

Interview with John H. Stutesman

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

JOHN H. STUTESMAN

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Q: Ok. Why don't we begin by talking about your entry into the foreign service and then to Shanghai. Was that one of your early assignments?

STUTESMAN: Well, my name is John Hale Stutesman. I was born in 1920 in Washington, D.C. and was educated in various schools and then Princeton, and graduated right into the war. I was an Army officer, fighting with an infantry division in Europe. In the summer of '45, the [State Department] written exam was offered to service men, and women, and to a few people who had been staff officers in the embassies. And I took a two-day leave, took the written exam and passed it and then . . . we were being prepared to go to Japan to fight and fortunately Hiroshima occurred—and as far as I am concerned, Hiroshima means “Life” to me—and so I came home around December of '45, took the written exam in the spring of '46 in Washington, passed, and was asked if I had any preferences. I said that I would like to go to Asia; that I had lived in Europe as a child, I had fought in Europe, and I wondered if they had something in Asia. They said yes, so I was sent to Shanghai as a vice-consul, arriving there in the fall of '46.

Q: Ok. Good. So that was your first foreign service post. That was Norman Hannah's first post, I think.

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STUTESMAN: That's right. Norman Hannah came in after me. There were several of us—speaking of people who are still alive, there was a man named Coblentz Swank, Emory C. Swank and I were on the boat together going to Shanghai and roomed together for the next several years. He is still alive and lives in Cleveland.

Q: Did you live in Hamilton House?

STUTESMAN: We had the apartment—there was a big apartment—in the office building. On the 7th floor? 6th floor? But it had three bedrooms, and of course living quarters, I mean living space—dining room, so on. Usually there were six bachelors there, some of whom were in transit to other places. But Swank, Rutherford, a man named Gebhart, myself, a man named Stokes who went up to Mukden, oh, and a couple of Public Health officers, who were there to screen visa applicants. Coast Guard? No, Public Health, I guess. They were in uniform. And we had a staff. Here I was, (laughs) a bachelor, and had staff of a cook, a cook's helper and an amah to do the laundry and a number one boy. We lived very pleasantly.

Q: What duties did you have initially?

STUTESMAN: There were four of us who arrived together, a man named —[can't remember the name] well, any way, four of us who arrived together—Swank, Stutesman, Stein-berger? Stein-something, and we were all lined up in front of the deputy. The consul general was a man named Monnett Davis. His deputy was a man named Pilcher, whose wife called him “Jaybird” so that was a permissible nickname. Those men had all been in China before the war. Pilcher said “Well, we've got lots of jobs,” and he said “Has anybody here been in commercial affairs? Done any business?” and one of the man, Swank, said that he'd helped his father in the business in the summer and so he was assigned to the economic section. And “Anybody been interested in farming?” and one of the men said yes, he had done summers and so he was sent to the agricultural section and the remaining two, Stutesman and the other guy, we were sent to the visa section. So I did

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visas for—what—most of the time, and then I was in charge of the visa section, finally. A man named Hungerford Howard was in charge when I went there first and then I took it over, and then I was shifted to the protection of Americans and that's what I was doing during the evacuation.

Q: What did protection work entail prior to evacuation?

STUTESMAN: Protection work basically is to watch out for Americans with legal problems. Obviously, we could not represent them. But you had to be there if they were on trial. You had to make sure that they were not being mistreated in prisons. It did not include, say, commercial problems. Those were dealt with by the commercial section. So if some American had a business problem, that wouldn't come to me. But it would come to me—uh, come to my section—there was just me and a Chinese lawyer on the staff. And then there was the welfare. . . . So, as I say, on the business matters, if say, in some district of China, they confiscated an American's stuff, that he was trying to sell, or something, then that would come to me rather than to the business people. I followed a man, a redheaded fellow— he was transferred.

For instance, there was an American male who had been a Marine. He took his discharge in China and he became a civilian in China. And he took a taxi drive, he had a girl with him, and left the money—his story was that he left the money on the front seat when he got out. In any case, the Chinese driver followed him and wanted his money and this big Marine, who was a little drunk, I guess, just backhanded him, which knocked him in the gutter and he hit his head and he died. The Chinese arrested him and he was taken to jail and we made sure that he had a lawyer and I went down and, indeed, they gave him life. Well, life in a Chinese JAIL was pretty difficult and as the Communists approached, I personally arranged with the navy to be prepared to take him. We had an arrangement. He was given sort of “Thursday nights out.” He and the Chinese jailer would go out to a restaurant and a whorehouse and then they would come back. And uh, so this particular

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Thursday, he just kept right on going right on through the place and was picked up and put on board a Navy ship and gotten out. I never had the slightest regret doing that.

The only other similar occasion was an American business man was being threatened with a jail sentence because he—and he probably had—been cheating some Chinese business people and so I helped him escape, got him on a Navy ship and got him out, at which point a woman officer, well, it doesn't matter that she was a woman, but an officer in the commercial section, filed a formal complaint, put it in my record, that I had conspired to help an American thief and they all rushed around, assured me that it wouldn't affect me; I didn't give a damn. I knew that I was doing the right thing getting the man out before the Communists kept him. But those were the kinds of things I was involved with, before the—that was my life involvement before the evacuation.

There was a splendid man who was there from the American Association—older man, whose name I don't remember, he'd been there many, many years; had been in the camps. And he was the one who was in touch with the widows, the pensioners, and the welfare cases, and the American community Association supplied the money for those welfare people. And, of course, the pensions came from the military pensions.

Q: Do you think that he might have been a minister?

STUTESMAN: No, he wasn't. He . . . had been a local guy. He may himself have been a military pensioner, I'm not sure. Very nice man. . . . But he was in this—he wasn't on the staff of the consulate—but he was—we provided him space and he was a paid employee of the American Association, or the American Protective Association, or whatever it was.

Q: The American Association comes across as the most important private association among the community for that kind of interest. They did some charity work; they did participate in the evacuation planning—but I'm still trying to get a feel for how it was organized, and what the membership was.

