Q: This is an interview with R. Smith Simpson on June 18, 2001. The aim is to supplement his initial interview of May 1991. I am George High. You're on.

SIMPSON: Let me undertake to summarize some of the discoveries I made in my diplomatic experience. This will amplify the earlier interview that covered my experiences as a Labor attaché and then as a Foreign Service officer sometimes on consular assignments and what I have been doing since my retirement from the Service.

The first thing I discovered was that the individual Foreign Service officethat is, of all rankcan not only play a useful role but an important one in sowing ideas, making suggestions to host officials and private citizens, as well as to his own government, if the officer has the background of education and experience and the imagination to do this. As for myself, I entered the Foreign Service Auxiliary in 1944 at the age of 38, having served twice in the federal government, first in the National Recovery Administration as a staff member of the Labor Advisory Board and then as an aide to an Assistant Deputy Administrator to take part in the development of codes of fair competition and then [was] lured from that by one of the industries, the Asphalt Shingle and Roofing Industry, to help administer its Code of Fair Competition. By virtue of a broad liberal arts
education, including a year of graduate schooling and then three years of law school, becoming a member of the Virginia Bar, with further graduate work at Columbia University in international law and relations, I had given the Asphalt Shingle and Roofing Industry a hard time at the public hearing on their proposed code, feeling they were venturing entirely too close to what our anti-trust laws forbid. This had won their favorable attention and I guess they had concluded that if I, on the government’s payroll, could give them a hard time, then on their payroll, I might give the government a hard time. Anyway, these experiences with the National Recovery Administration and industry, gave me insights into how our government and a typical industry was thinking and operating in that time of a worldwide depression.

Beginning in my undergraduate and graduate years at the University of Virginia and then continuing at law school, I became interested in labor problems. Since the NRA codes contained labor provisions to promote fair competition, I got an exposure to the practical problems involved in a government’s effort to promote fair labor standards in international competition for markets, something the International Labor Organization had done beginning in 1919 in the treaties of peace following World War I. I got interested in the ILO when, after law school, Columbia University gave me a fellowship to continue my international and labor interests by studies for a doctorate. Incidentally, I never got that doctorate because Columbia had a rule that you did not get that unless you published your dissertation, or got it published, and I did not have the funds for this. But my dissertation was on the Washington Hours Convention, establishing the eight-hour day and the 48-hour week internationally, and the problems of getting that drafted, adopted, and carried out gave me a good insight into international labor problems.

When the Supreme Court declared NIRA unconstitutional, I joined the faculty of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, where, along with teaching, I helped in the drafting of the Pennsylvania Social Security Law and was enlisted to advise that state’s government on relief and unemployment matters. I also was invited by the government of New Jersey to do the same with them. This experience and the writings it produced gave
me a reputation in labor and social problems which led to a telephone call from the War Shipping Administration the day after Pearl Harbor inviting me to join it in solving some of their labor problems, which were holding up convoys. Those included what the admirals in War Shipping were calling “the desertion of seamen from Allied ships.” I startled them by suggesting we not speak of “desertion” but “absenteeism,” my desire being to focus unemotionally on the cause or causes of the phenomenon, which we did.

As a result, we found that the cause had to do with criss-crossing a submarine-infested Atlantic without respite. When I asked the seamen if three times across followed by one time ashore would meet their need of rest, they heartily responded it would. War Shipping immediately introduced this system and the problem vanished. No other convoy delays occurred. We then found we had a morale problem aboard U.S. ships. Henry Kaiser was turning out Liberty ships faster than we could scrape up good, experienced cooks, so we had to establish a school for cooks. We also faced a shortage of engineers. I went to Cornell to negotiate a “quickie” course for Marine engineers. A shortage of mates and captains forced us to establish a Marine academy. When all of this was under way, the State Department in its postwar planning got to the drafting of labor and social provisions in the proposed UN charter and recruited me to lend a hand. Then came the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and governments headed for a final conference in San Francisco to adopt a final version of a charter.

