

EFFECT OF DIFFERENT METHODS OF CAMPAIGNING SHOWN IN THE CONDITION OF RETURNING TROOPS.



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1ST WISCONSIN VOL
CANTO WIS.

One of Miles's Porto Rican Soldiers.



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Type of Shafter's Returning Cuban Soldier.

yond that of any of the political ephemera at Washington. At the crack of his whip they jump. At his accusing and scornful glance they lose color and stammer.

A man has arrived.

MILES TO THE JOURNAL ON THE CONTROVERSY.

A Special Interview.

"I SHALL NEITHER OPPOSE NOR COURT AN OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION BUT I STAND READY TO ANSWER FOR MY PART IN THE CONDUCT OF THIS WAR."

General Nelson A. Miles said this yesterday as he sat before a small desk in room No. 654, at the Waldorf-Astoria. He had just arrived from Porto Rico. In appearance he was not the Miles who left the United States for Cuba last June. His face is bronzed and drawn into hard lines by exposure and by the climatic hardships of a West Indian Summer. His fine gray mustache is gone. In its place is a stubble growth, adding a certain vigor to the already strong mouth. He looks more than ever the fighter that he is.

In front of him was an avalanche of unopened letters, some in the square envelopes of social correspondence, but most of them in portentous, heavily stamped coverings of official communications. It was a tempting sight to eyes that had not seen land for a week, but with that considerate democracy which marks the man he was receiving all callers and answering as many of the innumerable questions fired at him as good taste and good judgment would permit.

True Democratic Simplicity.

His return was characterized throughout by modesty. No orderlies or members of his staff surrounded him. Any caller, however humble, could approach him with the assurance of a courteous and disinterested reception. He wore a simple fatigue uniform, the blouse held by one button at the throat. Two unadorned stars on the collar alone told that he was the Major-General commanding the army of the United States.

In what he said to the Journal, while the language was of itself entirely respectful, there are serious reflections made against those who interfered with General Miles's conduct of the military operations during the war.

Naturally the first question put to him referred to the authenticity of an interview called to the Kansas City Star, from Ponce, Porto Rico, on August 29, by J. D. Whelpley, the special correspondent of that paper.

The interview in question created a profound sensation. No one who had an intimate knowledge of the situation doubted its genuineness in the main. The rapid extension of the power of President McKinley's personal friend, H. C. Corbin, to the impairment of General Miles's authority and consequent usefulness, the promotion of Corbin from Adjutant-General to Major-General meant much to those who follow army affairs.

It was ascribed by General Miles's friends to politics. They believed that the same motive which prompted the shelving of such men as Fitzhugh Lee and the performance of Shafter were striking still higher at the hard-earned command of Nelson A. Miles.

Porto Rico Interview Mostly Correct.

The correspondent who called this interview to the United States was known to be on terms of cordial acquaintance with General Miles.

Mr. Whelpley is a man of mature years, a wide traveler and especially well posted upon army affairs. He has been through more than one Western campaign. He is the author of a series of able articles upon the trade relations of Mexico and the Central American Countries with the West. He is a writer of the most conservative type, and that he knew what he was about when he wrote the Miles interview was amply demonstrated upon his arrival in New York from Porto Rico, when he was able to give out the text of official correspondence between General Miles and the department completely bearing out what he had called. On the subject of this interview General Miles said to the Journal:

"YES, I GAVE MR. WHELPLEY AN INTERVIEW. I DID NOT SEE WHAT WAS CALLED, HOWEVER, UNTIL THE PAPERS CONTAINING IT WERE BROUGHT ON BOARD THE OGDAM THIS MORNING BY THE JOURNAL'S SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT. HE WAKED ME UP AT A VERY EARLY HOUR, BY THE WAY," HE ADDED WITH A LAUGH.

"OVER THE INTERVIEW," GENERAL MILES CONTINUED, "I AM NOT CONCERNED AT ALL. CAREFULLY. I WILL ONLY SAY NOW THAT IN SOME OF THE DETAILS, WHILE IN OTHERS IT IS NOT ENTIRELY ACCURATE. I AM NOT AT ALL CONCERNED. I HAVE NO TIME TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT FURTHER. NO, I DO NOT CARE TO

point out at this time the passages in the interview which impress me as not being entirely correct. I cannot see why I should do so at this time."