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STUTESMAN: I don't know, I really don't. The American community, obviously, was dominated, and rightly so, by the business people. I expect that there were dues levied on the American businesses, as well as individuals. But I don't know.

Q: Talk for a minute about the working atmosphere in the consulate; the relationships among people you would have worked under—two consuls general—Davis, and then Cabot—and, I talked to a fellow named Sandy Peaslee...

STUTESMAN: Peaslee! ...He went to the agricultural section. [Note by WILKINSON—Alexander “Sandy” Peaslee was the fourth of the group who started at the same time as Stutesman and was standing with the others in front of Pilcher's desk.]

Q: ...And he [Peaslee] has written a little private memoir and he describes going to dinner in tails, very early in the time there and it sounded like it was a formal consular function. Did that happen while you were there?

STUTESMAN: Well, I owned a set of tails. Tails are the uniform of the American diplomatic service. We have no gold braid; no hats; and so tails with a black vest is the uniform . . . Well, I mean that's what you wear at an Embassy when the Ambassador presents his credentials. So I took tails, as my uniform. Tuxedo, of course, summer and winter.

But, to get to the heart of the question, there were indeed, while I was there, '46 to '49, there were the two consuls general, one was Monnett Davis—old style, lovely wife, very well connected in the American community, and knew a great deal about China. I don't remember—of course, and I was one of the junior officers—I don't remember ever being invited to any formal affair at the Davis home—at the residence. Obviously, you have the Fourth of July, and things like that. Then Jack Cabot arrived, with his marvelous wife, and by that time, I was a little more senior, I had a little more direct access to Cabot. Also, the crisis brought the officers, naturally, more closely together. And then, toward the end, I would say, the last five months, four months that I was there, the women, most, many of

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the women had been sent off. And the bachelors, well, the bachelors had gone various ways, they had either moved out and so he asked me if I would like to move in with him. And so I did. I moved in to the residence with him and I lived with him, I guess, three or four months, you would have to check when the women left.

Q: They left in December '48.

STUTESMAN: Really?!

Q: Well, it may actually have been January by the time they got out. You were talking about it [in December.]

STUTESMAN: Swank had gone up to Tsingtao, or Tientsin, Tsingtao? and married—married a girl from the office—Rutherford? Rutherford? Where was he—he had moved out, I think. The Public . . . Health people had gone. Anyway, I moved in with Cabot. So, my relationships with him as consul general were much more intimate. And I attended parties there.

I wore my tails, however, to parties. I joined the French Club, . . . I didn't join the American Club, for two reasons. One of which, I am very pleased to put on record. One reason—a personal reason—was I had more fun with French people and their group, and English, then I did with the Americans. The Americans of my age tended to be married, with children, and not at all dull, but their idea of a party was not my idea of a party. The other reason, and the more important reason, was a question of principle. I was personally aghast that the American Club—the Country Club—would not only not accept membership of people who were of color, but would not even allow—I know this for a fact—did not even allow an Oriental in an American Army uniform to eat at the club. I found that disgusting. And so I never went near the damn place. Well, in the beginning I did. But, of course, it was easier for me to be of principle, than, say a man with a wife and a couple of babies, who needed a place where his wife could be in the sun and the children could be happy . . . So—the parties I went to occasionally were white tie. I looked good in a white

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tie.(laughs) And I had a lot of very very, very handsome women friends. . . . But anyone who thinks of Shanghai as a formal life is very mistaken. It was. . . it was like Rome in the last years before the barbarians came over the walls. I mean it was a completely open society. There were only two things that counted. One was money. And the other was charm. And I had no money, but I had lots of charm. And so I moved up and down the whole scale of Shanghai society—excluding the Chinese. That's—that was beyond me. I did not speak Chinese, nor was I engaged with them in a professional sense.

Q: Would you say that you and other consular officers, young men like yourself, were even particularly interested in the political conflict in China, or were you pretty well insulated into that western world?

STUTESMAN: Well, of course we were interested. And I was interested in China. If the Communists had not taken over, and driven us out, I perhaps would have become a Chinese language officer. I traveled a great deal in China. With Swank, for instance, we went up to Peking and spent some time there and then, with a French officer—a man who is still alive and I am still in touch with him—he and I formed a Franco-American expedition to Central Asia and we set off to discover the tomb of Genghis Khan, which we did. And we went all the way up to the Kokonor, which is way, way out. And we had calling cards printed with the “Franco-American Expedition.” (laughs) And so I got on fine with the Chinese on those occasions. But in Shanghai, the Chinese upper class, most of them spoke English, their doors were closed to junior officers in the American Embassy, and the American community.

Q: Let's go to that time, late 48, early 49. The crisis started to become more intense as Communist armies achieved more victories, first in Manchuria, and then moving very quickly down toward Beijing and the Yangtze River. I think it's interesting that you were living with Cabot. Can you tell me what his frame of mind was at that stage of the game?

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STUTESMAN: Sure. Jack Cabot was as New England as his name. A man of great principle; great courage. He was thoughtful about what was going on. But, I think—now this is an impression—I think that the Embassy, as most embassies, do, treated the views of consulates as not that interesting; not that important. That doesn't mean that they didn't consider him a proper judge of affairs, but I think on the whole the Embassy and its lines into Washington ran without much regard for what was being sent in from Canton and Tsingtao and Shanghai. Therefore, I would say that his concerns ran toward the community in Shanghai, more than whether or not the Communists would take over China, or what we would do vis a vis the Communists. I may be misrepresenting his views. I don't mean to.

I remember, speaking of him personally, I remember him talking to me about his experience in Argentina. He was there, I think he was Charg# in Argentina when Peron came, or when Peron was there. And Cabot took a dramatically different point of view on how to treat Peron from the attitude of the department. The department and the people handling these matters basically wanted to get on with Peron. And Cabot felt that was wrong. And, in fact, submitted his resignation, if he were to be kept on there, to carry on a policy that he disagreed with. An act of principle. But, as he said to me, it's a lot easier to take that action if you have considerable private means to support you. And I always remembered that. Then, he was allowed to leave, but he was kept in the service—I think he came straight to Shanghai from there? That would be about right . . .

