Q: Mr. Ambassador, what first attracted you to the field of foreign affairs?

JONES: I graduated from UCLA in 1949. I majored in political science, and I applied for a fellowship to study at the University of Southampton in England for a semester, and, fortunately, I was granted it. It was an IIE fellowship.

I went to England in 1949 and spent the summer semester there. I came back in September and went to law school. It was the first time that I had ever been out of the western part of the United States.

Q: You were a native Californian?

JONES: I was born and raised in Los Angeles, and other than going to Mexico, I had not been out of the state of California. The war had prevented a lot of travel. I was 21 years old, and I went to Southampton. I had a cousin who was then studying in Paris who had been in the war and went back to Paris. He was at the Sorbonne. I went to Paris and stayed with him for awhile and traveled around England. It gave me an entirely different view on life. I then became very much interested in international affairs, particularly in travel and seeing people in different cultures.
Our course at the University of Southampton was a multinational course. We had students from all over Europe, particularly a number of students who had been in the German Army or German Navy during World War II. It was a fascinating experience for me and I never really got it out of my system.

I came back and entered the University of Southern California Law School. I always had it in the back of my mind that eventually I would be getting back into international affairs. In those days there were very limited opportunities for us in that field.

I graduated from USC Law School in 1952. I was Law Review and had done very well in school, and I was vice president of my class. I was the only Black student in the entire Law School at that time. But I received no opportunities to practice law the way that I wanted to, which would have been with one of the larger firms. So I went into law practice on my own and eventually joined up with two other classmates of mine from USC and practiced law for ten years.

All during that time, I was interested in international affairs. I became the attorney for the African Students of Southern California, and I was a founding member of the World Affairs Council. I began to entertain leader grantees that came through California for the State Department. I became known to the State Department and in 1962 they mounted a recruiting drive, and they sent someone out to interview me. As a matter of fact, it was Richard Fox who subsequently also became an ambassador. He persuaded me to give up my law practice and to join the foreign service.

I sold my house in California, moved with my wife and two children, and my wife was expecting our third child, to Washington. I joined the State Department in 1962. I stayed there for 22 years until I retired.

Q: You had quite a bit of experience as a host for international students and the international cultural exchange. What was your first job?
JONES: My first job was as Chief of West African Programs, in the Office of African Programs in the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs. I came into the Department doing what I had been doing as a private citizen for the past ten years, which was dealing with foreign leader grantees, students, Americans going overseas, managing the African program. After I came into the Department, I traveled to Africa several times, over most of the continent.

In 1964, I had been in two years, I was then made Deputy Director of the Office of African Programs. In that capacity, one of the programs that reported to me was the Southern African Refugee Program which was a highly political program. In fact, everything we did was political. We tried to tailor our programs to support U.S. political objectives in African. We worked very, very closely with the African Bureau.

Q: Where did the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs exist in the Department bureaucratically?

JONES: At the time I came in, Lucius Battle was Assistant Secretary of State, Luke Battle later became ambassador to Egypt and Assistant Secretary for Near East and Southeast Asia. Luke Battle was the first Assistant Secretary that I served under and his Deputy was Art Hummel, who later became ambassador to China and reached the rank of career ambassador.

After Luke Battle, we then had two political appointees, Charles Frankel and Ed Ray, who were assistant secretaries under Lyndon Johnson. I stayed in the Office of African Programs as Deputy Director for four years. I traveled numerous times to Africa on both sides of the continent.

Q: What was our policy? What were our objectives that you were trying to further?

JONES: We were trying to give the new leaders of the new emerging nations, most of them became independent in the early 1960s, a favorable view of the United States and
also give us an opportunity to get to know who they were and to size them up. So we were very careful in selecting leader grantees who had potential for becoming leaders in their country.

We also had a program called, “The Southern Africa Refugee Program” which was developed by Averell Harriman. That program targeted what was then Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa and Namibia. We brought students out of the Southern African area, took them to Lincoln University in Pennsylvania where we set up a training school as part of that University, and they stayed there until they were capable of going into the mainstream of the U.S. colleges and universities. Sometimes they stayed at Lincoln as much as two years. Then they would go into the university system, get a degree and then go back to their own countries. The theory being that we wanted to favorably influence towards the United States the best and the brightest coming out of the Southern Africa countries.

It was so successful, we opened up a second center at Rochester University where we also brought in students from Southern Africa. We tried to target the best and the brightest, whereas the Soviet Union, who was our major adversary, generally would roll an airplane up and just take a load of students to Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. We could never match them in terms of numbers, but we tried to beat them in terms of quality.

The people we selected were very carefully chosen by our embassies AND also by liaisoning with the African resistance groups. We had very close relations with Edwardo Mordalin who was then the head of FRELIMO which was the resistance in Mozambique. He had studied in the United States and he personally selected students to come under the program. We also had very close contact with SWAPO and with the two resistance groups in Southern Rhodesia, which is now Zimbabwe, with Robert Mugabe's group, for instance.
We would bring them into a center at Broken Hill in Zambia. There they would be processed and sent from Broken Hill to Dar-es-Salaam and from Dar-es-Salaam they would be sent to the United States. I made a couple of trips out to that area to look at those facilities and to see how the program was going.

That program stayed in existence until Henry Kissinger became Secretary of State. At that time, he decided to cancel the program as part of the famous “Tar Baby Option,” what was presented in terms of what our policy would be towards Southern Africa. Henry Kissinger believed that it was highly unlikely that the Southern African countries were going to gain independence and that, therefore, our program of trying to influence the future leaders was counterproductive. He felt we should maintain close ties with the governments in place, which was Ian Smith, at the time, in Rhodesia. He abolished the program. He cut it out entirely. That was, I guess, in the very early 1970s, when the program was allowed to die.

Q: Have you had any reading over the years about how these leaders, these grantees, performed later on in these countries, who became independent and moved on their own way?

JONES: I left the African program in 1966 and became an Office Director in Program Planning, so I lost touch with many of them. But from my conversations with my colleagues, a number of them did become very prominent in their own countries and are in positions of influence.

Q: This takes us up to about what?

JONES: I left CUAF in 1966, and I became an office director in what was then called the Office of Program Planning and Analysis which was to develop a planning system—the old PPBS as it was called in those days. In planning our budgets—program planning and budgeting—we would allocate funds directly related to program objectives and program objectives must be related to foreign policy objectives. So I devised a program planning
system, whereby you would first determine the foreign policy objectives in a country, then you would analyze the categories of grants that you have and the amount of money that you had available, and determine what would be the most effective mix of grants in order to further our foreign policy objectives in that particular country or region.

Q: We are talking about the end of the Johnson Administration. How did the Johnson Administration at this stage see Africa? We are really speaking about Africa south of the Sahara, aren't we?

JONES: Yes.

Q: How did they see it?

JONES: In those days it was the entire continent. AF covered all of Africa, not just south of the Sahara. We had Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt. We had the whole continent.

Q: How did the Administration see Africa? What were our concerns?

JONES: The major concern was to prevent Soviet influence in the continent, to convince the emerging African states to adopt the democratic system basically, and to prevent the spread of communism and Marxism through the continent. Our programs were designed to further those broad goals. Obviously, in each country you had a set of separate country goals. Some of them might have been economic, but most of the time they were political goals. But in essence, the thrust was to prevent the spread of Marxism in the African continent.

Q: How did we view South Africa?

JONES: There were division of opinion in the State Department. There were some of those who believed that South Africa was a permanent fixture and that they would never change and that it would be the dominant country in the region. There were those others of us who felt that it was inevitable that there would be change in South Africa and, therefore,
we should try to exert as much influence on the potential leaders who would emerge in the South African environment.

During the Johnson Administration, the Southern African Refugee Program was the program, the single program, that we had in the entire federal government to directly attempt to reach out to the opposition forces in the Southern African region. That program was the most expensive program that we funded in the entire African region other than foreign aid. It was essentially a political program, and it was the most important cultural exchange program in the entire continent.

Q: Did we make any attempt to get to young Afrikaners who looked like they were going to be leaders to see if we could help turn them around? Or were they written off?

JONES: We did bring over a certain number of the majority group in South Africa. Of course, we did not mix them with the Africans. But our great influence was on the Africans not upon the majority group because so many of them traveled back and forth to the United States anyway. They didn't really need what we had, and it was a forgone conclusion that they had access to us, and they were not barred, whereas the Africans were barred. We had to actually get them after they had been smuggled out of South Africa.

Q: Did we have sort of an underground that was smuggling them out?

JONES: We didn't smuggle them out, no. The resistance movements did. Through them we were able to have access to some of the potential leaders.

Q: Was there any cases of, say, the consul general in Johannesburg or something saying “Mr. X would certainly make a good grantee and if he can possibly get out, we would be happy to do something.”
JONES: All of our posts identified potential grantees, but I do not recall anytime where we actually aided or abetted anyone to get out of South Africa. If we did, I don't know about it. I'm not saying we never did, but as far as I know, we did not.

Q: How about in Rhodesia at the time?

JONES: There was greater access to Rhodesia. It was fairly easy for them to cross the border into Zambia.

Q: You mentioned later that Kissinger decided that those countries were going to remain basically under White rule, and not to bother with potential Black leadership. Were there any great debates within the Department at the time?

JONES: There was in AF. At that time, I was not in the African area any more. That was about 1970. At that time, I was Deputy Assistant Secretary for the entire bureau and my responsibilities were much broader. So I did not directly participate in that. But there was a very lively debate and, in fact, the African Bureau did not agree with the position, as I understand it, that was taken by Kissinger.

Q: Who was leading the African Bureau side?

JONES: There was Fred Hadsel, a Deputy Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary was Dave Newsom and he, of course, was much more involved in it. What I learned was on the periphery of it.