Then the logjam broke in the Department on Sumner Wells' proposal to add a division on international labor affairs in the Department and labor specialists in the Foreign Service. This had the support of President Roosevelt, who broke the logjam. I was invited to help organize that division and the labor attaché program. The attachés had to be given berth in the Foreign Service Auxiliary due to an edict of Secretary Cordell Hull, who, promptly on our entry into the war, forbid further appointments to the Foreign Service to prevent, according to his words, the Service becoming “a haven for draft dodgers.” But the war required a Service with skills that peacetime diplomacy had not demanded. So, a Foreign Service Auxiliary had been created to provide them, which was to be dissolved on the
termination of the “emergency.” When we finished setting up the division, it suddenly struck me we had no Foreign Service officer or anyone with overseas experience. Having detected in the course of organizing the division a good deal of ill-concealed hostility among the Foreign Service officers staffing the Department, I knew we were in for serious problems and proposed to the division chief, Otis Mulliken, that I go out as one of the pioneer attach#s and then return to the Division. He reluctantly agreed, for the war had created a shortage of labor specialists. Finally, Otis did so, recognizing that the division needed someone with Foreign Service experience.

The question then arose as to where I would be sent. I was unrealistically offered Moscow. But I was not convinced anyone in the Soviet Union would talk to the labor attach# of a capitalist country. Furthermore, I had had no instruction in the language. Who could I talk to? Who would be willing to talk to me? Furthermore, how would I get around the Soviet Union to learn what labor conditions actually were?

Then I was offered in succession Paris and Rome. In both of these countries, travel would be difficult if not impossible. Furthermore, I did not know Italian. I opted for Belgium, a country small enough to get around in. The reason I wanted to get around and not be pinned to a capital were two. Capitals can be unreal places, especially as far as labor movements and problems are concerned. Secondly, my war shipping experience had put me in touch with representatives located in New York of the European Resistance movement and I knew they had serious doubts that a capitalist country like the United States would make good on its wartime promises of a better world and especially doubts of a capitalist country that had backed away from trying to do that very thing after WWI. What I had told them of the State Department's systematic postwar planning had seemed to convince them otherwise, as long as FDR was President at least. But I had told them of our briefings of the Vice President, Harry Truman, and how he had impressed us by quickly grasping the problems and proposals we were working on and that had reassured them. So, this was a part of the reason for my wanting to go out as a labor attach# in Europe, to make quick contact with Resistance leaders and convince them we were
serious in wanting to help to create a better world, had plans to do so, and wanted and needed their support. My experience had led me to conceptualize the immediate role of labor attaché at least in Europe as winning over the Resistance so that the United Nations could begin with strong labor support. That was a political role, but when it came to drafting my instructions, when asked to draft them, I considered it wise to do so in economic terms. The newly created Division of International Labor Affairs had been placed in an Office of Economic Affairs. I suspected that in order to reduce opposition to the creation of such a division, it had been argued in economic terms, so I considered it expedient to do so in economic terms all the more, having been exposed to the hostility of old timers in the course of helping to organize the division and the Labor Attaché Program, I wanted to introduce no additional problems by any professed excursion into political matters.

So, off I went to Belgium. That assignment has been covered in my earlier interview. I apologize for this long exposition of my own background, but it shows one of my problems in Embassy Brussels, which because of the wartime restrictions placed on the Service by Secretary Hull, had but a single political officer on its staff and he had no background comparable to mine. He entered the Service from a preparatory school, not with a college education, so that his range of interests was limited and did not include labor problems. He saw no need in the Foreign Service of an officer dealing with labor problems. He may well have come from a conservative background, as did many of the Foreign Service officers I had encountered in the Department in helping to organize the Division of International Labor Affairs, and been hostile to the New Deal or anything smacking of it. Of course, this labor program in the State Department was viewed as a New Deal fantasy. I recall one of the old timers I had encountered in the Department had boasted, “have never met a socialist (read labor leaders) and never expect to,” which I have found to be a prevailing view among the old timers in the Service.