Q: He was in Yugoslavia before Shanghai.

STUTESMAN: Was he? He was Ambassador to Yugoslavia, wasn't he?

Q: Well, no, he may have been a Charg#.

STUTESMAN: So he came to Shanghai from Yugoslavia?

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Q: Yeah. . . . My impression was always that one of the reasons he went to Shanghai was that somebody in the department thought that he understood how to work with Communists, as though there was just one generic way to do that.

STUTESMAN: Well, yes. and I think also there was, gradually there, there was an effort to get people into China who had not spent the bulk of their lives and careers in China. I think. Anyhow, I think he was a very good choice and a very good man. So was Davis. Both of them, I thought were excellent chiefs.

And, coming back to, perhaps an implication in one of your comments, I thought the consulate was well run with good morale; good relationships. I don't remember problems . . . you know, of turf, and that sort of thing. There may have been, but the people who were . . . Paul Meyer was in charge of consular affairs, and Briggs Howard . . . they were not struggling with other officers over who was to do this or that. There was, as I indicated, this one officer in the commercial section who tried to scalp me, but , I'm sure she had an honest feeling. It wasn't that she didn't like me, she just didn't think that I had done the right thing.

Q: There was a very prominent case, probably just a little bit before the time when you got there, of a coolie being killed by an American. A merchant marine, I think, and there was quite a hubbub in the Chinese press about it. And I can't tell if you are talking about the same case or a different case, but I think you are talking about a different case.

STUTESMAN: My guy probably did this in late '48 or early '49, when I was in the protection section. Because I was involved in observing his trial. I didn't understand it, of course, because it was all in Chinese, naturally. But, he was properly informed and he was told that he got a life sentence. I remember his look. But, anyhow, that was certainly later. And there was certainly some Chinese press, but not much. Well, after all he got life.

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Q: Yeah. So they would have been fairly happy. . . . See, this earlier case that I had in mind was handled exclusively by the U.S. Navy. And so there was a lot more Chinese resentment to that case because they felt like they had bypassed due process.

STUTESMAN: No, this man was a civilian.

Q: December '48, or actually, November '48, the first warnings went out from the consulate to the American community, that the situation was unstable and Americans should consider whether or not they should stay. As far as I can tell, the consulate walked a very fine line between encouraging people to leave and trying to keep some American presence in Shanghai.

STUTESMAN: I think that's right.

Q: Was there open discussion about the concern to keep some American interest there?

STUTESMAN: Well, I don't know. What I do know is that there were very strong voices—experienced voices—who believed that the Communist takeover would simply be another Chinese regime. And, after all, we had gotten along with them in various stages. There was a man, was it Billy Christian, in the . . . British-American Tobacco Company? There was another man, . . . any way, somebody who had been there for years, very senior in the business community, not a head of a corporation, but important. And I remember him talking about, “Oh, you know, the Chinese are Chinese, and essentially they're business oriented and have a strong practical sense and the ideology of communism is not going to cause them to drive us out. A very good friend in the French community, his father had been a businessman there, he had been raised there, he was managing apartment buildings and had a hand in the tramway, I think, in the French [Concession]—What was his [name]? “Fano” F-A-N-O, Jacques? Pierre Fano. He was like a lot of the French. He was leftist inclined. And, as, to some extent, a consequence of the war; to some extent as a consequence of his French education, but, he was absolutely convinced that, not only could he get on with the Chinese Communists, he thought they would be rather grateful

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to him for his attitudes. He was not in any sense anti-Chiang Kai-shek actively. At least, I don't think he was. But he thought he could get on. Well, of course, what they did was they caused him a great deal of grief; damn near killed him, and finally let him get out, but stripped him. I have no idea what happened to that businessman I was speaking about—I don't think it was Christian.—So there were these strong voices, the experienced men, all through the community, and then, as I wrote you, then you got from the American government as a representative—Admiral Badger and others—you got this strong, clear statement, “Just take it easy fellows. We'll be here. We'll organize things so there will be some sort of emergency protection. But you don't have to worry. Nobody's going to be mean to you guys.” So you have both of those factors: the experienced local businessmen—Americans—and outside the American Fleet, the . . . conquerors of the Japanese Fleet, you know, powerful and, that was pretty strong.

Now if you are asking me if there was a strong pressure to beware of the Communists, I would say, probably not.

Q: No!? hmm. Well, Badger [Admiral Oscar C. Badger, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Western Pacific] in mid-December, is very bellicose. He says that, well, to boil it down, he says that he is ready to land the Marines and protect the Americans. I would think that would be kind of disturbing to the consulate because of the possibility that it would cause more unrest among the Chinese and make the Americans more imperiled, rather than less. But maybe I'm reading it wrong.

STUTESMAN: Well, I don't know. I was, I was in, well, I don't want to say I was in charge of it, but I was the officer to work with the Navy on developing the emergency plans. And oh, we had maps laid out, we had various vehicles. It wasn't necessarily armed Marines riding around, it was the American community to be able to come into a certain locations and to be protected. But there was a clear understanding that there would be American military might to get us out. But essentially, it was to get us on to ships; to hold us—to hold us in the stream until the Chinese stopped shooting at each other . . .

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Q: *Yeah. Much more of a sense that it would be Americans caught in the crossfire, rather than being the targets of any hostile action.* STUTESMAN: *That's all. And there was no particular intention . . . The main thing was, in terms of the consulate, to identify Americans, to make sure there were ways to pick them up, to have them come to central locations, and then, to get them down [to] certain areas and avenues and on board ships if necessary. But clearly, [they thought] we'd be back on shore in two or three days.*

Q: *At least, that was the way you hoped it would work.*

STUTESMAN: *Yeah, well, I mean that was sort of the underlying principle. And that's—certainly as far as I ever got involved in the thing, we did not plan, until much later, we did not plan the evacuation. We planned for the movement of people to get them out of the crossfire.*

Q: *And that seems like a good representation of the opinion among the consular, and, in fact, the diplomatic—well, at the highest levels of the State Department—Butterworth, and Lovett, I think, were trying to encourage Cabot, well, I'll put it differently, to discourage Cabot from being too emotional . . .*

STUTESMAN: . . . Nervous.