Q: If you have the African hands saying, “Look, this place is volatile. We better prepared to leave here.” Where was the pressure coming from to say, “Well, the White rule is in place, and it's probably not going anywhere.” Was this mainly from the European Bureau?
JONES: From the European Bureau, for one. Some also from the Pentagon and perhaps also from the CIA and from the White House because that's where Kissinger was. Kissinger was National Security Advisor at that time.

Q: From that you moved over to become Deputy Assistant Secretary for Education and Cultural Affairs?

JONES: Yes, from 1969 to 1973. John Richardson, who was a political appointee, who had been head of Radio Free Europe, became the Assistant Secretary of State. He was appointed by Richard Nixon, and he named me as one of his deputies. I was the second deputy. It was Fred Irving, myself and a political appointee, Allen Reich. Fred and I were both career Foreign Service officers. We were the three deputies in that Bureau.

At that time, CU was the largest bureau other than Administration in the Department of State in terms of personnel.

Q: CU later moved over to USIA.

JONES: It moved to USIA. There was always a running battle as to whether CU should be in the Department or USIA because in the field the programs were carried out, for the most part, by the USIA officers.

Q: What was the rationale for having that where it was?

JONES: It was always in the State Department. It had been in the State Department since the Exchange Program started in the 1950s. It had become a full-fledged bureau in the early 1960s before I came into the Foreign Service. It had a pretty good constituency but, nevertheless, there were always strong forces particularly in USIA that wanted the Bureau moved to USIA and put under the umbrella and the control of the U.S. Information Agency which, indeed, was done under the Carter Administration some years after I had left the Bureau.
Q: Did it make sense, as far as you were concerned, to have it within the State Department?

JONES: I always thought the program was a political program not a propaganda program, not an information program, and that the place for it was in the State Department. For one thing, it provided direct access to the regional bureaus where foreign policy is made and it became an arm of the regional bureaus. We attended their staff meetings. We worked back-to-back with their offices.

Secondly, it also provided the State Department with a direct liaison to the intellectual community of the United States because we worked very closely with the Fulbright Commissions. In fact, they were a part of our program. We worked very closely with universities that were involved in foreign affairs academic centers like Berkeley, Harvard, and the Fletcher School. So there was a direct interchange between the intellectual community and the State Department. I think that now the program has been submerged and lost its identity and has, indeed, suffered from being moved out of the State Department into USIA.

Q: Because you're moving into what is essentially the peripheral agency as far as policy is concerned.

JONES: It's not part of the Department. It's a separate agency, and it has somewhat different objectives. Its major objective is to influence the media. The Educational and Cultural Exchange Program was to directly further foreign policy objectives by influencing people as opposed to ideas that come across in the media or the Voice of America.

Q: As the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, what were your prime responsibilities?

JONES: I have forgotten the number of offices that reported to me, but all of the foreign student programs reported to me, as did the programs for sending prominent Americans
abroad to meet their counterparts. The UNESCO program, which was also in our Bureau, reported to me, and a number of programs involving direct liaison with universities and colleges.

I was able to develop a program in which the goal, the objective, was to directly involve the predominately Black colleges in our exchange program since they had been pretty much left out over the years. I was able to have an officer appointed whose full-time job was to involve the predominately Black colleges in Educational and Cultural Exchange programs.

I also managed relations with the book industry. We had a number of programs which involved books. Several of the advisory commissions of private citizens also reported to me.

I was Chairman of the U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference along with Ambassador Reischauer, who was co-American Chairman, and the Japanese co-chairman was the president of one of the largest steel companies and head of the Japanese radio network. We were all co-chairmen of that conference in 1970 or 1971 in Hawaii.

Then I was also one of the direct liaisons with USIA so that I traveled a great deal to inspect our programs in the field, to South American, and Europe, for example, and I attended PAO conferences.

One of my most interesting responsibilities was as officer in charge of relations between the Department and the East West Center at the University of Hawaii. The Center was our main effort to create educational exchanges with Asia. Grants were made to Asians and Americans to study and live at the East West Center. It was most pleasant for me to liaison with the Board, visiting Honolulu frequently. When I left for UNESCO in '75, the Board of the East West Center, chaired by the Governor of Hawaii, presented me with a plaque.

Q: PAO is Public Affairs Officers.
JONES: Public Affairs Officers at USIA. I was generally the State Department representative at the PAO conferences that were held around the world.

Q: You were doing this in a very difficult time. We are talking about the height of agitation against the Vietnam War. You were dealing with the intellectual community in the United States which was very unhappy. You were dealing with institutions abroad which also were attacking our policy. How did this affect your operation?

JONES: It did have an affect because there was certainly a lot of agitation against anything dealing with government in those days. We were in Vietnam, and we were part of the Administration. It was our duty to defend our policies in Southeast Asia which, indeed, we did. This put us at odds from time to time with persons in the intellectual community. We didn't have any direct contact with the so-called peace movements or peace groups.

The appointees were carefully selected by the White House to support the White House. Lyndon Johnson never appointed anyone who disagreed with him. So the appointees on the advisory commissions that we dealt with were always supportive of Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War.

In 1969, of course, Richard Nixon was in, and by that time, we were beginning to wind down in Vietnam. The decision had been made to get us out of Vietnam. The thing that affected us the most directly was our budget because money was very tight in those days. Under the Kennedy Administration, our budgets had always began to go up. Then the more we got involved with Vietnam, the tighter money became, and we were constantly having to cut our program. The Chairman of our Appropriations Committee was John Rooney, Congressman from Brooklyn. He was a very, very difficult person to deal with on the Hill. He never supported the program. He was hostile towards the Educational and Cultural Exchange Program the entire time. Preparing for hearings before John Rooney for our budget was a dominating feature of our work at the assistant secretary level.
Q: John Rooney plays a large part in everybody that's been in the Foreign Service, because he was the man for years who had tight control over the State Department budget and would sometimes attack housing allowances, or entertainment allowances and all this. Did you develop a tactic for dealing with John Rooney before you went in? Any sort of ploys or ways that you felt you ought to approach him?

JONES: Well, John Rooney not only attacked the concept of the program, he wanted to be involved in the substance of the programs. So, therefore, he would look carefully at our grantees. One of our most important programs was our Soviet exchanges, the exchanges with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block, which was artistic, sports, plays, drama, and the content of some of those presentations was always of great interest to Rooney. I remember we sent a play to Romania and there were some four-letter words used in the play, and Rooney didn't like that. He became absolutely furious. He attacked us when we went up and he actually cut the budget by about one-third simply because of that.

Q: He was sort of a loose cannon always no matter what you did?

JONES: We would prepare literally for months in advance of our hearings with Rooney. We issued somewhere around 10,000 grants a year. They would all be listed in a big book almost like a telephone directory. He would just randomly pick a grantee's name out and expect us to know in great detail about that grantee, whether he could speak foreign languages, what his background was, what his political beliefs were, where he came from, even what kind of a family he had. So one of the things that we did was prepare a sheet on each grantee which covered four or five very large loose-leaf folders in alphabetical order. When he would call a grantee, we would flip through it very quickly and pull the sheet out, and then the assistant secretary who was testifying could read it and we had it all, the birth date, who he married, where he went to school, what his language proficiency was, everything we could find out about the person.
Q: Looking at it from a taxpayers' point of view, the amount of effort that went to placate John Rooney certainly was not well spent as far as the taxpayer was concerned.

JONES: I would say from December to April—usually the hearings were over with by April or May—that we devoted 80% of our time to preparing for John Rooney on the sixth floor in the assistant secretary's office, myself, Fred Irving, who was the other deputy, and John Richardson, spent perhaps 80% of our time getting ready for testimony.

Q: For a man who really, in my point of view, seemed to enjoy this rather than have a fixed policy position.

JONES: He never attempted to influence foreign policy, as such. But he certainly tried to influence our program in terms of the types of grants that we issued. We could never issue a grant to anyone if we knew that John Rooney was going to be opposed to it. If we thought he wasn't going to like a play, regardless of what the critics might have said about it, we would never send them overseas if John Rooney would object.

Q: That's frightening, isn't it?

JONES: That's the way it was in those days. John Rooney was a very powerful person. It not only affected us, it affected the entire Department because, if he cut our budget he was cutting the budget of the Department of State and then the Department of State, in effect, had less money. So it was a very serious matter.

Q: How about dealing with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under communist rule? What was our policy with cultural and educational exchanges?

JONES: Our main focus with Eastern Europe was on cultural exchanges, music, dance, theater and athletic sports teams. We frequently sent sports teams behind the Iron Curtain. We sent the Boston Celtics on a tour to Yugoslavia. Maybe that's why they are such good basketball players now. We sent performing artists, writers. That was our major focus.
Q: Did we monitor who the Soviets were sending, too?

JONES: Everything was reciprocity. We never sent anything unless there was reciprocity. So everything with the Soviet Union was tit-for-tat.

Q: How did you feel they responded? Was it grudgingly on their side? Were we both two players, both eager to get —

JONES: I remember meeting the Minister of Cultural Affairs for the Soviet Union. It was a woman whose name I have forgotten. I can recall that she was in a full-length mink coat, one of the most gorgeous mink coats that I've ever seen. She was a politician more than a cultural person. She was very friendly. She wanted to have more exchanges with the United States. She wanted to learn more about us. She was a very energetic woman and also a very talkative woman, a very strong person. She was not the type of person who the average American intellectual could talk seriously to. She was strictly a politician. We dealt with her on those terms.

Q: Was there a problem in sorting out grantees in the United States under the Nixon Administration because, when you start talking about sending authors, they have their own ideas, rather strongly held, with a certain amount of intrepidness, after you would launch some well-known writer?

JONES: There always was, but we would interview them first. Generally speaking, they realized that when they were sent overseas by the State Department they were representing our country. They tried to put their best foot forward. Also during that time, the Civil Rights Movement was in full swing, and a major thrust of our program of sending Americans abroad was to explain the American Civil Rights Movement particularly to the third world.