A broad background before entering the Foreign Service makes one objective in judging our diplomatic performance instead of defensive, against innovative creativity, which
seemed then - and still seems - to be a prevailing attitude. This attitude, plus frequent rotation, is frustrating efforts of reform. As far as rotation is concerned, once reformers are rotated out of positions which have enabled them to introduce reform, the reforms either whither away or, as in the case of Bill Crockett, someone is appointed to replace him who abolishes all of the reforms he had introduced. This discourages officers from even undertaking change. I might add that at least some of us involved in the creation of the International Labor Program, and possibly this was in FDR's own mind in supporting that program, felt it would get our diplomatic establishment to move our diplomacy off the traditional line of intergovernmental relations and to take an interest in the human condition. This is a Jeffersonian conceptualization of diplomacy and underlies the interest we have come to take in human rights. Incidentally therefore, such a program might democratize the Foreign Service and the State Department.

Another thing I have learned is that political sense is very important in the conduct of diplomacy so that this should be tested in both our written and oral examinations for the Foreign Service and possibly made qualifications likewise to be tested in hiring civil servants. Political acumen is basic to what we do in diplomacy even in the economic sphere. Diplomacy can be defined as the art and science of international politics. Another thing I have learned is that the consular contribution to diplomacy must be recognized and fully developed. Some consular posts are just as important as embassies. An example of this is the experience of a junior Foreign Service officer, Robert Rossow, in Iran as WWII came to an end. He was posted in the embassy in Teheran but wanted to have a better understanding of Iran and its people and therefore requested an assignment to our consulate in Isfahan. There he became aware of nocturnal disturbances and on investigation discovered that they were due to the redeployment of Soviet troops but instead of being redeployed back home as they were obligated to do under a wartime agreement with the allies, it was deploying them in the direction of Iran and Turkey. Not only was this a violation of the agreement but indicated what one of the objectives of the Soviet government was, namely to position itself so as to acquire a dominating influence
in the Iran area and in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. Rossow's reports of the redeployment to the Department were at first treated as unbelievable, but having had some wartime experience in the military, he was able to identify the particular equipment which the Soviet government was redeploying. This was enough eventually to convince the Department and it raised the question in the UN Council. The Soviets of course denied this was taking place, but the reports of Rossow were sufficiently detailed to make a convincing case so that the Soviets finally redeployed their military units to the Soviet Union. The experience of Rossow draws attention to what junior and consular officers can contribute to diplomacy if they have a suitable background as in Rossow's case. The experience illustrates the point that all officers, of all ranks, can contribute to the effectiveness of diplomacy.