Q: *Too nervous. And as Cabot was reporting the numbers of American departures, . . . monthly telegrams or weekly telegrams—and by the time the Communists came in, I think that the telegram reads something like “975 Americans now stranded in Shanghai.” I think that he viewed the situation more seriously than Lovett or Butterworth.*

STUTESMAN: *Probably. I wouldn't be surprised. . . . Of course, all consulates in China, and, well, in most places where the American messianic impulse is to send missionaries to “convert the pagans,” or the local people. Missionaries have a bad reputation with most consulates because they refuse to move until after they are in real danger. And then they holler. And then it becomes quite dangerous. But, in general, they don't foresee the*

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problem. They disregard what the government tells them, but then they holler for help. And that was a bit of a problem. I didn't have to go out myself to bring anybody in, and I don't remember any officer going out from the consulate. But it gave us a lot of concern sometimes, because they would wait until the last minute and then they'd come. This was true in the Middle East also. Wherever the American goes to bring God to the local people—usually converting a Baptist to a Catholic, rather than anything else, but still . . .

Q: Do you think that was only the missionary community? There were a lot of American businessmen who sought explicit assurances from the consulate that they would be protected.

STUTESMAN: Yeah, but the businessmen were not way out in the boondocks.

Q: True.

STUTESMAN: It's . . . the missionaries, and the educators, who were way out in difficult places, uh, deliberately—that's where they wanted to go and live and work, and those are the babies who are very hard to get at. Because once the roads become dangerous or the railroads stopped, then they're really out of touch. As far as I know—you'd know—but as far as I know, in those months—early '49—no missionaries were killed. I don't think so.

Q: Not in that area. . . . Some missionaries were killed up in Shandong, and, I think a couple in Manchuria. . . .

Walter McConaughy participated, I think, in some of the evacuation work. Is that right?

STUTESMAN: Walter was in charge of consular affairs. He was my boss. Walter came out, he replaced Paul Meyer—I couldn't tell you when—but he came out as a single man. They took his wife off the boat here in San Francisco when she was about to get on board. So he must have come out in the fall of '48 or something like that.

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And he was a fine officer. He pretty much, as I remember, he pretty much gave me my head on these subjects. I kept him informed, of course, and worked with him in terms of whatever the objectives might be, but I don't remember him giving me much tight management, but, you are quite right, he was the next level up. He was the responsible officer, and then above him was Cabot. Who was Cabot's deputy? Gosh, Pilcher had gone.

Q: Reuben Thomas is in there somewhere.

STUTESMAN: No, he was administrative officer, I think. . . . Linthicum? Linthicum was there wasn't he?

Q: Yes. Uh, a couple of specific episodes in the spring—I was intrigued that you ran a kind of a dry-run for the evacuation.

STUTESMAN: Yeah, I don't remember.

Q: Let's see. You met with the American Association on the 20th of December, '48, and kind of laid things out for them, and one of the missionaries wanted to know if you had jeeps and sirens to help people get to the evacuation points—and I see the sense of all those things, but again I wonder if they didn't think that would make the Chinese madder than they might have been anyway.

STUTESMAN: Well, . . . I think the basic American attitude—the attitude of the Americans who were there—and had been there, was that the Chinese were not very important, somehow; that we were Americans. . . I remember taking a girl home—a white girl, of course (I say “of course” because I really didn't run with the Chinese community) but, we were in a rickshaw and by then it was spring of '49, . . . it was in the evening, and two Chinese boys on bicycles came up along the rickshaw and began to taunt and so on. And I stood up and took off my coat and used it as a weapon, and swung it at them and they sort of drifted off. And I remember both of us were startled. The girl and I, because it was,

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quote: “un-Chinese.” . . . If you were a white person, unless you did something very stupid, or you were drunk in the gutter, you were not going to be assaulted by a Chinese. You might be assaulted by a white person, but you wouldn't be assaulted by a Chinese. At least that was the way we felt. . .

I remember . . . we had elevator operators in the office building. And one of them, again toward the end—in the last weeks there—he offended one of the American girls by showing her a pornographic photograph and, you know, that sort of thing. That would be unthought of in the classic sense of the relationship of the white person to the Oriental. And, as I told you, the American Club wouldn't even let an Oriental in an American Army uniform eat there, for God's sake. And we were no where near the imperialists the British were. The French, of course, married them and lived with them and moved with them. But the British didn't, of course, and we didn't.

Q: Very rarely. Uh, You ran a practice assembly and this, I think, was on the 19th of April. But the thing that I was kind of interested in were a couple of the names of people who helped out. You had some American volunteers, I guess you would call them. Men from the business community, and one of them—two of them in fact—are fellows who stayed in Shanghai and had trouble later on. Dil Kanady, Dilmus Kanady—Do you remember him very well? He is a particular interest of mine maybe because I lived in Texas for a long time and he came from Houston and I talked to his widow...

STUTESMAN: Did he die in prison or did they get him out?

Q: No [that is, he didn't die in prison].

STUTESMAN: But he was crazy when they got him out, or something like that.

Q: When they let him out, on the plane ride back, he refused to get out of the plane when they landed, someplace like Okinawa. Said he wasn't getting out until they got back to

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the United States. I think he settled down after he got back, but it was obviously a tough experience.

Can you tell me much about what he was like in Shanghai?

STUTESMAN: Well, I believe personally that he was a CIA operator. I didn't—at the time—I didn't pay much attention, but I thought he probably was a government employee, rather than a bona fide businessman.

One of the things I noticed . . . this is probably still true, [but] I am just guessing . . . [of] Americans and English, as a classic difference, when they are abroad: In an English community, if there is some perception that a man is an agent for the British secret service, the British community will close ranks and protect him. I'm speaking in general terms. In an American community, if there is a perception that a man is working for the CIA, immediately there will be jokes about spooks and spies and "Where's your cloak," and . . . an active effort to expose him. It has something to do with the basic American distrust of government, and the British basic belief in government. But it's damn dangerous for the American intelligence operator.