I can recall that one of the first programs that I organized was to send Thurgood Marshall, who at that time—I'm not sure if he was Solicitor General or whether he was still in private
practice—but we sent him overseas to Africa to talk about Civil Rights in the United States. That was very successful.

We also provided funding and grants to Operation Crossroads Africa, which was founded by Reverend James Robinson, now deceased, which was the forerunner of the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps was based on the concept developed by James Robinson who was a Black minister in Operation Crossroads. We provided funding for them.

*Q: Looking back on this and no longer being involved, do you feel we were making our point?*

JONES: I think that was one of the most effective programs that I've ever been involved in. There was also a certain esprit de corps that I have rarely found in other bureaus in the State Department, that we had in CU. We all thought that we were doing something important. You must recall the time of history. It was a time when new nations were literally springing up every day, from 1960 to 1970 in Africa, the Caribbean and Southeast Asia. So it was a very exciting time, and we felt it was very important that we make a favorable impact upon the new emerging nations.

*Q: What did you see as our greatest problem for selling the American point of view to these other nations?*

JONES: It depended upon the background of the country, obviously. In some of the former British colonies, many of their leaders were trained in Great Britain in Oxford and Cambridge. And they came out of Oxford and Cambridge—this was true also in the Caribbean—socialists and Marxist in ideology. Some of them had a built-in hostility to the United States, particularly to capitalism. So it was very important that we overcome some of the stereotypes that they had developed of us.

For the non-White grantees, Africans, Asians and those from the Caribbean, the racial situation in the United States had been portrayed in a very negative way. It was a very
difficult period during the 1960s, as we all know. It was important for us to explain to them the complexities of our society. So we always made it a point to send African grantees to the South so that they would get a better appreciation of the problems and the solutions.

Q: *In 1973 you went to UNESCO, is that right?*

JONES: Yes, in 1969, when I became Deputy Assistant Secretary, there were two offices that reported to me. One was the Office of Multilateral Programs, which was direct liaison with UNESCO. The other was the UNESCO National Commission, which was a group of about 65 or 70 very prominent Americans who had been appointed to support UNESCO and to develop U.S. policies toward UNESCO. Both of those offices reported directly to me. So I became very much involved in UNESCO. I would go over to the executive board meetings in the late ’60s and early ’70s.

In 1972 I was named Chairman of the United States Delegation to the UNESCO General Conference in Paris. I was confirmed by the Senate. We had a delegation composed of some very prominent people. One of them happened to be very close to Ronald Reagan at that time.

I chaired that delegation for six weeks in Paris. I made the United States policy statement, our major address, to that Conference. Some of the issues that were involved were, the Vietnam War which was still raging, so we were under great attack because of Vietnam, then the issue of direct satellite broadcasting which was just coming to the fore then; that is, the third world countries were afraid that our technology in satellite broadcasting would permit the United States through its superior capability to transmit directly into their countries without their permission. So direct satellite broadcasting was also a major issue.

At that time also, the Korean problem had not been solved. That was one of the major things that I had at that time, the relations between North and South Korea.
The Arab-Israeli situation became a dominant factor when I went to Paris in 1973 and was just beginning to come in a big way before the United Nations system.

Finally, the thrust of the third world countries to take greater control in the United Nations system was also one of the major issues at that time.

Q: Then you were appointed as Chief of Mission to UNESCO, is that correct?

JONES: Yes. I left CU in April of 1973, went into French language training, and then I went to Paris in July or August of 1973 to be the Chief of the United States Mission to UNESCO in Paris.

Q: When you get a job like this, is there a lot of competition particularly among Presidential supporters who would just love to have something that has the cache' of being cultural and particularly of being in Paris?

JONES: There was competition. There were several politicos who wanted the job and who made a very strong pitch for it. One of the members of our delegation in 1972, who was very close to the Republican Administration, had a candidate for the job, who was a political appointee.

Within the State Department there were a number of Foreign Service officers who had served in senior positions in the Bureau of International Organizations since IO (International Organizations) which had direct control over the delegation. The delegation reported to IO. Just before I left CU, the whole UNESCO program was transferred from CU into IO, so it was no longer a CU program when I went out to Paris. So there was competition in the Foreign Service.

I got the position because I had been Chairman of the Delegation to the 1972 General Conference. The program had reported to me for four and a half years, and I had the rank
of Deputy Assistant Secretary. So I was able to get it on the basis of merit. I don't think anyone as well qualified as that —

Q: In something like that, often that's not exactly the criteria for getting an appointment within the State Department.

JONES: Well, it worked in that case. I had some very strong support from my Assistant Secretary, John Richardson, and also from Sam De Palma, who was Assistant Secretary for IO. In fact, I was the last career Foreign Service officer to be Chief of Mission to UNESCO. Everyone since me were all political appointees.

Q: Could you describe, when you went out there in 1973, what was UNESCO? What were its responsibilities and who was out there?

JONES: The Director General of UNESCO at that time was Rene Maheau, who was a Frenchman. He was the Director General of UNESCO. UNESCO's mandate was education, science, culture and communications. That's how you get the name, United Nations Educational Science and Cultural Organization. Communications was also added.

Within the United Nations' system, the mandate of UNESCO was program involving education, science — for instance, the International Oceanographic Commission was an arm of UNESCO — cultural; UNESCO was the U.N. agency that preserved ancient monuments, historical sites, the environment, scientific developments, scientific research, educational planning, educational programs. It was the U.N. system that liaisoned directly with the ministers of education of the member states of UNESCO. It had to do, to a lesser degree, with pure cultural; that is, painting and the arts. But the major thrust was in education, scientific developments, scientific programs like “Man in the Biosphere” which preserved the natural habitat in certain parts of the world, the preservation of historic sites and historic monuments, and educational planning which was a big efforts in third world countries.
Q: When you went out there, did you have any marching orders particularly that the United States as a matter of policy wants this or that?

JONES: At that time, UNESCO was beginning to move into the area of communications, and there was a great concern among the American news media as to the intrusion, as they thought, of the United Nations system into freedom of the press. So one of the major responsibilities that I had was to prevent any erosion of our concept of freedom of the press through United Nations resolutions or programs.

Q: How did the news people feel there was a threat?

JONES: The Soviet Union wanted to sanction the recognition of the states' rights to control the media through a United Nations resolution. That was one of the major efforts. The third world countries wanted to be able to exercise some degree of control over the way that foreign media intervened in their countries, operated in their countries or reported upon their countries. As I mentioned before, they wanted to control satellite broadcasting which they felt was a direct threat to them.

All of these were of tremendous concern to the American press and media. They didn't believe in any restrictions on the press whatsoever, and they certainly did not want the United Nations passing resolutions concerning the freedom of access of information, the free flow of information, among countries and the access of correspondence to countries. So one of my major responsibilities was to protect and preserve what we considered to be a fundamental cornerstone of our society.

Q: This transcript, I hope, will be used by researchers who are not going to be too familiar with how the Department of State functioned. How did you operate? You had these things. You knew what you wanted to do. How did you do it?
JONES: UNESCO was a continuous series of meetings and conferences. Some of these were main conferences where all the 105 or 110 member states would participate. Some of them were working groups. Some of them were committees.

Twice a year there were two major meetings of the executive board. The executive board was elected and had the permanent members of the Security Council which included the United States. We were a permanent member of the executive board. Then there was a rotating system where other countries, based upon their region, a certain number from Africa, a certain number of South America, a certain number of Asia, were also members of the board so that it would be representative.

The executive board nominated the director general and controlled basic policy. It approved the organizational budget. It approved the UNESCO program plan. It passed resolutions. It introduced programs into the budget and the program plan. The executive board met twice a year for approximately six weeks every year in June and then again in the fall.

In between there were perhaps four or five major conferences of different types that were held either in Paris or around the world. UNESCO sponsored ministers of education conferences for the various regions of the world. They had one for the ministers of education of Europe. I was on the U.S. delegation as a political advisor to the U.S. delegation to that meeting which was chaired by an assistant secretary from what was then HEW (Health Education and Welfare). That conference met in Bucharest, Romania.

I chaired the United States delegation to the Ministers of Cultural Conference in Accra, Ghana, where cultural policies were discussed for the African region.

So there were meetings and conferences going on all year long in Paris. We had to have direct relations with all of the members of the organization. My delegation was comprised...
Q: An FSO-4 in the State Department parlance would be about a major level, I guess, in the military.

JONES: About a major level in the military or a lieutenant colonel level in the military.

The other members of the delegation were more senior officers. We had a representative from the Department of Education who was a senior officer, a specialist. We had myself and my deputy who were both from the State Department.

My deputy, for the first six months that I was there, was Rupert Prohme, who was a career FSO. And for the last three and a half years was Stanislas Constantine Warvariv who was a Foreign Service reserve officer. He was an interesting person because he was a Ukrainian who got out of the Soviet Union as the communist armies moved to the west in the 1930s and moved into Poland and then moved from Poland when World War II started. His family crossed and moved in to occupied Poland where the Germans were and then eventually crossed the lines and came to the United States just after the war. That is another story as to what happened to him. Some think he was murdered by the KGB. He died under some very mysterious circumstances. [Tape recorder turned off]

As I stated, the delegation was comprised of senior specialists. Each one had a particular responsibility. We divided up the workload by field, by substance, so that each person had a responsibility.

I was in overall charge of the delegation and was directly in charge of political affairs. I would say that 95% of my time was spent on the political issues that came into UNESCO. Any political issue that arose at the U.N. in New York would also come up at UNESCO, whether it was the Arab-Israeli conflict, the problems of Korea, South America, Puerto
Rico, involving Cuba, or southern Africa, they all came up at UNESCO. So there was a constant political problem in every issue. Everything is political.

I was also liaison with other permanent representatives from the other countries. I was chairman of the Geneva Group which is the group of the western European states which dealt with budgets and programs.

I also had direct relations with my Soviet counterpart, Pirodoff, who was Gromyko's son-in-law. He and I had a number of meetings together including a long dinner party that he invited me to, a private dinner in a Russian restaurant that lasted for about six and a half hours.