In my writing, I have drawn upon an allusion to a biological factor, namely that a full quarter of the oxygen we breathe is produced by the free floating minuscule plants known as photoplankton lying on the surface of the oceans where water and air meet and our planet is habitable only because an infinitesimal plant is so widely dispersed. So, too, the widespread distribution of diplomatic and consular officers of all ranks and all nations and their quiet, often subtle, activities around the globe day in and day out get much of the world's affairs rationally and peacefully attended to, thereby helping mankind to survive. With educated minds and training, tact and skill, and personalities conducive to civilized relations and tireless efforts, diplomatic and consular officers lay doubts and suspicions to rest, clear up misunderstandings, offer suggestions and advice, and nurture them to germination in ingenious ways, thereby making progress possible for a planet more hospitable to reason, peace, and justice. This also emphasizes the point that this globalized and turbulent world that we live in requires that the diplomatic and consular officers must be provided all the resources they need to enable diplomacy to reach its full potential. If this means devoting fewer billions of dollars to the exploration of outer space in order to make available more billions to the success of diplomacy here on Earth, we should by all means make that decision.
Still another thing I learned was from an experience I had in my last Foreign Service assignment. Having discovered in the Foreign Service a disturbing number of officers who did not measure up to the needs of a world power. I requested an assignment to the Board of Examiners of the Foreign Service to find out how candidates were recruited and selected. In orally examining candidates, I made the astonishing discovery that, among other things, they knew nothing of diplomacy, knew of no courses on diplomacy in their respective colleges and universities, not even in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, a graduate school, or the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, an undergraduate school, and had never read so much as one book on diplomacy. I volunteered to go on recruiting trips to colleges and universities to verify this and to find out where the best graduates were going. One college and university after another reported their best students were not applying to the Foreign Service but going into law and the CIA. I wanted also to familiarize myself with the academic world in preparation for writing a book on the State Department and finally to further my own reamericanization begun when I returned from Africa in 1958 after 13 years abroad. I discovered that diplomacy was being taught as a political science in only a handful of universities, only at Pittsburgh, Notre Dame, and Vermont as far as I could detect. I was surprised, to put it mildly. I was, in fact, appalled. Here we were, a world power, heavily dependent on diplomacy for the furthering of our security and leadership in world affairs, and our institutions of higher learning were neither preparing our citizens to understand it and nurture it with adequate funding and support, nor creating a reservoir of informed candidates for our diplomatic service. So, having retired from the Foreign Service in 1962 to do a book on the State Department - it was called Anatomy of the State Department - I began a campaign for college/university instruction in diplomacy and better public understanding of it. As a part of this campaign, I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Senate bills S15 and S865 to establish a national academy of foreign affairs. I supported the establishment of such an academy, citing my experience with the Board of Examiners of the Foreign Service, but due to the opposition of the committee's chairman, Senator Fulbright, neither bill got off the ground. In a private
conversation with me, the senator expressed the reason for his opposition thus: “If our universities cannot do this job, who can?” Nothing I could say could disabuse him of this superficial and shortsighted notion. In 1965, I was recalled to the Department by the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, William J. Crockett, to work on reforms I had been urging in magazine and newspaper articles. Lacking the interest and support of Secretary Rusk, few important ones were undertaken, including a proposal I made to add instruction in diplomacy to the so-called Orientation Course given by the State Department Foreign Service Institute to newly commissioned officers. As a contract employee, I was paid by the hour. Finding many of our proposed reforms were getting nowhere, I began reporting fewer hours than I actually worked, deeming the results were perpetrating a fraud on the American taxpayer. This work ended in 1966. A year later, my Anatomy of the State Department was published, pointing out that we desperately needed “widespread teaching of the diplomatic means of implementing policy.” It was widely reviewed, including The New York Times and Book of the Month Club News. Friends and strangers forwarded to me newspaper clippings on the book from around the country. One syndicated columnist by the name of Holmes Alexander made it the subject of one of his columns. I was invited to appear on the Today Show, hosted in those days by Hugh Downs, on a TV talk show in Washington, a radio talk show in Philadelphia with Covey Oliver, a University of Pennsylvania professor who had served as ambassador to Colombia and was soon to be appointed as Assistant Secretary of State for Interamerican Affairs. The State Department librarian advised me he had had to purchase more copies of Anatomy than of any other book because of the demand. A year later, in 1968, I edited Resources and Needs of American Diplomacy, a volume of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, containing 16 essays by practitioners, scholars, and journalists, with a final synthesis by myself on the nature and dimensions of diplomacy. This volume was hailed by an outstanding scholar in public administration as “a unique contribution” to his field. In the same year, the Young Turk Movement of reform-minded Foreign Service officers, some of the leaders of which were contributors to the Annals volume, sent copies of that volume to the presidential candidate and later to the Secretary of State nominee
William P. Rogers, when in office, appointed William B. Macomber as Deputy Under Secretary of Administration and instructed him to undertake a review of the Department and its needs. This bold undertaking involved 13 task forces of Department personnel numbering 250 officers and a report of over 200 pages suggesting modernization changes. This was published by the Government Printing Office (Department of State publication 8551) as “Diplomacy for the ’70s: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State.” A series of management reform bulletins beginning in January 1971 were issued by Macomber’s office throughout the year and continuing into 1972 describing “the action planned by the Department to carry out the recommendations of the task forces and the timetable of proposals to follow (Management Reform Bulletin Number Four 1971).” The Rogers- Macomber reform effort is listed here as I tried unsuccessfully to get Macomber interested in instruction in diplomacy at the Department’s Foreign Service Institute not only as desirable in itself but to underpin my nudging of the academic community. I also nudged the Young Turks to play a part in my campaign but without success. They were too busy getting reforms going in the diplomatic establishment.

