreck” which focused on the declining defense procurement budget. CSIS published a report and brought to the attention of several senators who brought its conclusions to committees and the
floor. The media picked it up and the report has become part of the lore. It has forced the administration to deal with it; in fact, the recent quadrennial defense review focused on how the budget could be squeezed enough so that more resources could be made available for procurement. The CSIS conclusions did not come as great surprise to DoD; it knew it had a procurement short fall. But without the study and the subsequent public debate, DoD had no significant avenue which it could be used to rectify the budgetary imbalance. This was just one case; in fact, such events take place all the time. If a problem can be identified outside the bureaucracy and brought to the cogitative map of the decision-makers, it then will be dealt with.

I think that non-governmental institutions have a meaningful role to play in the American foreign policy development process. The bureaucracy understands the importance of special interest groups. I am not sure that it has yet fully understood the significant role that the think tanks and academia play. A policy maker might well attend a conference sponsored by a think-tank or academia and perhaps have his or her views changed or revised by what is said at such sessions, but it is not clear to me that the bureaucracy has yet understood the subtle influence that a non-governmental institution plays through its impact on the media, Congress and public opinion in general. Ideas generated by these non-governmental institutions filter through the system and sometimes result in actions, such as legislative amendments. It is a complicated and very subtle in which cause and effect are sometimes hard to determine, but which certainly are in play; that is not always recognized by a bureaucrat.

I do think we have in the US a larger, more powerful group of “elites”—a term which cover a broad spectrum of individual experts as well as pressure groups—e.g. lobbies. They will influence the process to a much greater extent than happens in Europe—where the elites are a much smaller and narrower groups—, partially through their opinion expressions which are carried by the media which in turn then influence public opinion. While I was still in graduate school working on my Ph.D. thesis, I found that this elite group has a major impact on governmental actions on smaller issues. When a large issue becomes the focus
of public attention, like Vietnam, then the elites no longer have such a large voice. National issues are much more subject to the views of other groups; public opinion is subject to a much larger number of influences, making it subject to sudden changes often running contrary to the directions established by the administration or the elites.

We generally had a number of Foreign Service officers at the Institute. We usually had one Diplomat in Residence, a tandem couple (a husband and wife, both Foreign Service officers) supported by a Cox Foundation grant, and occasionally other officers for short term assignments. Sometimes we had a USIA officer and sometimes an AID officer in addition. So at any point of time, we had at least four Foreign Service officers at the Institute. They were a very useful addition to our staff. In many cases, these officers taught classes or seminars. I used one of them, John McNamara, to lead the study I mentioned earlier on the future of the Foreign Service. He really dug in; after all it was his future! That project resulted in a publication called “The Foreign Service in 2001”—issued in August 1992. Later that year and early in the following year, there was a reorganization of the Department of State, following the elections. I served on the transition team and was one of two people who was put in charge of the reorganization. So the work that a relatively junior officer did with me at Georgetown turned out to be invaluable to me and I hope also to the Foreign Service.

Most of the Foreign Service officers were anxious to be at Georgetown; it was a good place to be. Some however viewed it as a “year off” or a year long opportunity to seek the next assignment. With each new officer, I made it clear that I expected a product to be completed by the time their academic assignment was over. I found that the key to getting maximum contribution for these research associates was to stimulate them by suggesting projects to them which would intellectually challenge them. In general, I think that the Foreign Service officers who spent time with us worked out well, both for them and for us.

We also had military officers at the Institute. I would interview all potential candidates before agreeing to their assignments to Georgetown. At that time we would also agree
in general terms what the officer would do during his or her assignment to Georgetown; I would make clear what my expectations were. We therefore also started out with the hope that whatever would be done would make a contribution to both the officer and the Institute, preferably in terms of stimulating change—e.g. the future of the Foreign Service, US-Russia relations. On the latter subject, we ended up in fact with two reports that were issued. We along with lot of people in Washington were trying to figure out what our relations to this new entity called Russia should be. We in fact started our analysis just before the collapse of the Soviet Union and were heavily engaged in it when that empire fell apart. So we had fertile ground for developing suggestions for new policies. In fact, there was a bit of euphoria at the time with many thinking that the time had come for some earth-shaking changes in the world political dimension. I think that perhaps the academics were ahead of the bureaucrats in believing that the time had come for some real fundamental changes. Subsequent events may not have had the major impact that we had hoped for in 1992, but Yeltsin is still in charge in Russia, reform is proceeding albeit in fits and starts, NATO enlargement was received about as well as one could expect; not all is lost.

Academia has a lot of different dimensions. In some cases, it is the chronicler of events, recent and in the far past, which hopefully assists us to better understand the past. In my case, however, given my background, I try to use academia to make a contribution to current policy development. I think that is a legitimate endeavor for an institution or an individual who is not part of government.

I did try to follow the careers of the officers who had spent time with us at the Institute. In many cases, that time served as a platform before a good assignment. Elinor Constable, for example, spent a year with us teaching, recharging her batteries, and then soon thereafter became an assistant secretary. I was satisfied that in general officers found the time they spent with us personally rewarding and career enhancing.
I mentioned that in late 1992 an early 1993, I worked on the transition team. I had some work for the Clinton campaign team, mostly for Madeleine Albright, who was at time a professor at Georgetown and director of a small think tank which was politically active. During the campaign, one of her functions was to organize a speakers’ program. I was one of her “stable” and for example, debated on behalf of Clinton at a forum organized by the Chicago Council for Foreign Relations. When Brian Atwood, whom I had known for several years, was designated to head the transition team for the State Department, he asked me to join him to work on organizational issues, which I did. So I worked for a couple of months on that together with Dan Spiegel—another old friend from my SFRC staff days.