"Before war was declared," General Miles went on, "the cry in the newspapers and all over the country was, 'On to Havana.' I realized, and so told the War Department that, with the army in no condition to be moved, it would be a serious blunder to plunge into a mid-summer campaign against the Cuban capital. The men were not prepared for it, they were not properly clothed or armed. All of the ammunition factories working over time could not supply the necessary amount of munitions.

"I urged that Porto Rico be seized and used as a base of operations. That could be made a proving ground, as it were. The climate there is not so severe as that in Cuba. The volunteers and recruits could be seasoned in that island for the more serious work in Cuba. In the meantime we could have armed the insurgents and rendered them assistance in harassing the Spaniards. I was for accomplishing results with the least possible loss of life.

"But then you know Cervera's fleet was bottled up in Santiago harbor. Then there was a cry from the navy for troops. It was insisted that an army must be sent to surround the city of Santiago. General Shafter was selected to take command of a small force and go to that part of Cuba. His force was augmented. It increased until he was at the head of an army.

"WHILE I WAS AT TAMPA, ORGANIZING THE EXPEDITION, ITS IMPORTANCE BECAME APPARENT TO ME. I REQUESTED PERMISSION TO ACCOMPANY IT, OR TO ORGANIZE ANOTHER ONE.

"IN RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST I WAS EMPOWERED, BY VIRTUE OF A COMMUNICATION FROM SECRETARY OF WAR ALGER, TO ORGANIZE A SECOND EXPEDITION, TO BE COMMANDED BY GENERAL BROOKE AND TO CONSIST OF THREE DIVISIONS. IT WAS EXPLICITLY STATED THAT THIS EXPEDITION WAS TO BE ORGANIZED FOR THE CUBAN AND PORTO RICAN CAMPAIGN. THE COMMUNICATION ALSO CONVEYED TO ME THE INFORMATION THAT I WAS TO HAVE ABSOLUTE AND SOLE COMMAND OVER BOTH EXPEDITIONS. THE DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION WAS JUNE 28.

"Calls for troops from Santiago delayed the equipment of this expedition. As is already known, General Shafter did not find the campaign as easy as he had expected it would be, and on July 3 he telegraphed that he was considering the advisability of falling back. I telegraphed him immediately that I would join him in eight days with soldiers. He replied that he was glad of it. On July 11 I reached Santiago.

Will Not Submit to Being Robbed.

"General Shafter sent word to the Spanish commander that the commander in chief of the United States army was in the field and asked for a conference. We had a conference on July 13, General Shafter doing the direct talking, through an interpreter, to General Toral. The Spanish General said that he wanted time to communicate with Madrid. I, through General Shafter and the interpreter, told him that he had time enough, pointed out to him the futility of further resistance, and gave him sunlight on the following morning to surrender. He begged for longer time and I extended it to noon.

"ON THE DAY OF THIS CONFERENCE, AFTER RETURNING TO CAMP, I RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR AUTHORIZING ME TO ACCEPT THE SURRENDER OF GENERAL TORAL. I WAS GIVEN THE WIDEST DISCRETION. I ARRANGED ALL THE TERMS OF SURRENDER, AND WHEN I WAS SATISFIED THAT GENERAL TORAL WAS WILLING TO GIVE UP I WENT AWAY AND ALLOWED GENERAL SHAFTER TO ACCEPT THE SURRENDER.

"I HAVE BEEN WILLING TO GIVE GENERAL SHAFTER ALL OF THE CREDIT, BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE IN BEING ROBBED." "By this do you mean?" he was asked, "that credit was not given you in the dispatches as given out by the War Department?" This question General Miles refused to answer.

"THREE DAYS LATER, WHILE I WAS AT GUANTANAMO, I LEARNED THAT ADJUTANT-GENERAL CORBIN HAD SENT GENERAL SHAFTER A DISPATCH DATED JULY 10, THREE DAYS AFTER I LEFT WASHINGTON, TELLING HIM THAT I HAD BEEN SENT TO SANTIAGO WITH ORDERS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH HIM. I NEVER RECEIVED SUCH ORDERS. TALK ALONG THE LINE THAT I WAS SENT TO SANTIAGO TO SUPERSEDE GENERAL SHAFTER IS RUBBISH. DOES YOUR EDITOR SUPERSEDE YOU WHEN HE TAKES CHARGE OF YOUR WORK? DOES SECRETARY ALGER SUPERSEDE GENERAL SHAFTER WHEN HE GOES TO WIKOFF AND THEY FIRE A SULLUTE OF GUNS IN HIS HONOR? DOES THE CHIEF SUPERSEDE THE SUB-CHIEF?"