Q: What was the purpose of his getting together with you?

JONES: To get to know me. To size me up. To feel me out. And I was doing the same thing with him because their delegation was much larger than ours. They used UNESCO as a weigh station for the KGB people. So a large number of their so-called delegates to UNESCO would be the KGB people.

They were interested in gaining control of the organization through the third world. The Soviets never would oppose the third world on anything other than budget. They would always vote in the majority. In their subtle way they were trying to actually control the organization. And it was, of course, our responsibility not to let them do that — ours, along with our western European allies.

Q: How would you counter this?

JONES: We got to know delegations from all over the world, and when a problem came up we would liaison back and forth with the State Department until we worked out our policies. Then we would go directly to our embassy in the country. Say it was Nigeria, then we would have the State Department send a cable to our embassy in Lagos outlining the
problems in UNESCO and ask them to go to the foreign minister in Lagos, and express our concerns, and request that their delegation at UNESCO vote in a certain way. We applied pressures directly at the source. You could talk to people. But, of course, everyone followed instructions except from some of the smaller third world countries where they were so disorganized that they had no instructions.

Q: From a practical point of view, you really had to go to the head of any country in order to have them understand what the situation was.

JONES: They had to understand that the United States had an interest in certain matters, and if they voted against us on a certain matter, it might affect other things that we did with their country, such as, foreign aid or other things that they might be interested in. It was all part of our package of global interests.

Q: You mentioned that you were very much involved in the Arab-Israeli problem. How did this translate into your job and what were your concerns?

JONES: The first year that I was at UNESCO, which was 1973, the Arab-Israeli problem did not figure prominently in my work. In 1973, when Egypt crossed the Suez Canal and attacked the Israelis, that changed the entire format for me at UNESCO.

Shortly thereafter, the Arabs would introduce the so-called Zionism-racism resolution in the United Nations in New York, which attempted to link Zionism with racism. They also tried to introduce that resolution into UNESCO and into UNESCO bodies and have it become part of UNESCO.

The Arab-Israeli conflict surfaced in a number of ways, some of them rather bizarre. One of the ways was that the Israelis were excavating to find the ruins of the temple in Jerusalem which had been destroyed by the Romans in 70 A.D.

Q: The so-called Solomon's Temple.
JONES: The Al Aqsa Mosque, the third most holy place in the Moslem world, was built on top of where the temple had been, so that the Israeli’s were excavating underneath the mosque. And the Arabs violently objected to this. They said it was desecrating the mosque. As the organization that protected historical monuments, this directly came up under UNESCO.

In the occupied territories, the major educational programs in the Gaza Strip were run by UNESCO. UNESCO was the U.N. agency that provided educational programs in the Gaza Strip. So the occupied territories and the archeological digs plus the other issues of Zionism and racism, which also came under UNESCO, these kept coming to the fore and they were involved in every meeting we had. The Arabs would introduce an anti-Israeli resolution. And it, therefore, became my job to fight them.

Q: How would you fight them?

JONES: We would follow instructions. We always had a set of instructions that came from the Department which we negotiated out; by developing tactics to develop a majority opposed to the resolutions; by speeches, if they attacked the United States or they attacked Israel, I had to get to my feet and defend the United States and counterattack; by talking to delegates trying to influence their votes by going to the Capitals, as I said, influencing the way the votes were handed.

Many times the best that we could do, since the Arabs always had the majority, was to change the language. We had to be very careful in reading the resolution. We had to read it and understand clearly the hidden meaning of every word.

Q: There were two languages, French and English?

JONES: No, six languages: Chinese, French, English, Arabic, Spanish and Russian. So we had to analyze every resolution. If the word “condemned” for instance, was in a resolution involving Israel, then we even had to threaten to walk out. In fact, in one
meeting, which was a very crucial meeting, we did walk out. I never liked it. I never thought that was effective, but we would follow our instructions from Washington obviously. The domestic pressures were on us very heavily from the United States.

Q: Speaking of the domestic pressures, did it trouble you to be saying that Zionism was not racism when certainly in Israel if you are a Jew you are in a better position than if you are not a Jew?

JONES: That was the Arab's point, but our point was that Zionism was not racism. Zionism had to do with a religious concept and was not racism.

It was a very emotional issue with Americans, with the Israeli lobby in the United States. The Zionist-racist issue was a very emotional issue. They became very hostile to UNESCO. Previously they had been one of the major supporters of UNESCO. The far right had always opposed UNESCO in this country as they opposed the United Nations system in general. But then the Israeli lobby and certain congressmen and senators also became very much involved and became very hostile toward UNESCO as an organization. Whenever a resolution was passed, it was always the organization as a whole that was blamed for these resolutions.

I can recall Senator Ribicoff making a personal visit to my office to tell me what I should do in order to counter the Arabs.

Q: Senator Ribicoff was from Connecticut.

JONES: Senator Abraham Ribicoff was from Connecticut. I can remember Congressman Rosenthal from New York coming to my office. He shook his finger at me and told me, and these were his words, “The United States will stay in UNESCO so long as Rosenthal decides. When Rosenthal decides that they'll get out, we'll get out.” So I was under tremendous pressure.
I liked to write analytical cables, and I wrote a policy piece on how we should tactically oppose the Arab resolutions in the UNESCO by creating stronger contacts with the Arabs so that we could get our point of view across so that they would clearly understand what it was that we were objecting to and the consequences of their actions. A copy of this got to one of our major senators. He was from one of the main states. He wrote a personal letter to the President objecting to my paper. Even though it was classified and confidentially secret, somehow it got on his desk. In effect, he requested that I be removed because I was not sufficiently pro-Israel. It got all the way up to Kissinger, and to his credit, I got a cable back saying that a Foreign Service officer must be allowed to call the shots as they see them, and that we cannot have suppression of views in the Foreign Service and, therefore, my views were always welcome. I was not required to hold any particular line, that I could call the shots as I saw them.

*Q: This has always been one of the major problems, the feeling that anything dealing with Israel within the Department of State immediately is leaked out to Congress and to friends of Israel. You have the feeling they are always looking over your shoulder rather than saying what is in American interest.*

JONES: That is true. After that incident, I got a phone call from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, and he told me flatly to stop writing cables on the Israeli situation. If I had views on that issue in UNESCO and the UNESCO contacts, to write it by way of a personal letter to him, for his eyes only, because my cables were all, even though they were classified, secret, were all ending up on the Hill in the hands of very prominent people there.

*Q: This is one of the objections today. Anything that comes in from Central America ends up on the desk of Jesse Helms within a very short time. Were you able to make any headway on this? What ammunition did we have to really stop this anti-Israeli . . .*
JONES: I would try to talk with the leaders of the Israeli lobby and try to explain to them that it was not always in their best interest to take such a totally hostile view, that you did have to deal with the Arabs. They were there. You couldn't just go up and shout and scream at them every time you met them. I think I was able to convince a substantial number of them that this was the right tactic, that negotiations were, indeed, possible. So it worked out all right.

I continued to pursue what I thought was in our interests by way of my cables into the Department. I never pulled my punches. I generally received very strong support from the Bureau of International Organizations and from the Department. They always supported me. Sam Lewis, who later became ambassador to Israel, was Assistant Secretary at that time. He was very supportive of me.

I always tried to analyze the situation and what would be good for us as well as what would be good for Israel. I think, in most cases, my views were accepted. They were not rejected out of hand, and they were appreciated.

Q: Sometimes the United States has a policy, particularly in international organizations, and we pay a major price. When you take a look at years of our absolute refusal to have any relations with what we then termed communist China, every time a country made a movement towards recognizing them, we would do everything we could to change their votes, say, in the United Nations. We used an awful lot of political ammunition in order to further this policy. Did you have the same feeling that we were doing this in UNESCO on the Israeli situation or other things?

JONES: The Chinese issue was an issue in UNESCO because, at that time, we had not recognized PRC. So that was another issue that we were instructed to oppose, any efforts on the part of the United Nations to accord them recognition.
I think that it did throw things out of balance when I was there because so much of my time was devoted to the Arab-Israeli problem and to the budget problem, since we were coming out of the Vietnam War, and we wanted to keep U.N. budgets down. So I was always under instructions to vigorously oppose any budget increase.

The third issue that came up was the communications issue which overlapped into the Israeli thing to some degree. It was a major issue at the 1976 General Conference in Nairobi. Had we lost that fight, we would have withdrawn from UNESCO in 1976.

Q: Could you describe how that developed?

JONES: There was a conference in December of 1975 to develop guidelines for the 1976 General Conference on the right of a state to control communications in the media coming into that state from foreign countries. We had very strong position against that.

As that meeting opened, the delegate from Algeria amended the program that was in front of us to add the Zionism-racism resolution at the U.N. It gave recognition of the existence of that. He added this as an amendment to the proposition then before the conference, which was a world conference — all the members were there.

We fought that, and when it looked as though we were losing, we received instructions along with the western European countries with the exception of Switzerland, to walk out of the conference. So before a vote was taken on the Zionism-racism thing, we walked out of that meeting and boycotted it.

This left the Soviet Union in charge. They then amended the text of the communications resolution to accord recognition by the international community of the right of a state to control the media within its country, which, of course, was totally opposed to everything we stood for. This passed. It was adopted. These were the set of recommendations that then were going to the General Conference for adoption in Nairobi.
Our job in Nairobi, among others, was to see that under no circumstances this was adopted as a United Nations position. So we went to Nairobi in the fall of 1976. John Reinhardt was made chairman of the delegation.

Q: He was the Director of USIA at the time?

JONES: At that time, he was Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. He was not in USIA. That's why he was made chairman. He spent some time there, but he was also involved in other matters and went back and forth.