I found working on the transition team very stimulating because we had the sense that particularly on the organization, the time was opportune to effect some change. It is hard to change organizations after an administration has been established—short of cataclysms such as the recent forced amalgamations of foreign affairs agency. But in transition, we could begin with a relatively fresh page and suggest some changes. I found it stimulating to think about the Department's organization and consider various ways to increase its efficiency. Spiegel and I wrote a series of reports which were incorporated into briefing books for Warren Christopher, the new secretary. We briefed Christopher several times and a number of decisions were made based on our recommendations. We reinvigorated the under secretarial system by assigning to each under secretary responsibility for certain bureaus; that has undergone certain modifications recently. We suggest that in response to practices that had grown up under Baker; he would bring in five or six people every morning—without regard to official roles that these people played—and made policy right then and there in this informal group. Our view was that such practice would probably continue under any secretary; any secretary would convene a small group of personal advisors, but we strongly hoped that such group would include several under secretaries who were the operating linchpins in the Department. We tried to take a natural behavioral pattern—a small group of advisors—and institutionalize it by including in it a number of officials responsible for the day-to-day activities of the Department. We recommend
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the creation of an additional under secretary—for Global Affairs—and in general tried to strengthen the role of the under secretaries by having them frequently in touch with the secretary which would allow them to serve as conduits for his or her wishes to the Department's bureaucracy. That didn't work quite as well as we had hoped, but it as probably better than the Baker system. The problem was that some of the Under Secretaries did not connect well enough with the Bureaus and the Assistant Secretaries often felt cut out.

We recommended some other changes. The one which probably had the greatest impact on the bureaucracy was to radically cut the number of deputy assistant secretaries—about 40%. The idea was to try to reduce a top heavy bureaucratic structure and to try to increase the responsibilities of office directors. We found that a number of deputy assistant secretaries were essentially glorified office directors. By reducing the number of DAS positions, we hoped to strengthen the role of the office directors. I think that worked; the number of DASes were cut substantially, although I have recently noticed that the number is creeping up again.

So I found my work on the transition team to be interesting and fruitful, with an immediate and visible pay-off for our recommendations.

Q: In 1993, you were offered the job of Principal Deputy Director of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff. How did that come about?

BINNENDIJK: As I said, I had served on the transition team following the Clinton election. One day, Sam Lewis and I had lunch. He had just been named Director of the Policy Planning Staff, having been recalled from USIP. I had known Sam for several years; we had worked together on various products and projects, while he was in the Department and then when he was the President of the Institute for Peace. We had similar interest and in fact, I think we complimented each other. Eventually, he asked me to be his deputy and I accepted.
I joined Policy Planning because I thought that the immediate future would certainly be challenging in the foreign policy area. Not only had a new administration taken power, but the world bipolar system was going to be fundamentally altered. The concept of a balance of power between two super-powers was no longer valid. New visions, new policies, new strategies needed to be developed. Our hope was that the Policy Planning Staff would be given the charter to develop these new directions.

Once we began to work, the reality of life in the Department began to be evident. Our most difficult challenge was to connect in a firm way with the Secretary of State. Sam had more meetings with him than I did, which was to be expected, but most of those encounters took place during the early morning staff meetings which were essentially information exchange sessions. Sam was not present at most decision-making meetings. That was the real problem. If a Policy Planning staff was to be effective, it had to be part of the decision-making process.

There may have been some disconnect between what we envisaged as our role—the grand strategy development shop—and what Secretary Christopher might have been looking for. Christopher was essentially a negotiator who dealt with issues as a lawyer would—one problem at a time perhaps divorced from all the other problems and larger goals of US foreign policy goals. There was also a major difference in personalities; Christopher and Lewis are very different people which did not mix well. Sam comes from the real politik school, not afraid to use force when necessary. Christopher was much more reserved, much more Jeffersonian in outlook, relying more on problem resolution, restrained, shying away from new bold approaches. So it was not surprising that the relationship did not work out the way we had hoped.

Sam was unable to get into the key meetings, which was very unfortunate because he had a lot to contribute. I think the rest of the bureaucracy respected Sam; most had known him and appreciated his insights and knowledge. S/P did have a problem at the beginning being engaged by the bureaus. That was in part due to my view, expressed during the
transition, that too many people and organizations were being required to clear off on
cables and other documents. A major effort was made to therefore reduce the number
of clearances required on cables. I did not foresee that one of the organizations which
would be left out of the cable traffic would be S/P. We also lost speech writing to Public
Affairs. That really put us out in left field; we were left out of many of the issues. So we
had to find other ways to become involved and that was a constant battle at least at the
beginning. It also became clear after a while that Sam did not have the Secretary's ear; a
bureaucracy is very conscious of where power lies and that didn't help our standing in the
bureaucracy. So we had to fight hard to become involved in issues which we considered
to be rightfully in our purview. At one point we tried to draft a Foreign Affairs article for
Christopher, but we had great difficulty because it was defensive and we were unable to
capture Christopher's vision.

Furthermore, I think there were dissidents in the S/P staff. It was true that our foreign
policy was on the rocks in 1993, but our staff meetings sometimes got out of hand with the
dissenters being very critical of the new administration's foreign policy. That undoubtedly
filtered through the corridors of the Department which didn't help our position in the
bureaucracy at all. Sam and I were not personally that critical of the administration's
efforts, but we did run staff meetings quite freely and openly; that provided some staff
members an opportunity to criticize the Secretary severely. As I said, it is very likely that
those criticisms reached some 7th Floor principals adding to our already heavy burden of
trying to be involved in the decision making process.