"I was in command of the army by virtue of my office, and in every way in my power I assisted General Shafter.

Hindered by the Department.

"When we started on the Porto Rican campaign it had been planned to make the attack on the northern coast. The entire Spanish nation knew all about it. We went to the northern coast and the lighters we had been told would be there to meet us were not there. Then we made the attack on the southern coast and captured Porto Rico and seventy lighters—seven, I believe, in one port and sixty-three in another. General Brooke is still there."

"Whom do you hold responsible for the absence of the lighters?" "All I know is," replied the General, "that the lighters were not there." "It has been stated that you will ask for a Court of Inquiry?" "I have no such intention."

"Just what is your attitude?" "I DO NOT COURT A CONTROVERSY NOR INVITE AN ARGUMENT. I HAVE NO CHARGES TO MAKE. MY OFFICIAL REPORTS WILL TELL ALL I DESIRE TO HAVE MADE PUBLIC. I DON'T WANT TO FIGHT UNLESS I HAVE TO."

"WAS IT NOT LIKELY THAT THE DISPATCH OF ADJUTANT-GENERAL CORBIN TO GENERAL SHAFTER MIGHT CAUSE THE GRAVEST MISUNDERSTANDING AND CONFUSION?" "YES, IT MIGHT EASILY HAVE DONE SO. GENERAL SHAFTER MIGHT HAVE BEEN IMPELLED BY IT TO DISREGARD MY ORDERS AT A VERY CRITICAL TIME."

"Is it true that you requested permission to be allowed to parade in New York with the troop on this transport?" "Positively no. I made no such request, although I should have been pleased had the boys from the West been given an opportunity to see something of New York. It was my suggestion that they be camped about here somewhere for a few weeks in order to get them their pay and some clothes. None of them has been paid for three months, and the officers have not money enough to pay for their meals on this boat. They are disgracefully ragged, and I do not like to see them sent home with tattered clothes after brave service in the army, but it seems that it cannot be helped."

MILES EXPLAINS HIS FULL COURSE.

Efforts to Have the War Conducted Wisely—Generosity to Shafter—Duplicity at Washington—Hindered at Porto Rico.

The following statement was given to the press yesterday by General Miles in his cabin on the Ogdam. It purports to be written by a third person, as an interview with the General. In reply to a question, General Miles said: "You may make it an interview coming from me."

"IN THE first place, let me say that the war has closed after being conducted largely as I stated publicly at the beginning of the war that it would be. The statement was publicly made, and a general order was issued by me as Commander of the American army, in which the plan that I have striven to pursue was foreshadowed—namely, seeking to accomplish results with the least possible loss of life. In an interview in the latter part of May, I said:

"The United States Government is too strong, too great and too powerful to commit any foolish act in connection with the proposed invasion of Cuba."

"Referring to the proposed rush to the fever-stricken city of Havana, I said: "No officer is fit to command troops who, from any motive whatever, would needlessly risk the life of a single soldier, either from disease or the bullets of the enemy. I have never sacrificed the lives of men under my command, and I do not propose to subject them to any unnecessary risks in the present campaign."

Opposed to a Wild Scramble.

"In the order issued to the army at an early date, I directed that: "Every officer, of whatever grade, will, so far as may be in his power, guard and preserve the health and welfare of those under his charge. He must labor diligently and zealously to perfect himself and his subordinates in military drill, instruction and discipline, and, above all, he must constantly endeavor by precept and example to maintain the highest character, to foster and stimulate that true soldierly spirit and patriotic devotion to duty which must characterize an effective army."

"The principles thus enunciated have been zealously observed from the first. Owing to the fact that the season suited for campaigning in Cuba had been exhausted in debates and delay in Congress and in necessary preparations, I was opposed to rushing an ill-prepared, undisciplined and unequipped army in a movement against the capital of Cuba, defended by 100,000 trained Spanish troops, and in this position I stood practically alone for several weeks.

"Havana, Matanzas, Santiago and a few other points were down on my military map as hotbeds of disease, destructive to an army and places to be avoided, especially during the sickly season.