I was the one who was in charge of the communications issue. I was the permanent representative, and we were the ones who really managed the thing. So that was my major issue, and I was elected by the Conference as the U.S. representative on the General Committee of the Conference, which is the committee that sets the rules and manages the Conference. Then from that committee, I was elected as the United States' representative on the working group to prepare the resolution for submitting to the General Conference on, specifically, the communications issue.

On that working group there was a representative from the Soviet Union, myself, France. The Chairman was the former Vice President of India, Pasa Zaradi. I think there was a delegate from China and several from Latin America and some from Africa. I have forgotten the exact composition of the working group, but there were about 20, as I recall.

We met every day for several hours. In fact, they closed the door and put a guard in front of the door. We hammered out this resolution. I went back to the Department for instructions. I would leave that meeting to go back to the embassy and cable the Department to get instructions, attend the general sessions of the meeting, go to the cocktail parties that were part of the routine, five or six cocktail parties every evening. I was then back at the embassy office and would stay at the office until midnight sending
cables back and then we would get our instructions, meet at the office the next morning at 8:00 for our staff meeting. Then I would go into the session.

I have forgotten the text of the resolution that came out of it, but I was able to get all language regarding the recognition of states' rights to control the media out of it. As I recall, the resolution put the whole thing off. It didn't even address the question. It put it in limbo, so to speak, which was a way of killing it.

Q: Why did the nations that originally supported this back away from this?

JONES: They knew that if they adopted that resolution, we were going to withdraw from the organization. We made that clear.

Q: Withdrawing also money . . .

JONES: When that resolution was passed by that committee in December of the previous year, we cut off our contributions to the UNESCO immediately. We stopped all further contributions to UNESCO. So we were then $9 million in arrears at the time of that meeting. We met and were able to get the whole issue put aside. The issue never came to a vote. The only thing that came to a vote was whether to table it. That resolution was adopted to table it. The issue was put aside, and we were then satisfied. We stayed in the organization.

I can recall one of the things I did. They sent me three checks, each one for $3 million for me to personally deliver to the Director General. So I personally handed him $9 million which paid our dues.

The other matter that I would like to discuss on UNESCO, was the election of Amadu Makhbar M'Bow, who became the Director General.

Q: Yes, he became very controversial. Would you talk about that, please?
JONES: M'Bow was a Moslem from Senegal, very well-educated erudite fellow. He had been the Assistant Director General for Education in UNESCO. He happened to live down the street from me in Paris. He lived only four or five doors down from my residence. So I got to know him quite well. He had children the same age as my children. His wife was a Haitian, by the way, from a very distinguished family in Haiti. Our children became very close friends socially. So I got to know M'Bow. And M'Bow wanted to be Director General. Director General Mahieu opposed him. He wanted to run one more time. He had been in twelve years, he wanted one more term.

As a tactic to gain support from the African block and from other third world countries who supported M'Bow, particularly some of the moderate Moslem states, the United States decided to support M'Bow.

Q: Had you been sending back reports about how this man thought and all that?

JONES: Yes.

Q: Or did you really know?

JONES: Yes, I knew. M'Bow did not understand the United States, but, in my view, he was not anti-American. This was in 1974. It was a foregone conclusion that he was going to be elected. There had never been a African head of any U.N. organization, and so the votes were there. There was no question that M'Bow was going to be elected.

So we supported M'Bow. We did not support him with great enthusiasm, but we voted for him when the votes were counted, along with all of the other members of the Geneva group. All of the western countries decided to support him. We all supported M'Bow.

He became Director General. On the day he was elected Director General, the Israeli thing also blew up in that General Conference. There was a period of hiatus when there was no Director General, when Mahieu had stopped functioning and before M'Bow had
been made Director General. The organization was leaderless, and it was at this particular moment in Paris, in the fall of 1974, that many of the anti-Israeli resolutions got through, which caused M'Bow great problems.

M'Bow turned out to be, to our disappointment, more of a politician than an administrator. He was never interested in administrating the organization. I think that he wanted to be Secretary General of the U.N., and so when he became Director General, instead of attending to the organization, he proceeded to take off to visit heads of state. This is what he did about 50% of his time, visiting capitals, seeing heads of state, politicking on a global basis.

It was under his tutelage that the communications issue came up, the Zionism-racism issue came up. So, therefore, along with blaming the organization, M'Bow was also blamed. M'Bow was an impulsive man. I used to have luncheons with him and tell him what to do in terms of how to deal with the United States because he had never dealt with United States before. He didn't understand us at all. He didn't speak English. And he generally would follow my advice, so that relations with M'Bow, while I was there, were tolerable, were pretty good.

The problems with M'Bow occurred after I left. The decision was made, I think, to get out of UNESCO, and it just deteriorated.

Q: Also, wasn't he turning this more into a personal fiefdom as far as privileges and things like that?

JONES: He brought his own people in, and he threw out all of the Mahieu people. He ran the Secretariat on the basis of personal loyalty rather than on competence. So the organization became less efficient. It was never all that efficient to begin with because you have people from a hundred different countries working together trying to run an organization, and it's difficult enough to run a national corporation like General Motors,
for instance. It's not all that efficient to run an international organization and program and budget is very, very difficult.

He did operate on the basis of loyalty. He was at his peak, I think, when I left in 1977. After that, things began to fall apart for him. Finally, as you know, just last year or the year before last, he was defeated.

Q: By that time, we had left UNESCO.

JONES: By that time we had withdrawn. We withdrew in 1984. I left in 1977, so that was seven years after I left.

Q: It was just that the situation had deteriorated to the point where we just ignored it. As a matter of fact, it served as a very good lightning rod for the right wing of the United States.

JONES: That's right, it did. Well, the right wing in the United States, particularly the Reagan Administration, was hostile to the whole U.N. system, and UNESCO was their favorite target. I knew that we were going to withdraw when the Reagan Administration came to power. So I was not surprised.

I did maintain contact with M'Bow because his wife was Haitian, so he visited Haiti frequently, and I saw him in Haiti. The last time I saw him, he invited me to dinner. I was in Paris on other, totally unrelated, business for the Department of State in June of 1983. He invited me to dinner at his apartment in the building. I recall because it was the middle of Ramadan, and it was the longest day of the year; it was June 20th or 21st. So we couldn't eat dinner until almost 11:00 at night until the sun went down. M'Bow had been in meetings all day long. He was very irritable. He hadn't eaten anything since sun up, and we had to wait until it got dark before we could eat.

He told me then about his problems with the American delegation at UNESCO and that things were most unsatisfactory, as he put it. So I saw the handwriting on the wall.
Q: I think we might move now to your time as ambassador to Haiti.

JONES: Yes, let's see, is there anything else I want to say about UNESCO? I guess that is about all. I would like to mention my Deputy, Stan Warvariv, who was difficult to work with, but he performed in a very noble way. He died in 1982.

Q: You were saying under unusual circumstances?

JONES: Stan spoke fluent Russian because Russian was his native tongue. He was a violent anti-Communist but, at the same time, he loved “Mother Russia.” So he was always involving himself with the Russian delegation. I used to warn him about that, and while I was there, I sort of kept him on a leash, kept him away from the Russians, because I didn’t think it was wise for him to have private conversations with the Soviet delegates.

One of the instructions we were under in UNESCO was that we were not to talk to the PLO. The PLO had a delegation at UNESCO and they were constantly trying to involve my delegation, and particularly me, into conversations. I had to fend them off. I never broke that rule. Our instruction was not to deal with them, and I never dealt with them.

Warvariv got involved too close to the Russians, his “Mother Country.” I left Paris in August of 1977, and I went directly to Haiti. I was sworn in and went directly to Haiti. I had to be in Port-au-Prince to entertain Andrew Young, who I had just entertained at UNESCO a week before. That left Warvariv in charge.

He, rather than I, then became the delegate to a conference in Tbilisi in the Soviet Union, a UNESCO conference. While in Tbilisi, as I understand it and this is all second-hand, the KGB broke into his room and demanded that he become an agent for them because they somehow had been lead to believe through his contacts, that he was amenable to this. He refused and was sent to Moscow and then back to Paris. They threatened him that if didn't
become an agent for them that they would allege that he, and members of his family, had been pro-German during the war.

In fact, the Russian ambassador to UNESCO marched into M'Bow with alleged evidence. And I heard that he was also threatened by the French Resistance movement in Paris. So Stan was brought out of Paris and made our representative to the United Nations Postal Union, a rather innocuous organization in Geneva, based in Washington.

I saw him in November of 1981. He had just completed his physical examination, was in excellent physical condition. Then he went to a conference in Geneva of the Postal Union. He came back and, by the first of December, he was coming down with some mysterious illness. By Christmas he was paralyzed. He was diagnosed as having Lou Gehrig’s Disease. It became progressively worse so that by February he was dead. He died in late February or early March of 1982. Many of us believe that he was poisoned by the KGB.

Q: Coming to your appointment as ambassador to Haiti, I would have thought this might prove a problem because you obviously had gotten the backs up particularly some of the members of Congress who were particularly allied to the Israeli lobby. This normally is the “Kiss of Death” if you want to get anything that requires their approval.

JONES: As I told you, I talked to them many times, and I made a conscious effort to improve the status of Israel in UNESCO, and I think that I was reasonably successful in doing so. So there was no opposition to me whatsoever. When I came up for my confirmation hearings, the only questions I was asked was about my position, what I would do when I got to Haiti. I was not asked anything about UNESCO. So that never became a problem.

Q: You went there in 1977?

JONES: I went there the first part of August of 1977.
Q: What was our interest, at that point, in Haiti?

JONES: We had a number of major problems with Haiti. As you know, the Duvalier family had been in control of Haiti since 1957. The father Francois Duvalier, and the people around him, had been an absolute dictator and a very brutal dictator until 1971 when he died, and his son Jean-Claude ascended to the presidency at the age of 19. I came in 1977. So then Jean Claude was in his mid- to late twenties.