After Sam and I left, Jim Steinberg, the new S/P director, had a much better chemistry
with Christopher and I think then S/P's standing in the bureaucracy rose. In fact, Steinberg
became something like a right hand man to Christopher, not necessarily as a policy
planner, but as a very capable aide and counselor. The rest of the Department had to pay
attention to Jim Steinberg, despite the regulations on clearances because it knew that Jim
carried clout with the Secretary. Jim had a much more practical and perhaps more realistic vision of S/P's role.

So the question of where long range foreign policy might be developed was not answered by our efforts starting in 1993. In fact, there are very few, if any, other units in State where such planning might take place—INR perhaps, but its focus is essentially on intelligence and does not have the staff capable of doing the job. I still think that it is theoretically possible to have a Policy Planning Staff which can do long range planning, while at the same time serving the Secretary on some of his or her most immediate problems. But I admit it is very difficult. In fact, I think that is a role that my present institution, INSS, can and hopefully does play. We are a government think tank, not involved in day-to-day activities, but still able to develop options for future actions to the policy makers.

In fact, the military is better at strategic planning than the Department of State. I stress “military” because my comparison may not be applicable to DoD as a whole. I think there is general agreement that most planning efforts mounted by DoD civilians have failed. There was a period when Zal Khalilzad, now at RAND, was director of planning in the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy; in that period, 1990-91, some very constructive work was performed at Defense in the security area. He was effective, but he was an exception. At the beginning of the Clinton administration, an assistant secretary for planning position was established; it lasted for less than a year. Then the planning office was moved from pillar to post and after a while was also abolished. So today, if we look for policy planners in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we won’t find them, with the possible exception of Ted Warner’s office.

On the other hand, in the military establishment, there are offices like J-5 which is fully occupied doing strategic planning. There are J-3 offices which do operational planning. The military is essentially trained to think differently; it values education and planning to a much higher degree than the civilian community and is prepared to send its officers periodically for sabbaticals to think and learn, particularly about new technologies and their
significance to the battlefield. I think it is clear that in a bureaucracy that sees itself and prides itself on being highly “operational”, if planning is to be effective and valued, a major cultural change needs to take place. The military is obviously first of all an operational organization; it is always charged with “doing things.” Yet, at least while we are not “at war”, the military is able to build into their officers’ career development programs periods during which officers are assigned to hone their educational backgrounds and planning skills; those are considered assets and are viewed as key to promotional opportunities. I would include exercises and simulations as part of this skill honing process because the officers learn from those activities and hopefully improve their capabilities by not repeating mistakes made. The main point is that in the military education and planning are valued and is rewarded.

We just need to look at Eisenhower’s career to see the effect of that cultural attitude. Ike was promoted in the late 1930s largely because he did very well in exercises. Those are lessons that are not overlooked by officers; they know the value of planning and the practical consequences of experience in planning and education can have on his or her career. That attitude is not found in the Foreign Service.

Some academic efforts in long range planning can be made relevant to our foreign policy process. But it is not easily done. A lot of academic products are read by few and then filed away. Occasionally, there are some major insights that do shape a practitioner’s views—e.g. Paul Kennedy’s book on imperial overstretch, Sam Huntington on the clash of civilizations, or Frank Falsuyam on the End of History. Those academic contributions force people to think about over-all strategy for the country. But those insights are few and far between.

That fact leads me to the conclusion that if long range policy planning is ever to make a contribution in the foreign affairs field, we need to develop institutions that live between academia and the bureaucracy. It can not be a part of Congress; even the Congressional Research Service which can afford to take a somewhat longer look, finds itself tied down
to the daily and continual requests for information from congressional offices. To be successful, this new organization must be able to penetrate the bureaucracy; i.e. it cannot be entirely divorced from the daily concerns of the bureaucrats and must have a good appreciation of the thinking of the senior leadership. That is not easy to do, but I don't think it is impossible.

Let me go back to my job on the Policy Planning Staff. Sam Lewis spent a considerable amount of time on Middle East issues, even though Dennis Ross was the special emissary—creating some frictions. Sam also was involved in a very bad traffic accident and therefore had to take considerable amount of leave, leaving me in charge. When Sam was present, I tended to focus on certain issues like NATO enlargement, the North Korean nuclear issue, Security Council reform and some others. I worked hard on those matters, in addition to my responsibilities for supervision of a large staff—in retrospect, perhaps too large. I have come to the conclusion that S/P should probably never have more than 20 officers on it—we had almost twice as many.

We didn't have as attentive audience among the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary and the under secretaries as we had hoped for. So we shifted much of our attention to the bureaus. I mentioned that I worked on Security Council reform; that was a joint project with IO and Rick Inderfurth, then at the UN. This was an issue whose time had come; it didn't require an effort to mount interest in it. Rick and I talked about the problem soon after I joined S/P; we wrote the basic paper and got IO and the UN staff to join us in this effort.

On Korea, the issue was formally the responsibility of Bob Gallucci, who was our special emissary to talks with the North Koreans. At one stage, I wrote a four page memorandum to the Secretary outlining my perspectives on the challenge and on ways the US should approach the issue of nuclear proliferation in the North. I sent a copy to Bob, who shared my views entirely. So I joined Bob in all of the inter-agency meetings in 1993-94. Basically, I protected his flanks because I could take positions that he might not have been able to take in light of his official position, but with which he concurred. I was fully aware that
the situation was very delicate and that if we pushed too hard, we might precipitate a conflict that would be extremely costly to us and the South. But there was no give on our basic non-proliferation objectives; I thought we could reach them by a combination of “carrots and sticks” and get the North to agree on a deal which would have prevented any further development of a nuclear capability. That is the strategy we did follow and it was successful and as far as I can see, is still on track. There were people who were pushing hard for punitive measures—sanctions, etc. They thought they could force the Koreans into giving up their nuclear plans without even negotiating with them. I didn't think that was very likely because the North Koreans would have perceived sanctions as a kind of war and might have well responded with arms; so I pushed hard for negotiations. My feeling was that Bob shared my views all along and that I helped to achieve our common objectives by holding out for negotiations. I do remember a conversation we had in his office, after he had read my memorandum; it was quite clear to me after that that we were on the same wave length. So I spent a lot of time working with Bob on the North Korean problem.