In 1970, I organized and chaired a two-day conference on diplomacy in Philadelphia sponsored and funded by the American Academy of Political and Social Science to respond to the views expressed by political scientists on my rounds of colleges and universities that diplomacy was too “vague,” “opaque,” and “nebulous” to be taught - too much of an art and too little of a science, they said. This conference was of practitioners and scholars who wrote papers and commentaries on papers which were circulated in advance to maximize the success of the conference in reaching a definition of diplomacy and discussing whether it could be taught on the college/university level. If so, whether sufficient materials existed for the purpose. If not, how they might be produced. This led me to suggest the need for a center for the study of diplomacy as a means of producing additional materials. The bibliography of existing materials produced by Professor Plischke was the first known to exist. The unanimous view of the participants was that diplomacy could indeed be taught as part of a liberal arts curriculum. The results of
the conference were notable, including setting forth the papers and commentaries to prepare for the conference, in a publication called “Instruction in Diplomacy: a Liberal Arts Approach” published by the Academy in 1972 and donated to all university and college libraries. This publication, therefore, made available the first exhaustive bibliography on diplomacy known to exist and led to the formation of a continuing committee for the study of diplomacy (CSD). This committee, which I organized from participants in the conference to keep the ball rolling, met three to four times a year. Lacking funds, the committee could not provide travel costs, each member defraying his own, attesting to his devotion to the cause. As chairman of the committee, I prepared, periodically, a newsletter to circulate to members to provide news of developments relevant to the committee's task of nurturing interest in the academic community in instruction, along with suggestions of what members could do in that respect: suggest panel discussions of diplomacy at annual meetings of the International Studies Association and American Political Science Association, stimulate members to write articles, book reviews, and letters to editors of newspapers urging more attention be paid to diplomacy. My home being in Northern Virginia eight miles from the Potomac, I was able to keep in touch with the State Department as I was obliged to do anyway to do my writing so as to make the newsletter a source of accurate, up-to-date information on current diplomatic developments and on what could be done to improve the quality of diplomacy. It also enabled me to keep urging the need for a center of the study of diplomacy. Whenever possible, CSD meetings were held at universities sponsored by appropriate schools and departments so as to maximize knowledge of what we were doing. At one such meeting, hosted by the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, one of our members, Peter Krogh, then assistant dean of the Fletcher School, learned the Georgetown School was searching for a dean, applied for and got the position, whereupon I said to him, “Now, Peter, let's go,” meaning “Let's get diplomacy taught at the school” and get going a center of the study of diplomacy so we could generate materials needed for collegiate instruction with the view eventually to get it taught in high schools and grade schools. Peter pleaded, “My plate is full of long-pending problems, but I will get to these innovations as soon as I
can.” The CSD made little progress in getting diplomacy taught. While panel discussions at ISA and APSA conventions were well attended, interest in offering courses continued to be minimal. Academicians having got their doctorate without having had such a course, they did not know how to structure one. Also, it was easier to teach subjects with whose materials they were familiar. Moreover, with “publish or perish” a prevailing rule, it was to their interest to teach and write on subjects with which they were already acquainted. Until Peter Krogh became dean of Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, it was an uphill educational struggle even there, where it was chaired by the unflagging devotion of a CSD member. In 1972, I was invited to give a paper at the Dallas Convention of the ISA on “what has happened to diplomacy in American thinking.” I got Peter invited to come in on it to ensure he would be there and hear the discussion. At panel's end, Peter put his hand on my shoulder, saying, “Now I see what you are talking about” meaning he felt I had made a convincing case for filling a serious gap in political science instruction in international relations by failure to provide courses on diplomacy. But he still wanted proof diplomacy could be taught before going to bat for such a course in the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. Accordingly, he made arrangements for me to teach such a course in the Georgetown School of Continuing Education. I agreed to teach a one semester course three times, not wishing to limit the scope of my effort to a single university for a longer period. In 1972-1973, I prepared and taught a course on “The Dynamics of Diplomacy” in the Georgetown School of Continuing Education winter, spring, and summer semesters using case studies from the memoirs or biographies of diplomats. It went over well, attracting undergraduate and graduate students at Georgetown, officers at embassies located in Washington, one from the State Department, an Army captain posted at Ford Mead, and activists in public affairs organizations. The one from the State Department was a junior Foreign Service officer whom I had examined 10 years before for the Foreign Service. When I asked him why he was there, he replied, “You asked me on my oral exam what diplomacy is and I thought I should find out.” The result was that Dean Krogh thought diplomacy could be taught and had such a course added to the School of Foreign Service's curriculum. Diplomacy thus became recognized as a distinct subject
deserving the serious analytical attention of the academic world and indeed deserving of professionalization, providing a basis for justifying at some future date a claim of American practitioners that they are professionals, which they are not, being only careerists some of whom may have a smattering of professional preparation but are not required to have it for admission to the Foreign Service.