Around him was still the Duvalier clique, who were running the country and running it very firmly. There were, maybe, a couple of hundred political prisoners in jail at that time. One of the cornerstones of the Carter Administration was human rights. One of the major issues that I had was to encourage the appreciation of human rights in Haiti, to get political prisoners released, to try and get Jean Claude to move towards a more democratic and liberal society, to have elections which were relatively free, to allow more dissent in the country, more opposition.

Those were the political goals, then there was always the underlying premise that we did not want Haiti to come under the influence of Marxism. Cuba beamed broadcasts to Haiti every day. There were lots of Haitians living in Cuba.

Thirdly, the most overriding problem in the country was economic development. It was the poorest country in the western hemisphere. We had, at that time, which was before the outbreak of hostilities in Central America, this was before Somoza was overthrown, the foreign aid program to Haiti was, I think, the second largest in the western hemisphere at that time. Of course, now it's totally overshadowed by the Central America. But at that time, it was the second largest aid program. Our aid program was focused on rural health delivery, programs helping the poorest of the poor, as the Carter Administration liked to say, building roads so that the peasants could bring their produce to market, and improving the soil. Much of Haiti's forest had been chopped down for charcoal and the hills were barren from erosion and top soil was washed into the ocean. We tried to
replant the hillsides to improve agricultural production; to develop cooperatives and to help the farmers better market their products, particularly coffee; to encourage industrial development within the country; to negotiate new textile agreements with the United States which permitted the development of a textile industry in Haiti; and also to provide an R & R facility for Guantanamo. That was major. We had a flight to Guantanamo every week from Port-au-Prince. It was a major stop-off port for the Caribbean fleet because the Dominican Republic did not welcome American warships after the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965. They were particularly paranoid about airplane carriers, so we had three or four visits a year of airplane carriers that would come into the Port of Prince for R & R for the sailors.

Q: Let's go to human rights. After all, here is a régime which is founded on everything that the human rights policy opposes, no democracy, knock down your opponents, torture them, imprison them and all this. You lift this and you, in effect, depose the government. How did you preach this to people who certainly had no interest in following our preaching?

JONES: First of all, a lot of people didn't understand Haiti, and I suppose they still don't. It's a very complex country and a very complex society.

The Duvalier régime was based upon the support of the peasants. It was not an oligarchy in the Latin American sense. In most Latin American countries, such as Somoza, for instance, and Nicaragua or El Salvador, it was based upon the landed oligarchy who ran the country, the 2% of the people who own 98% of the land, as you had in El Salvador. That was not the case in Haiti.

Duvalier came into power with the support of the masses of the peasants, of the poor people. His régime was a poor-people's régime. The upper-class Haitians who were of mixed blood, mulattos, fair-skinned, were frozen completely out of the Duvalier régime. They did not participate politically in the régime at all. Many of them were killed by him,
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simply wiped out. There were cities in Haiti where there were no longer any of the old elite, the old fair-skinned elite, although they were still there and still controlled the economy around Port-au-Prince.

So there was support among the masses for Duvalier. He was not a régime that was uniformly condemned by all the people in Haiti. The exiles who had left Haiti and come to the United States or had gone to Venezuela or to France, were absolutely livid and irreconcilable as far as Duvalier was concerned. They were totally hostile to the régime and wanted only to overthrow Duvalier. But the masses of the poor people supported Duvalier.

I traveled with him a couple of times around the country. The outpouring of enthusiasm by the poor people, particularly women, who saw themselves as potential brides of Duvalier.

Q: This was before he married.

JONES: This was before he married. It was enormous, and this was not just generated by thugs, by Tontons Macoutes, of which there were plenty. There was support in Haiti for the Duvalier régime at that time. Now, this began to erode later on. But at that time, there was considerable support among the poor people.

The opposition to Duvalier was mainly the better educated people, the intellectuals, the elite, not the business elite, but the intellectual elite of Haiti, the newspaper people, the writers, the better educated people in Haiti, particularly in Port-au-Prince and in some of the other smaller cities like Gonaives. Contrary to some opinions, I felt that, at that time which was 1977, there was substantial support of Duvalier among the masses in Haiti.

Now as far as political freedom went, it was nonexistent in Haiti. No Haitian president since they became independent has ever left office voluntarily. They have either died in office or they have been carried out. So there was no real tradition of democracy as we know it in Haiti. Haitian society did not function in that way. So the agitation for the American style of
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democracy came from a small group in Haiti and then from a large group of exiles outside of Haiti.

I felt, at that time, it was important for us to improve the human rights condition, to move Duvalier towards democracy, and if possible, to liberalize the society and to develop contacts with all elements of society because I always felt that the Duvalier régime was temporary. In the Haitian tradition, régimes did not last. In fact, I used to tell Duvalier that. I developed a pretty good working relation with Jean-Claude.

Q: From the outside he seemed to be a rather ineffectual president, but he remained in power a long time. What was your evaluation of him?

JONES: There were people around him who wanted to keep him in power. He was a very clever person. He was not at all dumb as some people thought. Jean-Claude was very clever in playing one group off against the other. He genuinely did, I think, want to develop his country but in a way that would support him. In other words, his primary motive, his modus operandi was to retain power. There was no question about that. This was his overwhelming goal. If that meant developing the country, improving the economic situation in the country, then so be it. He would certainly support it.

He differed from his father in that Jean-Claude was not as strong as his father, and he did not have a killer instinct. He did not like bloodshed. So he tried to run the country without too much violence, without overt suppression of the people unless it became necessary. He would resort to it but only as a last resort. He didn't have the stomach for brutality.

I developed, as I said, pretty good relations with Jean-Claude. After I'd been there for about two months, then I met with him and talked with him several times and told him how important it was, in terms of maintaining relations with the United States, to observe human rights particularly regarding political prisoners.
He did release 125 political prisoners in the fall of 1977 which was the largest group of political prisoners ever released by Duvalier. Now I don’t know how many were left. I think there were only a very few left in the jails. But he released 125 political prisoners.

He also had sham elections. They were sham in that, if you opposed the Duvalier regime, you were not permitted to run. However, if you agreed to support the regime, he did permit candidates to oppose each other so that the elections were contested in the sense that as long you did not advocate the overthrow of Duvalier, then you could argue over any other issue, and you had an election. And they did have parliamentary elections twice, I believe, while I was in Haiti.

I was never able to get much relaxation of the media. He still controlled the press pretty stronger. He did allow some opposition voice on the radio. There were a couple of radio stations that were very muted in their opposition to Duvalier and they were able to get away with it. He tolerated them.

At one point, toward the last two years that I was in Haiti, Duvalier occasionally, I think two or three times, called me when I didn’t expect it and asked me to come immediately, unannounced, in a private car to his villa on top of the mountain. He never gave me time to go to the embassy and get instructions. He would just send a car and driver for me and summon me to his villa. Then we would sit down, for maybe two hours, just he and I alone in a room. He would offer me Cuban cigars and scotch whiskey. We would sit down and talk, and he would just listen to me. I would go down his Cabinet and tell him the ones who I thought were crooks and suggested that he get rid of them. And, as I said, I told him very candidly that, “You cannot last. This regime is not going to last.” And I suggested to him that he adopt a parliamentary-type of democracy whereby he stay on as head of state, but he would have an elected prime minister, who he could gradually turn power over to. I told him I thought this was the only way he was going to stay in power. I said, “It’s just not in the cards that you’re going to be President for life. You’re only 28, 29 years old. You’re not going to make it.” I said, “You’ve got your choice. You can either moderate your
position and perhaps stay on, or you can continue allowing the more reactionary elements to dominate the society. I guarantee you will be carried out feet first.”

He always listened to me and laughed, and we joked. We developed a pretty candid relationship. Of course, I would go to the embassy and report the conversation as it happened and report it to Washington. So I think that I developed a pretty close relationship with J.C., as we called him.

The way I divided my embassy, I was the main liaison with the senior levels of the Haitian Government, which meant the Duvalier regime. Only the ambassador can do that, and someone had to do it. You cannot have relations with a country, whether you agree with what they are doing or not, and ignore them or insult them. Then you are simply freezing yourself out of decision making and freezing yourself out of information which is vital. So I was the major contact with the high-level political controllers of the country, Duvalier and his ministers and the head of the army.

I was also designated as the main contact with the elite group in Haiti, the business elite, the people who control the economy. These were fair skinned mulattos who were frozen out of government entirely. They were very well educated, very sophisticated. They were not land owners. There were no big land owners in Haiti. The peasants owned the land in Haiti. But they owned the industry. They owned the computer chip factories, the baseball factories, the textile mills, the light industry sector that was developing in Haiti, patterned on Taiwan and Hong Kong.

So I developed close relations with the Mevs family—Pritz Mevs, who's grandfather had come to Haiti from Germany to avoid service in the Kaiser's army and had married an African woman. The Mevs family controlled the sugar mill and shoe factory in Haiti. They controlled the soap making, toothpaste manufacture. The Brandt family, Clifford Brandt, who was a Jamaican, was also of German-African origin. The Brandts owned all kinds of
George Leger, who later became ambassador from Haiti to the United States—his grandfather had been president of Haiti—was the leading lawyer in Port-au-Prince. He was a great fisherman, as I am, and we would go deep sea fishing together frequently. When we would get out on the boat, of course, we could talk freely with no one listening.

With other members of that group, no one else in the embassy could have access to because they wouldn't be bothered with anyone else in the embassy below the level of ambassador. They simply wouldn't.

My DCM, of course, was the manager of the embassy, and he had contacts. But my political officers were instructed to develop contacts with potential opposition groups. We had direct liaison with Gerard Bourge, who founded the Haitian Civil Rights League, and Jean Dominique who was the young broadcaster who was openly anti-Duvalier.

The political section was tasked to develop contacts with potential opposition groups in the country and so on down the line in the embassy, with the military attaché dealing with the military, and the information people with the press, and the aid people out in the country, out in the field in the rural areas.

So I thought we had the country pretty well covered. I think we knew what was going on in Haiti, in those days, very well. I had a good staff there.