Generally, on the projects I was involved in, I would seek the assistance of one of the S/P staffers. In some cases, I did the work myself. On NATO enlargement, I worked with Steve Flanagan and I think we managed to start a debate on the issue in the Department, although in 1993, there were very few people like Under Secretary Lynn Davis who had much interest in the issue or even fewer who thought that NATO enlargement was a good idea. But we started the debate but it was not until Holbrooke became Assistant Secretary for European Affairs that the issue really got pushed.

So one of my challenges was to try to generate work from the professionals; that was not easy because I learned that the impact of one's words can be diminished if said too often or at too great a length. We wrote a lot of papers, most of them volunteered. After a while, we got the sense that the Secretary's office began to look at our product just as another
burden; we wrote too much and too often. Had we been somewhat more selective and judicious, we might have had a greater impact.

In a sense, my academic work came in handy on some of the issues that I worked on in S/P. For example, I had written on NATO enlargement while at Georgetown. Knowing that there was some useful work being done outside the Department, I invited, for example, Dick Kugler and Ron Asmus from RAND to come in and brief us. But generally, we did not use these outside resources to work on specific issues. But we certainly exchanged ideas with them. For example, we invited Sam Huntington to come to speak to us about his theories about clashes of civilizations. The whole S/P staff spent about two hours with him, learning and exchanging views. It is not likely that this discussion had any immediate impact on policy formulation, but did affect our general outlook.

Sam Lewis maintained contacts with the Institute for Peace, whose President he had been. He started a major project with them on “preventative diplomacy.” It was a phrase that Christopher had used early in his administration to indicate that he thought there were opportunities to prevent international situations from deteriorating to levels that made resolutions extremely difficult. The major barrier to that kind of diplomacy is cost; it can be extremely expensive to use the ounce of prevention. Usually, it would have required an increase in assistance or other programs.

In that connection, I might mention the “alert memoranda” that S/P prepared for the Secretary. It is a function usually exercised by the intelligence community, but we tried to focus attention on specific challenges that we could see looming on the horizon. Periodically, we would send this memo listing the six or eight major problems that he should be paying attention to because they could explode. We also suggested possible preventive steps that might be taken. Once again, I learned a bitter lesson; we probably overloaded the system. Had we tackled one issue at a time we might have had an impact. I think by sending this periodic report with six or eight danger signals we were perceived as unduly alarmist. We cried wolf too often. Furthermore, our ideas for action had not been
staffed out with the bureaus; that undoubtedly also gave rise to resistance. So what should have been a useful product, became detrimental to S/P's position in the bureaucracy. I don't have any doubt that it was S/P's role to warn the Secretary and other principals of dangerous shoals. But I learned that principals focus better on one subject and that they do not pay much attention to long lists of problems. Furthermore, in the Department at least, to have any effect, a staff office must develop a battle plan with an operational bureau, so that recommendations to the Secretary have the support of at least one major bureau.

S/P lost its speech writing responsibilities right at the beginning of Christopher's term. That hurt. Speech writing is a time consuming, frustrating, sometime mundane chore, but it is critical to policy development. It is often how policy is made and articulated. When S/P lost that function to Public Affairs, it lost a lot of its influence. We did work with Bureau of Public Affairs—Donelan's office—on writing speeches, but we didn't “own the pen”; that made a big difference.

At the outset, I had hoped to escape the managerial duties that often fall on the senior deputy. At the beginning, Sam did some, but it soon became clear that Sam wanted me to take on the lion' share and so I did—reluctantly. So for my tour, I managed the Office. It was a heavier workload than I had hoped for. We brought a lot of new people to the staff. I learned to deal with the White House Personnel Office. So the managerial problems were time consuming.

After my tour in S/P, I still believe that it is a valuable asset to the Department. It can not become too much of an ivory tower operation; if we erred in any way, then we were guilty of doing that. We did not connect with the day-to-day operators, but because we had a very talented staff, we proceeded to produce a lot of papers which went to the Secretary's office, but outside the context of his daily concerns.
I have given considerable thought to the role that S/P might play in the Department. But first of all, and key to all efforts, the director of S/P must have a clear understanding of the Secretary’s expectations; he or she must develop a relationship with the Secretary which would allow the director to have direct access to the Secretary and which would enable the director to participate in all key meetings that the Secretary might chair. It is also important for S/P staff to participate in Bureau staff meetings to improve the flow of information within the Department. S/P must have the right to clear all cables that change policy. S/P must be the Secretary's speech writer.

In terms of staff capabilities, S/P must have good writers—crisp and concise. Not all of our staff was able to do that. I mentioned earlier that I thought S/P was overstaffed. It is important for Policy Planning to be a “lean, mean machine” —no more than 20 professionals. I believe that it would be very useful for the director of S/P to consult with a bureau assistant secretary when a vacancy arises in S/P; a known quantity—particularly a favorably known one—is very important to building good relationships with a bureau. I don't think it is necessary for S/P to be staffed by Foreign Service officers, but the officers should have the approval of the bureau with which he or she will be working.

I have an open mind on the question whether it would be useful for the Department to have a Policy Planning Council—3 to 5 wise men who meet periodically to consider policy options and directions. There was such a Council in the mid-1980s and I can see that it could be a useful asset. But there are difficulties as well and I just haven't reached any conclusions on this issue.