What Miles Planned.

"When finally called upon to submit a plan of campaign, I did so, and put it in writing. In substance I took the stand, first, that every effort should be made to equip the Cubans and thereby enable them to harass the Spanish forces. The cry of 'On to Havana!' should be encouraged, but when the transports, loaded with troops, were out of sight of land they should sail as straight as steam power could bear them to the gate of the Antilles and the key of the whole position—Porto Rico.

"Then, having seized and occupied that island, a movement to Cuba was to follow by means of a strong cavalry force, which was to be organized and equipped by August or September.

"I contemplated that with 20,000 cavalry thrown to the centre of Cuba, cutting the Spanish forces in two, and moving west to Havana, by the time the rainy season was over and it would be possible to manoeuvre an army, we could move against that city a well organized, well equipped and well disciplined army and complete the capture of the Spanish forces.

Wished to Go to Santiago.

"The enclosing of Cervera's fleet in the harbor of Santiago changed the conditions and made it necessary to move a military force to that point at once. While at Tampa organizing the expedition I felt the importance of the enterprise so greatly that I requested permission to accompany that expedition or to immediately organize another to join it.

"This permission was not granted so far as accompanying the expedition was concerned, but authority was granted to equip a second force for movement and operation against the enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico." However, before this expedition was equipped, calls were made for additional forces to go to Santiago, and they were immediately forwarded.

"On the third day of July General Shafter telegraphed that his losses had been greatly underestimated; that he met with stronger resistance than he had anticipated; that he was seriously considering the advisability of falling back to a position five miles to the rear, and that he had been unable to be up during the heat for four days.

"Under such circumstances I telegraphed General Shafter that I would be with him in a week with strong reinforcements, of course taking the troops prepared for the second expedition, which had been ordered by the President to operate against the enemy in Cuba, as well as in Porto Rico. These reinforcements were pushed rapidly forward, and some of them arrived in advance of myself and were put in position in the trenches around Santiago.

In Full Command at Santiago.

"Under verbal instructions of the President, I deemed my presence was required, and that I should give such directions as in my opinion were best for the army and for the Government.

"These were the circumstances under which I left Washington, arriving at Santiago, July 11, not as a private individual, nor as a visitor.

"Any pretence that I went there disrobed of my authority or official capacity is too childish to be considered by sensible men. From the moment I arrived at Santiago I was responsible for what might occur.

"I arrived there with the Yale, Columbia and Rita, loaded with infantry, and three ships loaded with artillery, besides those already disembarked. I designed to disembark the troops and artillery named on the west side of Santiago, as was understood before leaving Washington, and before we went ashore I made the necessary arrangements accordingly.

His Authority Recognized.

"I then proceeded to the front, and after consulting with General Shafter, a note was sent to the Spanish commander by General Shafter, saying that the Commanding General of the United States Army had arrived in his camp with strong reinforcements, and would meet him between the lines at any hour agreeable to him. The reply of the Spanish commander was that he would meet me at 12 o'clock next morning.

"The meeting was held, and after some conversation between General Shafter and General Toral, I frankly informed the Spanish General that I had left Washington six days before, and that it was then the determination of the Government that this portion of the Spanish army must be captured or destroyed.

"I also informed the Spanish general that my reinforcements had already arrived with me; that some of those forces had already disembarked, and the remainder would be disembarked on the west side of the harbor, and that it would be useless for him to contend against the inevitable. These transports could also be plainly seen by the Spanish from Morro Castle and other points.

"General Toral replied that so long as he had rations and ammunition he had to fight in order to maintain the honor of the Spanish arms. In response he was informed that he had already maintained the honor of the Spanish arms, and that further efforts would be useless and would result in the wanton sacrifice of human life.

Alger's Telegraphic Admission.

"He then said that he was waiting to hear from his Government, and was informed by me that he had already taken much time for that purpose and would be given until daylight of the following morning, it being then 3 o'clock, to submit his final answer.

"He begged for longer time, and earnestly requested until 12 o'clock next day. This was finally granted, the meeting dissolved and the officers separated.

"On returning from this conference a dispatch was received from Washington, as follows: "Washington, July 13, 1898.—Major-General Miles: You may accept surrender by granting parole to officers and men, the officers re-

Continued on Third Page.