And I don't think there was any probability that Kanady could succeed if they left him—they should never have left him, I don't think—and then the Chinese nailed him within weeks, didn't they?

Q: It's a little longer than that. Close to a year . . . the spring of '50.

STUTESMAN: Before they put him in jail? They let him stay that long?

Q: Uh huh. Now, he had a friend, or at least an acquaintance, who pretty clearly was CIA, and that's a man named Hugh Redman. And Redman did die in jail.

STUTESMAN: In Shanghai?

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Q: Right. Well, I shouldn't say "in Shanghai." I don't know if they had moved him. But he was picked up in Shanghai and the story was that he and Kanady were planning an escape together. But I can't find anything to show Kanady as a CIA agent. But maybe you can help me with this. I don't know. I get the impression that the CIA, or whatever they called their office in Shanghai at that time, did attempt to recruit a couple of people, pretty close to the end, to insure that they did have some agents who stayed behind.

STUTESMAN: Oh yeah? In the business community, do you mean?

Q: Business or missionary. . . .

STUTESMAN: I have no idea. When I got there in '46, it was before the CIA got going and what we had then were the military attach#s, naval and army, . . . and then, of course, the Embassy people, and then, sort of miscellaneous OSS alumni around, many of whom I knew very well personally. And I honestly don't know whether a CIA office was set up in Shanghai—I'm sure it was—I'm not trying to conceal anything, but I honestly don't know who it was or where. . . .

Q: OK. So you thought that Kanady—this is hard now—Can you separate what you thought in 1949 about Kanady, from what you think today. Do you think you thought at that time that he was plant?

STUTESMAN: Oh, you mean when I was there? Yeah I thought he was probably uh, a government employee, was the word I used—to you—but, yeah, I didn't think he was really a bona fide business man. I couldn't tell you why. . . . We didn't play together very much. Obviously we were at parties occasionally, but he was no pal. And Redman, I don't remember at all. Oh, Redman . . . Who were the guys who were dropped out of an airplane in Manchuria? . . .

Q: Well, Redman was in Manchuria, with a detachment called ESD-44—External Survey Detachment—and then he left Manchuria at some point and went down to Shanghai,

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married a white Russian, and, according to one story, was looking for a way to stay in Shanghai and so offered his services to the CIA.

STUTESMAN: Bill Orchard stayed in Shanghai.

Q: That's the other name I was going to ask you about.

STUTESMAN: But he—I don't think he was a government employee—maybe that means he was a very good government employee—but Bill stayed on, I think rather reluctantly, but he stayed on, and he married a local girl . . .

Q: Married a French woman.

STUTESMAN: Oh was she? Or Chinese?

Q: French. There were some others who married Chinese, but he married a French woman. . . .

STUTESMAN: But I remember Bill. And I did party with Bill. A good man; a nice man.

Q: A banker? Or American Express Company?

STUTESMAN: American Express Company, as I remember.

Q: He wrote an article after he came out called "We Watched Democracy Die" in the Saturday Evening Post. . . . He was one of those jailed . . . I shouldn't say jailed. House arrest. . . . Basically, because the Chinese wanted full control of all the assets of his company, and his company wouldn't give them up and the State Department . . .

STUTESMAN: Yeah, and that's what happened with Fano and some of the others. Yeah and they made them pay back wages and that sort of stuff.

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Q: Do you remember Paul Hoffman coming to visit in December of '48? He was in charge of the . . . Economic Cooperation Administration. And he said that they ought to continue to provide aid to the people of China regardless of the regime. And that caused a lot of trouble.

Badger made his statements offering to protect Americans. But regardless of that, most of the Americans who were there did leave between December '48 and September '49.

STUTESMAN: Well, of course, the women and children were pretty strongly sent off. I don't know when, but, Cabot sent his own wife away. . . . Every now and then, you know, some head government man, like an Ambassador, will say "all the other women and children will leave, but my wife can stay because, after all, you know, she's my wife." Well, he didn't. She left. And, I bet she left reluctantly. Marvelous woman. Then, of course, you began to have real evidence that the Communists were perhaps a different crowd. And then, when did they shoot up the English ship in the Yangtze?

Q: That's in mid-April.

STUTESMAN: Was it? Well then, of course, the US Navy—Badger stopped talking big—I doubt very much if he even came ashore after that, but any how, the Navy clearly wasn't going to stay and fight the Chinese nation. And at that point, Americans began to take off. I mean, it wasn't the US Government telling them to go. It was pretty obvious. I'm sure still there was a strong sentiment among those like Fano, and others, that "That's all right. We'll stay." but they had assets there; they had reasons to stay; . . . maybe they were persuading themselves. Maybe they were not quite as bold as they thought. But, then we began to get this flood of people and that's when I was very active. I had a Navy liaison officer who was sitting with me, and we were filling up ships. Americans were coming in. They would show they were Americans and—of course, I'm so full of odd memories—

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An elderly woman—she was a missionary, but an educator. She came in. She had her cat. She didn't want to leave without her cat. And the Navy's basic attitude was "You can't come on board our ship with a cat!" And I got on the phone and I worked and I worked and by God I got her on a boat—with her cat! And in the fall of that year, '49, when I was on my way to Tehran, my next post, my wife and I—I got married—were in Damascus, in a hotel. Got in an elevator and an elderly woman . . . got in the elevator. And as we rode up, she looked at me and she said, "You're Consul Stutesman!" and I said "Yes," and she said, "You saved . . . Jack!" (or whatever his name was) I thought, "That's wonderful. Who's Jack?" Well Jack was her cat!—A minor story, but a pleasant one.

And we got the lifer out of jail; we got the businessman on the run and we poured people on board those ships. And when I left, of course, the ships had stopped. But there were not that many people standing in line when the last ships left. We had done a good job.

Q: The community goes from about 4,000 people in September-October down to about a thousand by the time the Communists come in. So, yes, I think that the people who wanted to go, got out.

STUTESMAN: And there was an absolute minimum of red tape. And I take great pride in that, because, we just cut it with the Navy. and the Navy deserves commendation. I mean, I may be a little slurring when I talk about Badger's big talk, but when it came down to the business of getting us out, they did a first class job.