Also a result, in 1978, Dean Krogh decided to move on my proposal to establish at Georgetown a center for the study of diplomacy, which he preferred to call Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. That is how the ISD came into existence eight years after the 1970 conference in Philadelphia at which the idea was first floated as a needed underpinning of liberal arts instruction. Incidentally, this was the first such center in this country and, so far as is known, the first in the world.

Throughout the period of 1962 to 1983, whenever I visited the University of Virginia - invited to give talks on foreign affairs or otherwise - I made it a point to call on the successive heads of the department of government and foreign affairs, beginning with Professor Ruhi Ramazani, to keep dropping the seed of political science instruction in diplomacy. To move this idea along, I sparked and funded a two-day conference of practitioners and scholars at the university in 1983 along the line of the 1970 Philadelphia conference with papers and commentaries circulated in advance defining diplomacy, discussing whether it could and should be taught as part of a liberal arts education, reviewing the material available for instruction, including that being made available by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, and discussing what more was needed. I gave the lead-off paper on the nature and dynamics of diplomacy. To continue fertilizing the thinking of the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute, particularly along the line I was pushing, to include instruction in diplomacy for incoming Foreign Service officers. I had Stephen Low, the FSI director, invited to comment on my paper. His comment was so unenthusiastic it prompted off the record comment by other participants.
To stimulate alumni interest in diplomacy and that of the University in offering instruction in it, the conference was reported in an extensive article in the University's Alumni News. Professor Michael Prosser at the University’s Rhetoric Department, who had been holding an annual World Affairs Day at the University for high school students, asked if I would fund one of them. As this would provide an opportunity to test my thinking about high school instruction in diplomacy, I agreed to do so if it were devoted to diplomacy. This proposal Professor Prosser accepted with enthusiasm. With some trepidation, I gave the lead-off talk, explaining what diplomacy is in simple, personal terms by reciting some of my experiences as a Foreign Service officer. To my astonishment, having concluded my talk and resumed my seat on the platform, I had to vise to acknowledge the somewhat vociferous response. Speaking to me later, one high school teacher said, “Your talk made my day.” This was some evidence that diplomacy could indeed be successfully introduced in high school curriculum. After my talk, the students were distributed to four workshops for a question and answer discussion led by four Foreign Service officers I had recruited for the purpose.