As far as focus, S/P should concentrate on big issues which might have long range impact. There should not be so many papers written that they become depreciated or devalues in the building. S/P should be one of the places in the Department that adds a domestic political perspective to foreign policy development. Bureaus don't tend to do that and probably are not qualified to do so. Policy Planning needs to be aware of domestic political considerations and must be able to alert the Secretary to potential problems from that
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front. This dimension adds to the need to staff S/P carefully; the best candidate is one who has had experience both within and outside the government. We had some very good Foreign Service officers, but I think they would have been more useful had they had some experience outside the bureaucracy.

It is important that each product have a client. I think in my time in S/P we produced far too many papers for which there was no market. If S/P has a good idea, it is vital that it find a bureau which will support the concept; then the product will have much more resonance.

I think it is very important for S/P to use resources outside its own shop. For example, I think that if S/P used the FSI or my present organization, it would find that its work would be enhanced. Such institutions can provide a base for simulations or policy studies which might provide fresh perspectives. Semi-academic institutions can be force multipliers and I think their work would be very useful to S/P. I tried to do some of that with FSI and I found that some of the simulations proved useful.

I found that there were very few planning meetings among planners from all agencies. It is not an established US government community. While in S/P, I had more meetings with European planners than I did with my colleagues in the US government, particularly on the defense side. We had one relationship that I think was particularly useful. Joe Nye was at the National Intelligence Council of the CIA. We joined with him to work on some papers; he provided the intelligence capability and we our policy development skills. We briefed Tony Lake, for example, on the results of our efforts; if things had been working properly, we should also have briefed Christopher. Secretary Christopher was operationally oriented; it would be very useful to have a Secretary who has a feel for policy planning and preferably even a great interest in the process. My guess is that Secretary Albright fills the bill very well; it is part of her background; she should be able to use S/P's capabilities. I realize that secretaries are extremely busy and that to find time for reflection is very difficult. S/P has to feed secretaries its products in digestible doses.
If you look at military services, I believe that the Navy plans less and cares less about education. That reflects its principal task: to protect the sea lanes and project our power from waters which are far off shore. That task takes a lot of time. In a sense, that is comparable to the duties of the Foreign Service, whose principal work locale is outside the US. The Foreign Service is also highly operational, just as the Navy is. The Army and the Air Force are primarily deployed within the US borders. That gives them the great advantage of location, which translates into opportunities to provide educational opportunities as well as planning assignments. This raises the question of how the culture of the Foreign Service might be changed to give greater support for both planning and education—less operational. That may not be possible. Time for reflection may never be seen as career enhancing in the Foreign Service—or the Navy. For example, a training assignment to FSI—beyond language or area training—is seen as harmful to an officer's career. I suppose one way a cultural change can be attempted is to allow FSI to confer degrees or to instruct the promotion panels to give positive attention to an officer's achievements at FSI. The military does that and an officer's attendance at an educational institution if factored into promotions. Tying educational assignments and promotions would make for a quick cultural change. If an officer graduated from FSI with outstanding grades and a Master's Degree and that was seen as a plus for assignments and promotions, that would bring a change in the Foreign Service culture.

I served in S/P about 14 or 15 months. I stayed there as acting director for 3 months after Sam left.

**Q: In 1994, you became the Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies. How did that happen?**

**BINNENDIJK:** In early 1994, I was sitting in S/P in midst of chaos. Sam had left; it was very clear that in the way he left created tensions between S/P and some of the 7th Floor principals. I don't fault Sam; he was a victim of circumstances beyond his control. It became clear to me that the Department's leadership wanted to start all over again with
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S/P. I was not very likely to be a candidate to succeed Sam, either because I was tied to the Lewis regime or because it is not in the Department's tradition to promote deputies. So I had a choice of staying on as deputy to a new director—which was not an outrageous alternative—, but I had joined the Department in great part because I respected Sam and wanted to work with him.

Late in 1993 I had seen a flyer cross my desk seeking candidates for the directorship of the Institute for National Strategic Studies. I had worked with this Institute before—e.g. when at FSI we put on a joint symposium with it—and had indicated some interest in the job a couple of years earlier. I had constant contacts with the then Director when I was with IISS in London; he was an IISS member and we would see each other periodically. At the time the notice crossed my desk, I had no thought of leaving S/P. But soon thereafter, the situation began to fall apart and in early 1994, I made a call to the Vice President of NDU; that was Ambassador Howard Walker at the time. He told me that they were close to filling the job, but that it still might be worth my while to come by. That I did and met General Cerjan, the President of NDU. With a few days I was offered the job. It happened very quickly. NDU did have a number of candidates, but was not overjoyed by any of them. I suspect that it was about to make choice it didn't want to make; my timing, which is usually terrible, happen to be perfect for that situation and was offered the job. I then had to make the painful decision whether I would take it—frankly, I was not totally ready to leave the Department. Even after Sam departure, I still was greatly attracted to the policy development process and was not at all sure I wanted to leave it quite yet. There were a number of unresolved issues in which I was involved which I would have liked to see come to a conclusion.

So I weighed the options and finally decided that the opportunity to run my own program was just too tempting not to accept the NDU offer. The Institute staff of 80-90 people—many of whom were very competent; I had a good budget; I had a lot of freedom and quite importantly direct access to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili. There
has always been a connection between the director of the Institute and the Chairman, but I worked hard to strengthen it.

I found the Institute in some disarray. There had not been a permanent director for eight or nine months. As I said, much of the staff was very competent, but there were some personnel changes that had to be made. I found an organization which did not have much focus—no unity of purpose. I had a broad mandate from Lieutenant General Cerjan; he told me to take the Institute to the next level.