Q: Now, this is pretty minor, but, Badger did talk big at first. And then, probably with good reasoning, as soon as the Amethyst got shelled, he got out of Shanghai immediately. But, did people tend to talk about him and make jokes about that?

STUTESMAN: Well, you know, most of the young men had been in the war. I had been in uniform for four years. I had killed my German. And they had done some damage to me. And, all the Britishers had either been in jail there, or the concentration camps [that

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is, the Japanese-run internment camps of foreigners around Shanghai during the war] and in some cases had survived the goddamn railroad down in Thailand, and others had been in the war in various ways. So, what you had was a group of young men in positions of responsibility all through the community—in the consulates and [so forth]. All of them had gone through a war. Well, a war—if you survive it—has a lasting effect. . . First of all it steals you so you can stand up to a good deal of stress. But also it makes you rather sardonic about senior officers. So the fact that Badger made a fool of himself was not surprising to all the young officers—all the young men who had been in the war; who had seen that happen time after time. Now it doesn't mean that he wasn't a fine admiral and that he . . . doesn't deserve his stars, or whatever . . . his decorations. But its a long way, I'm sorry to say, of my saying to you that, sure, we all sort of laughed about it. But then we were on our own, and that's it. . . . And the women and children were gone. You didn't have hysterical mothers and “What's going to happen to my little girl?” They were out.

Q: Now, when you say the women and children were gone, are you speaking of the community in general? Or just of the dependants?

STUTESMAN: Well, mostly of the dependants. There were some secretaries [who] stayed. Do you go to the movies? Do you know a perfectly beautiful woman named Turner? Whose been in some very fine movies. I can't think of her first name now.

Q: Oh. Kathleen Turner.

STUTESMAN: Well, she is the daughter of a man named Dick Turner, who was a vice-consul and who married a lovely American secretary. And they stayed on. They stayed on for a while in Shanghai. In fact they may have married [there.] They married just before that. I'm pretty sure they were there when the Communists came in. Kathleen's their daughter. . . . He's dead. Her mother's alive, somewhere. I don't know where.

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Q: If you think about the American community, who would say were the prominent opinion makers?

STUTESMAN: You mean in the business community? Well don't forget, there were two separate—significantly separate—groups. One was the missionary-educational group and one was the business group. I don't mean they didn't mingle at the top. They had some relationships. But basically, they were separate. And then you had that group—diminished of course—but you had the adventurer Americans. The pilots for CAT and CNAC; the Princess Sumair crowd, the sailors ashore, I mean, who had left their ships; the guys who thought they could make a fast buck in Shanghai, and so on. So you had levels, obviously, and groups, but the two major groups: the educational people and the business people.

It seems to me that Cabot—you'd have to check the records—but, it seems to me that Cabot had two great meetings of the American community leaderships at his residence and deliberately invited into one session the business people and into another session the missionary educational people. You'd have to check me on that, but that's a faint memory of mine. I know he had two meetings; two separate meetings. So, each of those groups . . . had spokesmen. and I would say that the business community leadership—certainly when I first got there in '46—was still the men who had been the leaders in the camps, and who didn't go home, or maybe went home but came right back. And I honestly forget their names. Nor did they have much to do with me. I was a vice-consul dealing with visas. The educational people, it seems to me, a lot of them were the missionaries—what was it— St. John's University . . . were sort of the tops of the universities and the senior clerics in the Protestant, mostly Protestant—well, I don't remember the Roman Catholics being much involved. They obviously were, but they probably got their orders from somebody else!

Q: Yeah. It looks that way. It looks like the Maryknolls and the Jesuits had much less freedom to make any decisions.

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STUTESMAN: Yeah. I don't remember them being much involved very actively.

Q: The principal American publications would have been the Shanghai Evening Post and the China Weekly Review, run by Bill Powell.

STUTESMAN: Yeah, well, of course, he [Powell] was one of the Americans who was very hopeful, if not expectant that he could get on just fine with them [that is, the Chinese Communists] and they'd love him for all of his previous attitudes. He ended up here didn't he?

Q: Yes, he lives in San Francisco. . . . In fact, I interviewed him about five years ago. . . . Uh, Randall Gould is the other guy [editor of the Shanghai Evening Post] and he strikes me as sort of the mainstream editor. The man who's more in touch with business views.

STUTESMAN: You haven't asked me, and I'd like to tell you about the big Jewish community in Shanghai. As a visa officer, the main effort of our program was to—this was not government policy, but it was a fact—was to provide immigrant visas to the Jewish community in Shanghai. And that community was formed from the fact that . . . you did not have to have a visa to go to Shanghai. If you got to Shanghai, you could stay there. . . . You didn't have to have a valid passport. You could just be there. It was an international community and all you had to do was get there. So Jews in central Europe, and Poland and Germany, of course, saw that as an opportunity and they came across . . . Russia in the trains, and down . . . to Shanghai. And there were Jewish groups in Tientsin too. Or they came on ships.

And then the war started. And the Japanese herded them pretty much into an area in Shanghai called Hongkew, which, in fact they had already been living in. But they pretty much chased them out of other parts. Some of the Poles—Polish Jews—very tough people, I've been told, simply didn't bother to move. They just stayed put. But on the whole, most Jews were moved into Hongkew. The Germans tried very hard, I've been

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told, to persuade the Japanese to kill them. The Japanese wouldn't do it. Nor did the Japanese put them in concentration camps. Even if they had . . . even though they were white. They treated them differently from the English and the French and so on who were in the camps. And so the Jews survived the war. They were not directly persecuted by the Japanese. But they had to undergo great privations. And so they died. The elders died, and the children died, and so on. But on the whole, when the war ended and the Americans got to Shanghai in '46, or end of '45, on the whole, the Jewish community was well; healthy enough and fairly strong and beautifully organized. By being forced to live together, they had also developed—built upon their own cultural attitudes—schools, and hospitals and taking care of the elderly . . .

Q: OK. You were telling me about the Jewish organization.