In 1980, at the urging of a publisher, who wanted to capitalize on the presidential campaign, I assembled a collection of my writings for a book I called The Crisis in American Diplomacy. This has been used as a textbook in university courses and has appeared on the reading lists of other courses on international relations. In 1986, to keep the concept and importance of diplomacy circulating at the University of Virginia as well as to dignify student debate and provide students an opportunity to think and research on their own and gain experience in the articulation of their views (important in a democracy) I sparked an annual debate on diplomacy between the two student debating societies and established a modest fund whose income is used to defray its expenses. To dignify the debate, a commentator at the end analyzes the issues debated and any overlooked. This is generally a faculty member, but sometimes an outsider is invited, such as William Colby, former CIA director, when the debate was on the diplomatic problems caused by the CIA. A dinner is given the evening of the debate for the commentator, and the student
organizing committee, thereby taking advantage of an occasion to bring students and faculty together. The debate is held in the dome room of Jefferson's Rotunda, the most distinguished locale of the university, to an overflowing audience. The prizes are each year dedicated to an outstanding diplomat beginning with Demosthenes, Geoffrey Chaucer, and of course Thomas Jefferson. The dedication appears in a printed program to enhance its educational value. For these various reasons, the debate has been from the start enthusiastically welcomed by both students and faculty, being described by one faculty member as “the most interesting event on the grounds.”

In 1986, I authored “Perspectives on the Study of Diplomacy,” an occasional paper published by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, on whose board of directors I was serving. In 1987, the following year, I authored Education in Diplomacy: an Instructional Guide, an Institute book presenting seven courses being taught, as in the case of mine at Georgetown having been taught, with a selected bibliography and an introduction by Dean Krogh beginning “The author of this monograph, Smith Simpson, is the original and indefatigable advocate of teaching diplomacy. This volume distills the rationale for his advocacy and offers a practical guide for getting on with the task... Students need and want to know about how the world's work is done... They want to know because they like to have it told as it is. Teaching diplomacy does this dual job.” After Dean Krogh's foreword, my introductory chapter defines diplomacy, distinguishes diplomacy and foreign policy, but analyzes the contributions diplomats make to the foreign policy of their own and their host governments, what diplomats do, and the urgent need of amplifying the resources of diplomacy. The book appears in the reading lists of university courses on diplomacy and the State Department's list of recommended reading for candidates for admission to the Foreign Service.In 1992, as a result of the 1983 conference, the annual student debate on diplomacy, and a bequest of a former Foreign Service officer graduate of the university, Hugh S. Cummings, Jr., and his wife, for a chair in international relations, led to the introduction of political science instruction in diplomacy at the University of Virginia, with David Newsom, a retired Foreign Service officer, three time ambassador,
former Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Secretary of State Ad Interim, and retired director of the Georgetown Institute, being appointed to fill the chair to teach diplomacy under a five-year contract. Due to a year's absence, when he served as interim dean of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, his five years ended in May of 1998. Newsom's successor, Marshall Bremen, is a retired Foreign Service officer who continues the innovation. I might add that, stimulated by the Georgetown Institute and its publications, the University of Leicester (the UK) has created a Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, which has become the nucleus of a worldwide network promoting research in all aspects of diplomacy. It has institutional links with 16 groups around the world and has won the recognition of diplomacy as a separate subject for research and discussion in the British and American International Studies Association and the International Relations Standing Group of the European Consortium for Political Research. The Leicester CSD has also launched an Internet home page. Would that our Pioneering Institute were as dynamic!

To place this campaign for instruction in diplomacy in historical perspective, it is the third stage in the attention our educational system has paid to the development of an international community, the first being the introduction of courses on international law, spearheaded by John Bassett Moore, who became a judge of the World Court. The second was the introduction of courses in international relations at the end of WWI simulated by textbooks produced by Raymond Leslie Buel of Harvard, Frederick L. Schuman of Chicago and Williams, and Hands Morgenthau of Chicago. The third stage is represented by courses on diplomacy and a rapidly increasing number of books on diplomacy after WWII. Yet to be accomplished, among which one has to look to future generations to accomplish, is the introduction of courses on diplomacy in high school and grade school and the establishment at the University of Virginia of a Thomas Jefferson Center for the Study of Diplomacy.

Q: This concludes the interview of R. Smith Simpson, held on Jun18, 2001.
End of interview