The Institute was founded in 1984 to bring together a number of disparate groups then working at NDU. The research elements which became part of the Institute were established primarily to serve the Secretary and the Chairman; which was given primary attention varied from time to time depending on the personalities. Colin Powell decided not to use the Institute and instructed the staff to backstop the various CINCs around the world. Because of that new direction, the regional programs of the Institute were really strengthened at the expense of analysis of force structure and general military capabilities. The Institute has always emphasized research and has had a publications program from its inception—e.g. the McNair papers and some books.

I started a Strategic Assessment publication which brought people together to discuss a very vital issue for DoD. From that came an annual flagship publication. This part of my effort to make the Institute more visible in DoD. I greatly expanded the publication program as well as the conferences—symposia—program. At the same time, I tried to revitalize the connection with Chairman—primarily through the staff of the Joint Chiefs. OSD was less interested in our work, although there were some deputies assistant secretaries which continued to show great interest. The Joint Staff is quite receptive to our work. We have done a lot of projects with and for them.

I have also tried to make the Institute a real part of the National Defense University. In the past, it apparently was detached from NDU pursuing its own agenda. General Rokke,
the successor to General Cerjan, urged me to pursue this avenue. He was an academic as contrasted to his predecessor who was an operator—a doer. Cerjan wanted to raise the visibility of NDU by raising the visibility of INSS; that was his guidance to me when he hired me. Rokke warned to pursue that goal, but that I should be careful as I raised the visibility of INSS. In addition, Rokke wanted my program integrated with the rest of NDU, in part by using the University's resources in our programs.

So my objectives have been to raise the visibility of INSS by trying to make it a first class think-tank—with a major publications program as a vital adjunct; by being a strategic advisor to the Joint Staff; and by integrating the work of INSS with that of the NDU. My view is that there is a synergy among those three goals and each, if done well, will reinforce the other two. But I must admit that our striving towards these goals is a challenge at times because if you publish a paper without censorship—which is key to a good think tank—it might make the Joint Staff nervous and that sometimes is a problem. I have had to cancel a few projects because of those tensions and my principal challenge is get a good balance of products which will serve all three goals. That is critical to doing my job well since it is important that we have support from all our, major constituencies. We have to put forward reasonable positions which are not totally out of sync with the administration's views.

In that sense, INSS is different from Georgetown where it was possible to challenge the administration with impunity. Here I think we can push on the edges of a policy and try to perhaps shape it somewhat differently, but we are part of an administration and must not be seen as trying to subvert it. I do think we have role in discussing new ideas and shaping them. I am personally much more sympathetic to our foreign policy today than I was in 1993; in any case, blatant criticism would not be a proper role for INSS. In some ways, I see the Institute as a bridge between our military—i.e. national security—and the foreign policy establishment. We bring to the DoD table the competence of experienced foreign policy practitioners like Bob Oakley. We have Phebe Marr who is a recognized expert on the Persian Gulf and particularly Iraq. So we have at INSS people who understand world
regions well and who are able to bring to bear their expertise on military planning. My hope is, and I think we have already proven, that this knowledge of foreign places and cultures will be a useful resource to the military who tend to think more in operational terms.

I have found it much harder to bring the military perspective to the foreign policy establishment because we are part of DoD and are seen as that. I do use some of my personal relationships with people in State to keep them informed about our activities—I send four or five notes each week to the Department, either to an assistant secretary or sometimes to the Secretary. The trick is to do so without sending proprietary information designed for Defense. State representatives participate often in our seminars and conferences. For example, this morning I chaired a session on NATO which was addresses by Secretary General Solona. After that, Ron Asmus, the EUR deputy assistant secretary for NATO, to make a few comments along with Ken Myer, of Senator Lugar’s staff. There were probably 40-45 people in attendance including such luminaries as Hal Sonnenfeldt, Jack Matlock, and some retired diplomats and the former Vice-CNO.

We considered for a while entering into joint efforts with INR, but that additional workload seemed too formidable. As it is we sponsor approximately 200 events every year; I think that it is about the maximum that we can do without tripping over ourselves and reducing the impact. But I do see INSS as a locus for representatives of various bureaucracies to meet, in different formats—conferences, work-shops, simulations, etc.

I have been here now for more than three years. I think we have made a lot of progress in all the three areas that I discussed earlier. I am most pleased with what we have been able to accomplish to enhance the think-tank aspects of the Institute through the publication of new periodicals like “Strategic Assessment” which has given focus to a lot of our work and has become a central theme to bring the staff together. We have published about 120 papers in the “Strategic Forum” series; these are short four page analyses which are distributed to about 3,000 people, carefully selected from both inside and outside the government. That series meets the Institute's objective of educating serious people
involved in important issues; hopefully the papers also bring some consensus in the national security community—most of which resides in Washington, in Cambridge, Mass and in NY—on current problems. Although we tend to focus on specific individuals, all of our products are in the public domain, including the World Wide Net. We have our own home page and everything that we have published in the last three years is available there.

The Internet is a great avenue to link people with similar interests from all over the world. I get messages from every corner of this globe—comments from Mongolia from people who have read our material. The Brookings Institute recently sponsored a conference which was attended by a North Korean official delegation. During one of the meetings, I glanced over to one of North Korean delegate's place and noticed that he had one of the papers that had been issued in the “Strategic Forum” series. It was thoroughly marked up; it had obviously been read thoroughly, probably by several members of the delegation. They used the material for their comments. I think that paper had probably been downloaded from the Internet. We get over 100,000 “hits” on our home page every week from everywhere—probably 75-100 countries every week.