STUTESMAN: Well, Charles Jordan was an American, I think born in Pennsylvania. And he was sent out to take charge of the relief effort of the private Jewish community—Jewish organization—which had the purpose of bringing hope to these people and also organization so that they could be sent off to Canada, the United States, Australia . . . Very, very few wanted to go back to Germany. Some did. And Charlie Jordan was just an extraordinary man. A person who was a patriotic American; never, never tried to sell us somebody that he knew was a bad apple. Never complained. Once a family—a man and his wife and three or four children stood before me, and I had the immigrant visas for them, but he had TB and I could not give him the visa and he and the family had to stand there and decide whether or not the mother and the children would leave, go to the United States and the man stay in Shanghai and take his chances. And I have never been party to a more agonizing kind of decision for a family to make, standing there. They made it. They did send the wife and children away. But I didn't get a phone call from the Jewish organization that afternoon saying “Well aren't you are a miserable creature!” Nothing. It was straight forward.

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And Charlie went on. Eventually he was killed by the Communists in Hungary. They took him out in a boat and drowned him in the river when he was trying to get some Jews out of there. But that community was very much diminished by the time the Communists came in. As far as I know, the Communists continued to let them leave if they had visas—as far as I know.

There was a Russian community, of course, left over from the czarist days and some of those people would come through our hands. But most of the girls had already left. Most of them had been picked up in '45 by the US Navy, including Admiral Zumwalt. And so there wasn't a big push in that.

And the Chinese—there were some, but mostly those were interested in business matters. And I don't think the Chinese business community was looking for havens in '48-'49. Maybe they were, but they were thinking more in terms of Hong Kong . . . or Taiwan, than they were in coming to the United States.

Well, that's an aside, perhaps, and they were not included in our emergency plans. I mean, we did not concern ourselves with people who were not Americans. Nor do I remember talking to Charlie Jordan about it. But basically the community had been diminished to a very small size. I doubt if there were ten thousand, if that, left by the time the Communists came in. Down from a hundred thousand, maybe; eighty or a hundred thousand, I don't know.

And there's one other thing I wanted to tell you about. Again, these are anecdotes, but I know that's what you are looking for. When the Navy pulled out, they simply left—on the docks, in the big storage depots—warehouses full of stuff, and equipment. They just took off. Obviously there was nothing else they could do. They couldn't sell it—they were gone. I mean, the Navy left, practically over night. I wouldn't say they didn't warn us they were leaving. Because they obviously must have. But it was a cut-and-run operation if I ever saw one. And so I went down. I was involved—I can't remember exactly how—but in order

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to protect the . . . [stores] . . . we hired two sets of guards. Now the Sikh guards that the British brought in before had been used, first by the British military and then by the British business people, as guards. And then, they had built themselves up as sort of the local security apparatus. Then the Japanese came in. And some of the Sikhs worked with the Japanese, and some did not. And so when the war ended, you had a split in that Sikh community. There were those who were considered to be traitors, having worked with the Japanese, and those who were not.

So we reached out and we set up two sets of guards. One on the inside of the compound and one on the outside of the compound. I couldn't tell you which was which. But the one side were the Sikhs who had been with the Japanese and one side were Sikhs who had been against the Japanese. So that cut down the possibility of the Sikhs on the inside throwing stuff over the wall to the Sikhs on the outside. Of course, that was not a problem for long because the Communists came in—how soon did they come in after the Navy left? Three weeks?

Q: Less than a month. . . . Yes. Right about three weeks. They come in on the 25th of May.

STUTESMAN: Then, my final story, final, I mean, without being asked a question, is how I left Shanghai—which I may have written you something about in a letter, but in any case. I had been there almost . . . two and a half years. And usually a post like that, after two years, you start thinking about getting your orders to return home, on vacation, on a holiday. Because the Congress, before the war, had discovered that, since American foreign service officers were not given paid vacations, they simply stayed where they were. So you had American foreign service officers who hadn't been home for twenty years. And its not at all surprising that many of them married foreign women. Congress didn't like this. And Roosevelt didn't like it. So a law was passed saying that after two years, a man, an officer, or an employee, must be given home leave—paid home leave—which means

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return to the United States. It could not be taken on route somewhere, or in the country. It had to be in the United States. You had to physically appear in the United States.

So, I was due for home leave. On the other hand, the Communists, by this time, had closed off everything—the railroads, the roads, ships, period. There we were. I came into the office, and here was a telegram for me. It was handed to me by the Personnel officer, and it said “Stutesman: home leave and return.” [laughter] So I took it to my chief—to Cabot. As I say, I was living in his residence. And I said, “Well, if you don't mind, I'd like to take a chance at the airport. The airport, as far as I know, is still not taken over by the Communists. And if an airplane lands, that's where it would land.” So he smiled, and . . . this man who had been my roommate, Gebhardt, had a car, and I persuaded him.

So, I packed a suitcase, and we went out to the airport. Lunghua was a great big airport. Big as Canada. And he and I walked in and it was empty! I mean, it was a very strange feeling. It was like one of these movies where you walk into a town and there was still cooking on the stove but there's nobody in the streets; nobody in the houses. And we walked around, and we took some fire from across the river. Rifle fire. And so Gebby said to me, “There's nobody here. Let's go home.” I said, “Let's wait.” And a small plane flew in; a two-engine plane. It was a CAT. And I knew the pilot, slightly—an American. I had partied with him. And I ran out and he was so surprised to see me. I said I had my orders and I can get out. I said “I'll lie down in the baggage compartment. . . . Can you get me out?” He said, “No, I can't. I'm loaded with treasures. I'm flying to Taipei (Taiwan).” (And, as you know, the Chinese moved the stuff out.) But, he said, there is a CNAC plane in the air, flying from Japan to Honk Kong, with its regular stop in Shanghai. But they don't plan to stop. But I'll reach them on the air and I'll tell them it's OK to land.” So he did. And he flew away. Then, after a while, here came this big, beautiful four-engine plane and it landed. And this guy and I, Gebby and I, pushed the little wheeled stairs out to the airplane, and I ran up, and there was a Chinese stewardess standing there, looking as

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pale as this paper, I mean, really scared. I said "I'll pay you when I get there." And I got to Shanghai and they interviewed me at the airport. . .