Q: What were the pressures on you? You had the Carter Administration, the State Department and Andrew Young. The U.N. was playing a very active role. It was an administration that was looking closely at so-called trouble spots on the human rights deal, and you were on one of the main ones. How did this impact you?
JONES: Human rights was the major problem that I had in Haiti. My role in convincing Duvalier to moderate his human rights policies was one of my major efforts.

As I said, we got political prisoners released. Sometimes it was successful. Sometimes it wasn't. The Human Rights League started largely through quiet encouragement from our embassy, from us, through my political officers. They got themselves organized and were going great guns. Then the Duvalier crowd decided that they were becoming too potent a factor in society, and they sent their counter-insurgency battalion called, “The Leopards” in plain clothes, into their meeting one night and destroyed the entire complex, beat up everybody there including my political officer who was there representing us. He got hit in the ear with a karate chop and fractured his ear drum and had to be evacuated. So they broke that up.

I guess we might have gone a little bit too far. I don't think we did, because we didn't control it. The Haitians thought that we had more control than we did, and they went one step too far. When they crossed over that line of openly opposing the r#gime, then they were suppressed and suppressed brutally.

The other major effort was our aid program. That was always very emotional because I would go out into the field and see these malnourished, undernourished children. I would go into the hospitals in the field and into a hut that would be a hospital and see these people who were ill and sick and have to involve myself at all levels of society which I tried to do.

It was very difficult to go into an area where you had such extreme poverty and see it. But we had to do it because we had to have contacts. We could not operate in that country effectively unless we did. But, nevertheless, it was very difficult for someone coming from a highly developed society as we are to go into a Haitian village and go particularly into a hospital because the villagers didn't live all that bad. Some of them lived quite descent
lives. But to go into a hospital where there was no medical care and see these babies and injured people, it was always very difficult.

Q: How did the Americans, yourself, your staff, particularly your aid people, feel about dealing with a country which has always been considered, certainly within the Latin American and South American context, as being the basket case, as they call it? It seems almost that nothing we could do would really help.

JONES: The problems are overwhelming in Haiti. You have a population, at that time, I'm not sure what it is now, it was about 6 # million which is slightly larger than that of the Dominion Republic. The population of Haiti was three or four times larger than all of the British Caribbean put together. The Dominion Republic was twice the size in land. Haiti was mountainous. There were no flat plains where you could grow large crops. So it was over populated. The population at a 2% growth rate was going to double in about 30 or 40 years. Illiteracy was about between 80% and 90%. There was not an adequate health care system, not an adequate educational system. There was not an adequate transportation system. The country simply was under-developed, and the Haitians were very ingenious in surviving and they maintained a great sense of dignity and, in fact, a sense of joie de vivre in Haiti. It was a very lively country. So it was not as depressing as one may think, and you developed a great deal of affection for the Haitian people. Living in Haiti was not bad because, if you liked water and I love the ocean and the sea, there was always the ocean and sea to go swimming or to go fishing, which made things a lot better.

Q: What sort of pressures did you get from, say, the Carter Administration?

JONES: The main pressure was on human rights, and that was from Pat Derian. I always made it a point, when I came up to see them, to talk with them and to tell them what I was doing, that they understood that Haiti was a very difficult society. It was not a country where you could go in and shake your finger at people and they would do what you say. That simply was not possible.
So, in general, they were supportive of my efforts and I had, I think, a good relation with Pat and with Mark Schneider, who was the deputy.

We had one problem, I recall. We wanted to get a motor boat, a gun boat, for the Haitian Navy, which would have been commanded by a graduate of Annapolis, a Haitian graduate, to use to interdict the narcotics traffic that was going up the straits and also to just generally patrol the waters in Haiti, and to provide rescue capability because in that Port-au-Prince channel there were a number of reefs. None of them were marked. The lighthouses had all burned out, and there was no air traffic control at the airport. You fly in by the seat of your pants. So I was just afraid all the time that we were going to have a tragedy, that a ship was going to hit a reef or an airplane was going to go down in the ocean, and there were no boats to go out and help anyone. So I wanted this boat to have rescue capabilities as well as to help interdict the narcotics traffic which was not a problem in Haiti but was all around Haiti.

Pat Derian and the Office opposed that because it had a .50-caliber machine gun on it. They opposed it because it could be used to suppress the people. I recall that I made a special trip to Washington and went to see the Deputy Secretary from California, Warren Christopher, and explained to him what it was that we were doing and why we were doing it and why we needed to have this boat. He overruled the Human Rights Office, and we got the boat. They sailed it down to Haiti, and we all went for a cruise on it when it came.

That was the only run in that I had with the Human Rights Office. The rest of the time they were very supportive of me.

Q: Mainly because the problems were so overwhelming. I was in Korea and there we had big problems with them. But that was a different situation. What about the problem of boat people from Haiti? This is one that has caused a great deal of heartbreak and concern in the United States and also in your time?
JONES: The boat people were leaving Haiti at a pretty constant stream when I was there. We were convinced at the embassy that with few exceptions, there were exceptions, but the majority of these people who left were leaving for economic reasons and not political reasons. They were generally from the peasant class, but who had gotten enough money together, like $1,000, to buy passage on one of these sailboats that sailed from Northern Haiti to Florida. So they were very energetic people. They were the most energetic of that social class in the country.

It was our view at the embassy, and my political officer felt very strongly about this, that these people were economic and not political refugees. When they got to the United States, of course, they immediately became political refugees and everything was anti-Duvalier and how much they were going to be harassed if they came home.

We were very careful to monitor those that were sent home to see if they were, in fact, harassed. And with very few exceptions they were not. Duvalier simply didn't care about the boat people. He was glad to get rid of them because it reduced the population pressures. They were not politically active in the country. So he simply didn't care. When they came home, unless they had a personal grudge about a wife or a girlfriend that was settled when they came home, they were not harassed, they were not bothered.

But domestically, in the United States, their cause was taken up and Jesse Jackson got involved in that. I met with Jesse Jackson here in Washington at the Shoreham Hotel. He was here for a major speech. I briefed him on the refugee boat problem in Haiti and cautioned him not to be used by certain people who were using the boat people for their own particular domestic political hits.

Q: Who were these people? What groups?

JONES: Some of them were Haitian exiles who were using them as a vehicle to try and overthrow the regime, to develop sentiment against Duvalier, to portray them as political
refugees who would be tortured if they came home and to develop public opinion in the United States to overthrow Duvalier.

The exiles who were politically active always wanted the United States to cut off foreign aid to Haiti, to do everything we could to overthrow the regime. Now I never agreed with this as a policy. I didn't think it was the time. I didn't think the United States should be in the business of overthrowing regimes. I thought it would lead to a blood bath, and I did not want blood on my hands. So I simply refused to do it. But there were very powerful people, particularly in southern Florida and still are, but things have changed now, of course. But at that time, they were very vocal.

To find out what was really going on, I came to Florida sort of incognito. The federal authorities, of course, knew who I was. But I went out to the detention center where they detained these Haitians and just wore some regular clothes so they wouldn't know that I was the ambassador. I went into the detention center and talked to them and interviewed them to see how they were being treated, to see whether they were being treated badly from our point of view. I had lunch out there with them and spent almost a whole day out in the Everglades at this detention center.

These were very energetic people. They were intelligent. They knew what they were doing. They knew exactly what to do, how to stay in the country. They had lawyers. They had become good lawyers on their own. They said all the right things. They were very vocal in being anti-Duvalier.

Q: You were mentioning relations with Panama or was that later on?

JONES: That's later on. I went to Panama while I was in Haiti as part of the briefing on the Panama Canal Treaties because that was one of the things I was to do also, to get the Haitian Government at the OAS to support our treaty with Panama. I accompanied the Haitian foreign minister to Washington for the signing of the Treaties, and I met Torrijos and I flew to Panama and was briefed in Panama by General McAuliffe and flown all
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over the Canal and given the usual briefings so that I would know what I was talking about when I discussed the matter. We were all, I guess, most of the ambassadors were accorded that treatment at that time.

Q: One of the things in Haiti, there must of been a lot of pressure on your consular section. How did you deal with that?

JONES: There were two kinds of pressures. One, a very large number of Americans lived in Haiti, something between 5,000 and 15,000. We could never figure out exactly how many because so many were . . .

Q: Who were these?

JONES: Some of them were ex-patriots who liked Haiti and just lived there. Some of them were retirees from the military who lived in Haiti. The overwhelming majority were missionaries and Haiti was just wall to wall missionaries from every type of denomination that you could think of, Catholic and Protestant. I would say that two-thirds of them were probably missionaries. But a substantial number lived in Port-au-Prince permanently and had residence there.

Several wealthy Americans had families in Haiti. Kitner, who was the former president of ABC, had a house in Haiti. The Kennedy family frequently visited Haiti anonymously for various reasons. Senator Byrd from Virginia regularly came to Haiti. He had a favorite house. Mike Wallace of “60 Minutes.” His sister-in-law ran a shop, a boutique in Haiti, and so Mike Wallace came to Haiti several times every year. So there were a lot of Americans living in Haiti that we had to liaison with.

The big problem, of course, was visas for the Haitians. The lines would start at midnight in front of the consular section. There were professional line-standers who made their living standing in line, as you probably know from your experience. There were sometimes
violence if you denied someone. One of officers was attacked because she denied a visa. She was scratched in the eye.

There were attempts of bribes. Our officers would be offered money to get people visas. They had to be very careful not to get involved. Sometimes someone would befriend you deliberately thinking that this would influence you in giving them or some member of their family a visa. So this was a very sensitive aspect of our operations in Haiti.

We had an airplane crash and a number of Americans were killed. That required consular efforts.

A couple of times narcotics planes flying over Haiti from Colombia crashed, and we got involved with that which was most unpleasant because there were always rumblings of organized crime coming in attempting to pressure our embassy people for one reason or another.