At the end of each paper, we usually list the author and his or her E-mail address. We find that authors get a lot of mail from all over the world. In my case, I usually write a quick response to the correspondent. We do keep records of the countries from which we receive e-mail which gives us some feel for what topics strike a response and where. I think that we are well on our way to exploit the NET as much as we can for educational purposes. I do see it as an extension of the Institute. We will be building linkages with counterpart institutions throughout the world using the NET. We already have some linkages, but I hope to broaden that aspect of our outreach program. I think we provide a valuable resource to the global community; much of our work—books, papers, etc—, as I said, is already available to interested parties through the Internet.
We are by and large pretty far ahead of other institutions in the use of the Internet. But they will catch up making the linkages much closer and certainly encouraging greater exchange among scholars and practitioners from all over the world. At the moment, we are working to link up with IISS. I was in London two weeks ago and reached agreement with that Institute to join forces. If we can do that and other linkages as well, that should greatly increase the readership of our material as well as theirs. That process should greatly enhance the significance and validity of discussion because more participants will have had access to the same data bases. The debate in the national security area will be a much better informed one. The more good information that is available, the better.

I might just make a brief comment here about INSS relationships with similar institutions around the world. We now have very close ties to about 20 such institutes—NIDS in Japan, KIDA in Korea, NDU in China, Ebenhausen in Germany, IISS and King's College in Great Britain, the Lester Pearson Institute in Canada, IDSA in India, National Defense University in Pakistan, USA-Canada Institute in Russia, etc. And we are trying to enlarge our network to include more and more similar institutions in this global relationship. I think our close contacts with these institutions provides the US government an avenue to become better acquainted with the views of some leading scholars and practitioners in the national security area. When I got here, INSS had ties to many institutions around the world, but they were quite superficial. One of my first early endeavors was to sit down with my staff and agree on what countries were of vital interest to the US, which had key institutes and what were they, and then we decided to focus on those and begin a meaningful relationship with them. I suspect that our “sister” institutions do the same thing and are interested in developing a close relationship with American institutions such as INSS. It is important that such a network of institutions be borne and fostered because I think it provides all with insights and perceptions that if divined early enough may forestall crisis or confrontations which become difficult to diffuse unless caught very early in a cycle.
A number of observers have suggested that much of international dialogue will be conducted in the future through informal channels; i.e. not government-to-government. I think this network of national security institutions has been and hopefully will further develop to be an avenue for such informal discussions. By bringing together government practitioners and academics from various countries, the network serves as a bridge among a variety of communities.

These relationships go far beyond exchanges on the Internet. We are cooperating with these institutes on specific projects. In late March, I was in China for a series of meetings with the PLA (the Chinese Army)—two days with their NDU and the other three with meetings with other elements of the PLA. It was part of the “constructive engagement” program of this administration. We had a dialogue with the Chinese on strategic matters. We used the opportunity to present our strategic perspective, which is not necessarily the official perspective. The Chinese in turn provided us with perspective—the single one in China. Our program was of course fully sanctioned by DoD and as I said, part of a broader US policy towards China.

In the case of India, our efforts are probably a little more ad hoc. We meet about once a year with IDSA either here or in Delhi for two or three days. Our delegation normally consists of about 15-20 people; theirs would be about the same size. We had presentations from each side on the major strategic issues facing our countries. Each paper would be discussed at some length, just to improve understanding of our respective positions. I should say that almost all of the institutes have some governmental financial support—except IISS—it doesn't necessarily follow that the presentations and comments follow the government's line at all times. We of course don't rely on the institutes entirely; they provide a platform for both members of their institution as well as people outside who are prominent in the country. The same goes for us; our delegations consists of both members of INSS as well as leading thinkers in the US as a whole—both governmental
and non-governmental. So discussions in most instances are quite free wheeling, unrestrained by any governmental “hold.” It is what might be called a Track I-1/2 operation.

In some cases, the discussions have resulted in books or publications. Generally, I would try to have some product emanating from a conference, but I have found that perhaps the most useful document is the summary memorandum that I send after my return to the Secretary or the Chairman; I try to give some flavor of the attitudes and views that we encountered. I sometime send a note to Secretary Albright, if I think I have heard some important views expressed.

Finally, I think that there have been instances where the INSS has made a difference. When the right idea has been tabled at the right time, we have had impact on policy decisions, as for example, in the idea of a European “Partnership for Peace” and on NATO enlargement. We have been writing for months about admitting three countries to NATO first, followed by two others sometime later. That was the decision in the recent NATO summit. In Asia, we have been very active in urging a reaffirmation of the Japan-US security treaty and I think we had influence on the policy on this issue. So we have been able to have impact in several areas—more than I anticipated when I took the job of Director.

I think that our influence is being slowly, but surely recognized by people and organizations outside of DoD. I am not satisfied that we have reached the zenith and I intend to keep pushing, but we are on the right path. I am concerned that we will have a lot of new responsibilities placed on us; I already see the beginnings of that trend; e.g. I am under some pressure to open a China center at INSS focusing on the Chinese military—an obvious delicate issue. As people turn increasingly to NDU and INSS, we need to be careful that we are not swamped lest we risk the quality of our products. We may need to reorganize to refocus on our primary responsibilities. The quality might be improved in a few areas, but in general I am satisfied with the numbers and competence of the staff.
Personally, I still chose carefully which topics I want to be involved. With over 200 events that take place here, I could easily be overcome and unable to give enough attention to any issue. I don't want that to happen and therefore still select carefully those matters which are of greatest interest to me.

Let me conclude this effort with some reflections on my experiences to date. My views are still open to change as I gain more experience but I have drawn some tentative conclusions. For example, somewhat to my amazement, I have found that the foreign policy process in the United States, at the end of the day, works! I have seen it almost from every angle—the budget side, the policy side both in the NSC and the Department of State, the congressional involvement, as well as the academic and semi academic interests and participation. It is a fairly cumbersome process; it will always have critics—that is the nature of the process which is based on a governmental system that fosters tensions and compromises. So the process will never eliminate criticism and that is probably all to the good.