Q: You mean Hong Kong.

STUTESMAN: I mean in Hong Kong. And my name was on the airwaves here because some friends heard it in the news. I was not the last man of Shanghai, but I was the last man out of unoccupied Shanghai. This was in the morning around 10:30 and I think the Communists actually got to the Bund around noon that day, didn't they?

Q: On the 25th, do you think?

STUTESMAN: Whatever the day was. That was the day?

Q: Well, you were pretty lucky. I talked to a woman yesterday who was in Shanghai before the war—Helen Lyons—

STUTESMAN: Oh, I know Helen.

Q: . . . She was in the visa section. And she got out in 1942, only because she had just joined the consular staff in October of '41. Otherwise she might have been interned the whole war.

STUTESMAN: . . . As a bachelor, they would have kept me there until the end. So I would have stayed there as long as Bill Orchard and probably would have ended up marrying somebody there. Anyhow, my life would have ended up taking quite a different turn. Or, I could have had what happened to Bill Olive, who knows. But in any case.

Q: Did you know him?

STUTESMAN: Very well.

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Q: Was that one of his early assignments?

STUTESMAN: I don't know what he did in the war. I think, perhaps he was a staff officer during the war. But he was in Shanghai when I arrived. Dealing with the maritime problems. His office was literally ten feet from mine. And Shanghai in '46 was a wild port, just filled with ships. These American merchant marines were very, very tough; very difficult. And Bill—and I think this was one reason why he was broken so quickly—Bill stood up to these men with the power of law. He was the vice-consul representing law—the whole United States government—and he took his strength from that. And he was very, very effective and I've seen him stand up to these brutal sailors who were three feet taller than he was, it seemed, and never flinched. Very, very strong, fine man. And he married a girl there. Nice girl, can't think of her name.

Anyhow, I was gone when this thing happened to him and, as I think I wrote to you I was very distressed to learn about it and to realize that Dean Acheson, and others, had felt that the American people would be too easily shocked, or whatever his reasoning was, but he didn't want to tell the American people what had happened. I'm sure it was part of the policy of “Well, we're going to be able to get along with those people out there any how, and let's not treat this as a bad, damaging thing and certainly let's not excite the American people.” Which was Acheson. Acheson was not, in my opinion, a good secretary of state. He did some good things, but I think he had a very arrogant attitude toward everybody. Particularly toward the American people. So, when our men were captured in Korea, and so quickly brainwashed, it came as a terrible shock to the American people. The Chinese had done it to Bill Olive in a day and a half, or something like that. And I think the reason they succeeded, primarily, was they stripped them of his protective strength. And told him they didn't care if he was representing the United States government. All they wanted him to do was get on his knees and beg for mercy.—Bastards!

Q: Yeah, they treated him pretty badly.

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You didn't know a man John Tobin? . . . He was one of the very last Americans. Evidently hired by McConaughy to sort of look after American property after the consulate closed in the spring of 1950. He was a retired Navy guy.

STUTESMAN: Well, that is not the man who was representing the American community that I was telling you about, the elderly man. But, Tobin, no, I don't remember.

Q: "Home leave and return." Did anybody believe that American consular officers might be going back?

STUTESMAN: No. It was a routine personnel action. What it was, was, my name came up on the machine and they sent me my orders. Who ever did it probably was hardly aware that China was having a difficult time. It was certainly not a policy matter.

Q: OK. So it sounds like there is a significant change that occurs at some point in the spring. In December of '48, when you were talking to Americans, the line, the impression; the sentiment, was that you might have to back away from the crossfire for a while, but then Americans would be able to return. But when you got orders that said leave and return, in May, that was something to laugh at.

STUTESMAN: Oh, no, there was absolutely no policy. This was simply somebody in personnel that was writing his day's work and so here's Stutesman in Shanghai—yeah he's ok so . . . home leave and return.

Q: But my point is that by that time it was clear to you that you wouldn't be returning. Can you pinpoint when that change in attitude occurred? Because if you had gotten those orders in December, you might not have laughed to see "Leave and return."

STUTESMAN: Oh, that's right. Yes. That's a very good point. Yes, I never thought of it that way. And in fact I would have taken leave and returned. I would have gotten back sometime in March with another two years ahead of us. . . .When the Communists got

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down to the Yangtze, quite apart from beating up on the Amethyst,... there was mighty little expectation that Chiang would be able to split China and hold it across the center; the waist of China and hold the south. There may have been some discussion of it, but I don't think anybody was really rather serious . . . I've heard people discuss the possibility of having divided China the way North Korea and South Korea were divided. . . . Years later, I'm talking about. . . . I have never been persuaded that it would have worked. I don't think the Communists would have taken half a loaf and I don't think Chiang Kai-shek could have held his half. . . .

Q: Well you probably weren't even thinking in those terms even in December, because evacuation was predicated on the assumption that there would be fighting in Shanghai...

STUTESMAN: And that the Communists would take over.

Q: And that the Communists would take over. So if you were going to return . . .

STUTESMAN: Well, when I say that the Communists would take over, you know, you are asking me to remember impressions [from] a long time ago. But, I would say that when Badger was talking to us about “Well, just get out of the line of fire,” it was not an absolute assumption that the Communists were going to win. It was, uh, “They are going to have some fighting around here.” But, after all, we were still pumping in both military aid and other aid. But, what they were thinking at the Embassy, I honestly don't know.

I used to go up to the Embassy, but mostly to see friends. I used to go shoot up there. I had a shotgun. Deer, little small deer—I'd shoot outside of Nanking. And then, actually in Shanghai, I'd . . . take my gun on a Sunday and get on a tram car and just ride the tram car to the end of the line and walk out into the fields and shoot pheasant. It was a halcyon life! [laughter] . . . Halcyon days.

Well, I know you want me to give you more data on major policy decisions and here I am dreaming about good days in my youth! [laughter]

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Q: *That's a part of the picture; a very interesting part of the picture.*

End of interview