There was one case where a certain prominent American's plane crashed with a load of marijuana and he was interned by the Haitians and put in jail. We began to get some threatening phone calls from some very strange places in the United States which we felt were involved with organized crime, that we should get this guy out and get him out quickly.

So the consular section in Haiti was a very sensitive operation, very busy. In fact, our first head of the section had a nervous breakdown and had to be relieved.

Q: I think this has happened with certain frequency there and in Jamaica and in a few other places.

JONES: Yes.

Q: Was there anything on this that you want to talk about?
JONES: In 1980 there was one threat on my life when I had to be evacuated. I was going to be kidnapped by a Cuban-sponsored guerilla group, and John-Claude was going to be assassinated at the same time with a land mine planted in his driveway. I was informed of this by the Haitian foreign minister. My guards had to be increased with all of that, and my family and I had to be evacuated for a period of time.

Q: How did we view the Cuban communist threat?

JONES: Under the Duvaliers, communism was totally suppressed and it was underground. It was there, but it was underground. We couldn't find out where it was. If Duvalier couldn't find it, we certainly couldn't find it. Cuba broadcast to Haiti every day in Creole. When Castro came to power, there were several hundred thousand Haitians in Cuba cutting sugar cane. So they stayed there. They never left. They tell me that a fair number of his officers in his army in Angola where of Haitian descent. Cuba was very interested in Haiti, but they never made any real impact, as far as I could see.

Q: After you left Haiti, this would be when?

JONES: This was in the summer of 1980. I was there almost three years exactly. Then I came back and was Diplomat in Residence at Hampton University for a year, which is a predominately Black college.

Q: Then you retired?

JONES: No, then I went back into the Department. I was in INR for a year, working on the Law of the Sea Treaty. I wrote a paper on the Law of the Sea Treaty, which subsequently was published in the Journal of Oceans and International Law. I am a lawyer, and I sat on that task force that discussed the Law of the Sea Treaty, as an observer for INR and wrote a paper on it.
Q: What was your impression of the Reagan Administration which came in and was certainly not very interested in the Law of the Sea?

JONES: No, they were opposed to it, although the task force generally was in favor of it. The interagency task force was the Defense Department, Interior, the whole realm of government. They sent an options paper to the White House. One of the options, of course, was to oppose the Treaty and refuse to join, which was the option accepted by President Reagan. On the other hand, Elliot Richardson and others who had worked very hard on the Treaty were very much, and I presume are still very much, in favor of the Law of the Sea.

As I got into it and with my U.N. experience, I felt that the Law of the Sea was something that was coming, and that it would be in our interest to be in at the beginning so that we could influence it in a way that would be productive for us rather than to boycott it and allow it to take its own stream, or for someone else to come in and exert influence. So I felt it would have been in our interest to join the Law of the Sea because it's going to come. But the Reagan Administration took a different view.

Q: You left the Foreign Service and retired when?

JONES: I retired in June of 1984 after I left the Law of the Sea. Then I spent two more years in MMO, management operations, working on a classified program which, in essence, involved survivability of the country and the diplomatic establishment in the event of a nuclear war which I can't go into in detail. Suffice to say that I did a lot of traveling in that. I did travel all over the world—South America, Asia, Australia, Western Europe and Africa. It was interesting, but I did not feel it was diplomacy as I had been trained to do. But it was an interesting two years.

Q: When you left the Service, you worked over on the Hill for Congress?
JONES: When I left, I immediately went to the University of Virginia as the ambassador in residence for a year, 1985. I was at the University of Virginia at the Woodrow Wilson School where I taught courses in diplomacy. Then I was also at the Law School where I lectured occasionally and did a paper on the Law of the Sea.

After leaving the University of Virginia, I worked on private business for almost a year. Then I was made staff director of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs in the first part of 1987. I served there until the end of October, when I resigned from that position on the Hill. That was an interesting experience in many ways, although I confess that at the age that I was then—I was then 59 years old—it was not the type of job that appealed to me. It was highly political and it was a staff job. I was used to being number one. I was used to telling people what to do rather than being told what to do. When you work for a congressperson or a committee, you are at their beck and call and you do what they want you to do. I did not agree with some of the things that that committee was doing. So it did not work out well. But I did have an opportunity to get back into the swing of things.

I went to El Salvador with the committee and sat in on meetings with Duarte and the government in El Salvador. Then we went to Nicaragua and met with the Ortega regime. I went to Haiti twice. The committee sent me to Haiti after the overthrow of Jean-Claude Duvalier. I met at length with the oligarchy then, the army group, that was then controlling Haiti.

Then they sent me to Panama for a week to meet with Noriega, which was perhaps, along with Haitian trip, the most fascinating trip. My Republican counterpart's plane was grounded so I was representing the majority committee. He never made it to Panama until the last day, so I was there alone and met with all of the major players in Panama. I met with the President DelValle. I met with the opposition leaders of the civil rights movement in Panama, with Aldius Calderone, with the three major opposition factions. I met with Indians. I met with people from the other major areas like Cherokee in the north.
of Panama. I met with people supporting Noriega, as well as opposing him. I had extensive
meetings with the West Indian community, which is a community that people generally
ignore in Panama, although they comprise approximately 10% of the population. Most
of them support Noriega. Then I met for about an hour one-on-one with Noriega and his
general staff, the Panama Defense Force. I met privately with two of the leading colonels,
there names were Purcell, who happen to be West Indians and who were two of the
principal military advisors in that clique around Noriega.

I first talked with Noriega about the attack on the American Embassy, and I told him
that since I had been a Foreign Service officer, and I had served abroad and I knew
what it was to be attacked, that we did not appreciate this and would not tolerate attacks
on the American Embassy. This was contrary to international law, and I wanted him to
know on no uncertain terms that this would not be tolerated by the Congress or by the
administration.

Then I discussed whether he would voluntarily leave office, which he was very equivocal
about, the role of the opposition allowing opposition to him politically, which again he
waffled on. And he talked about his support in the country and, of course, blamed the
United States for supporting the opposition groups.

I assessed Noriega as a very clever person. In the paper that I wrote, I felt that the
Administration was wrong, that Noriega was not going to be overthrown soon, that he
had a lot of support which reminded me a little bit of Duvalier, that he had a lot of support
among the poor people of the country. I met with the mayor of the slums around town, her
name was Salbino, who was communist and she supported Noriega.

Among the West Indians, almost all supported Noriega because they had been frozen out
of the government in Panama.

As I assessed the situation, the opposition to Noriega was centered mainly in the middle
classes, the fair-skinned “blancos,” as they are called, the middle classes, and the labor
movement, which was darker skinned, but nevertheless where mainly upper class, middle class people.

These people were not willing to die. I didn't see in them a willingness to get out on the barricades and attack Noriega physically—to die. They were not willing to see their fortunes destroyed in fighting Noriega. DelValle was a complete weakling. I didn't feel that he was a serious person at all as a president.

So my view after leaving Panama (August 1987) was that Noriega was going to stay in power for a while, that if he was overthrown, he would probably be overthrown from the inner circle around him rather than from any popular will. I still tend to believe that.

Q: Working within Congress, did you find that the domestic dynamics of dealing with foreign policy was such that sometimes you felt a little bit like Alice in Wonderland? What American interests in a country were had little to do with how a congressman might view another country.

JONES: Each congressman had his particular axe to grind. He had his own point of view, and they tended to over estimate what the United States could and could not do. They seemed to think that if we threatened to cut off foreign aid, and they were always passing resolutions about cutting off foreign aid, they cut off aid to Haiti, for instance, while I was there, that this would somehow force a regime to do as we wanted to do. I felt that this was very unrealistic.

They were, of course, amenable to pressures from their constituencies and from pressure groups. When they travel they don't tend to stay very long in a country, and they travel as a group. They go around as a group so that everything is staged for a congressional delegation. You don't get a spontaneous exchange as you do when you travel as an individual. Therefore, they come away with views that are not always realistic.
Q: Looking back, what would you point to as being, that you felt in your career, was your greatest accomplishment? What gave you the greatest personal satisfaction?

JONES: That's hard to say. I don't think there was any one focus of my career. My career was rather varied. I would say that in each of my incarnations, so to speak, there were certain things that I felt that I did that gave me great satisfaction.

In the Education and Cultural program, working to strengthen that bureau to make it more effective in terms of promoting our foreign policy interest, I think I came away from that with a great deal of satisfaction.

In keeping the United States in UNESCO in 1976, when I'm sure we would have gone out had that resolution gone another way, being able to maneuver and to manipulate so that I, on the one hand, had the support of M'Bow, and he never supported any other American the way he supported me, and on the other hand getting the State Department to back us up and to work with the Israeli lobby, all at the same time, then also maintain good relations with the Arabs, and I had excellent relations with the Arabs, I thought that this was a major accomplishment.

In Haiti, I think that moderating Jean-Claude Duvalier, preventing violence in that country, getting the release of the political prisoners, and improving the focus of our foreign aid program so that it was better able to meet the needs of the poorest people, those are the things that I think that I accomplished.

One other committee that I served on as a U.S. representative during my four years at UNESCO was—I was the U.S. representative—on the Committee to Preserve the Monuments of Ancient Egypt. We used to go out to Aswan and cruise up and down the Nile River looking at the Abu Simbel and those great monuments that were being flooded by the Aswan Dam. I think that working with that committee and helping to preserve those great monuments of antiquity also gave me a great deal of satisfaction.
Q: Would you recommend the Foreign Service as a career to a young person?

JONES: The Foreign Service is not for everyone. It's only for a certain type of individual. It has to be a person, first of all, that has a strong interest in international affairs, who likes to travel, and is able to deal with other cultures. So many people who are intellectuals cannot really relate to people of different cultural backgrounds, can't live with them, can't treat them decently.

A Foreign Service officer has to be able to work without great remuneration because you will never make any money in the Foreign Service. So if making money is your object in life, then I would never advise a Foreign Service career.

End of interview