The process is incredibly complex, particularly if contrasted with that of any other country. Yet, as I said, at the end of the deliberations, there is a consensus which usually leads to successful outcomes. We are the most powerful country in the word; what we say and do does matter. It is a damn good thing that we have built into the process a measure of cumbersomeness, in negative terms, or checks and balances—a positive spin. No matter what an administration does, it will have critics which force it to examine its position very carefully. As I said, the “check and balance” forces—whether it be the media or Congress—force the decision makers to come up with policies that have collected the wishes of the large segment of the population. That is a real plus, particularly for a country which is the world's most important power. We have self correcting mechanisms which are time consuming, which result in policies which often seem messy and confusing, but in the longer term, I think the world benefits from our internal inefficient decision making process.
If our power were not domestically challenged—i.e. run by an autocratic regime—the world would be at much greater peril.

It is true that new initiatives are more difficult to inject into the process. A consensus has to built first before the initiative can even be given a serious hearing by the decision makers. The complexity of the system militates against new initiatives springing up unexpectedly; the system is designed for a steady and straight course. For example, the initiative for NATO enlargement started in a very modest way primarily as an idea of S/P, although some outside groups like RAND had written something on it. I wrote my first article on the subject for The International Herald Tribune in November 8, 1991, supporting the concept. I was probably one of the few people at the time who was even thinking about the possibility. The debate on it began in government in 1993; it may in fact have emerged too quickly in 1994. Dick Holbrooke may have sprung it too suddenly without really building enough support for it in the foreign policy community. But the checks and balances are beginning to work. Probably two-thirds of the Senate will ratify the first tranche of enlargement, over the opposition of two-thirds of the national security elites. My guess is the first wave of enlargement will be every painful; the debate will be vigorous and extended, culminating in a ratification instrument filled with restrictive amendments. The floor vote will support enlargement, but it will show so much doubt that the process for further enlargement will be greatly slowed down. So the second and third tranches will be delayed. We probably can add Poland, Czech, Hungary, Romania and the neutrals without too much risk, but the Baltics are a different story. So NATO enlargement is an illustration of a policy initiative that started very modestly, grew and has begun to be messy. The checks and balances are at work; the issue is becoming subject of a national debate and I think it will restrain the decision makers so that the final outcome will be beneficial to our foreign policy. The issue has been debated in academic and professional circles since 1990-91; it was a subject discussed in the presidential campaign where the issue was really the speed with Dole supporting a faster timetable than Clinton. But the real debate will come as we approach ratification.
This example illustrates the process in which the most powerful country of the world comes up with an idea—saving and redirecting the most successful alliance in history to meet tomorrow's threat while at the same time building in additional stability for countries in transition from being semi-occupied to developing their own security capability and a western democracy. But this idea can not become so grandiose that it will try to incorporate areas that raise real security threats for the Russians and which could result in the final analysis with a very messy situation and confrontation. So the process has self-limiting restraints which, as I suggested before, will work to the benefit of the whole world.

So in a broad sense, I have no great problems with our present foreign policy process. It allows all sides to have their day in court. The process is messy, but I think history will show that it has served us and the world well. I admit that this is a post-Vietnam analysis because I think the process either failed us by allowing us to become so deeply involved in Vietnam or it was bypassed by a succession of presidents who didn't want a messy debate on a national issue. This may happen again, but at the moment I think the process serves us well and should continue to do so as long as we remember the Vietnam experience.

As I mentioned earlier, one of the most satisfying part of my career came in the mid to late 1970s when Congress successfully reasserted its role in foreign policy at the expense of the “Imperial” Presidency. The exercise of that congressional right undoubtedly made the process more messy; to me that is a good thing for despite the increased complexities, it forces the administration to stay in tune with public sentiment. Occasionally, the process is abused, but that is the cost a country has to pay for an open decision making process. The result is the greater good—a more centrist policy that does not veer too much to one side or another—e.g. Carter's troop withdrawal from Korea, Reagan's push for “Star Wars” which would have upset the Soviets and wasted a lot of money. In both cases, the policy was forced to the center of the road.

The advent of technology may speed up the process a little bit because communications are and will increase in speed and efficiency. It may make it messier because it allows
for greater participation; we already see that now with NGOs having a much greater voice in foreign policy than ever before although the role of the NGOs may be due less to technology than new ways of conducting international relations. But State Department is far behind the curve in its ability to understand and use technology if it wants to be a meaningful player, it will have to change its culture. A few days ago, I jokingly told someone that when I moved from S/P to INSS, I moved from the 19th Century to the 21st—in terms of technology. That is not much of an exaggeration. I had a big debate whether the culture of the State Department will allow it to move into the 21st Century. There are a number of quarters who believe without a major cultural change, the Department will be unable to absorb the technology or even any comprehension of its potential effect on foreign policy. The Department is staffed with policy oriented personnel unlike the military which has many engineers in its ranks. That gives the military a distinct advantage in both understanding and absorbing the new technologies. I have come around to the view: “build it and they will use it.” I have experienced that personally; I now use the computer much more than ever before. It stares at me at my desk and I can see what it can do, although I am not nearly totally computer literate. But I do know its capabilities. So I think if the Secretary of State will direct that sufficient resources be devoted to a first class communication system, the Department will use it.

Technology is certainly improving the effectiveness of our military. In fact, the danger is that we will be so powerful that we will not be able to have any allies since we will be so far ahead of them.

Technology will also increase the participation in the foreign policy area. I see that as a plus, generally, because it allows the decision makers to anticipate problems at an earlier stage of the process than is now possible and to respond more quickly to developing crisis. It allows the decision makers to take into account the sensitivities of others long before they reach their decisions—they will know more at an earlier stage.
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End of interview

Interview with Hans Binnendijk, 1996 http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000087